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Abstract: The understanding of decision-making systems has come together in recent years to form a unified theory of decision-making
in the mammalian brain as arising from multiple, interacting systems (a planning system, a habit system, and a situation-recognition
system). This unified decision-making system has multiple potential access points through which it can be driven to make
maladaptive choices, particularly choices that entail seeking of certain drugs or behaviors. We identify 10 key vulnerabilities in the
system: (1) moving away from homeostasis, (2) changing allostatic set points, (3) euphorigenic “reward-like” signals, (4)
overvaluation in the planning system, (5) incorrect search of situation-action-outcome relationships, (6) misclassification of
situations, (7) overvaluation in the habit system, (8) a mismatch in the balance of the two decision systems, (9) over-fast discounting
processes, and (10) changed learning rates. These vulnerabilities provide a taxonomy of potential problems with decision-making
systems. Although each vulnerability can drive an agent to return to the addictive choice, each vulnerability also implies a
characteristic symptomology. Different drugs, different behaviors, and different individuals are likely to access different
vulnerabilities. This has implications for an individual’s susceptibility to addiction and the transition to addiction, for the potential
for relapse, and for the potential for treatment.
Keywords: Addiction; decision making; dopamine; frontal cortex; gambling; hippocampus; striatum
1. Introduction
Addiction can be operationally defined as the continued
making of maladaptive choices, even in the face of the
explicitly stated desire to make a different choice (see
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
[DSM-IV-TR], American Psychiatric Association 2000;
International Classification of Diseases [ICD-10], World
Health Organization 1992). In particular, addicts continue
to pursue drugs or other maladaptive behaviors despite
terrible consequences (Altman et al. 1996; Goldstein
2000; Koob & LeMoal 2006; Lowinson et al. 1997). Addic-
tive drugs have been hypothesized to drive maladaptive
decision-making through pharmacological interactions
with neurophysiological mechanisms evolved for normal
learning systems (Berke 2003; Everitt et al. 2001;
Hyman 2005; Kelley 2004a; Lowinson et al. 1997;
Redish 2004). Addictive behaviors have been hypoth-
esized to drive maladaptive decision-making through
interactions between normal learning systems and the
reward distribution of certain behaviors (Custer 1984;
Dickerson & O’Connor 2006; Dowling et al. 2005; Parke &
Griffiths 2004; Redish et al. 2007; Wagenaar 1988).
However, how those interactions drive maladaptive
decision-making remains a key, unanswered question.
Over the last 30 years, a number of theories have been
proposed attempting to explain why an agent might con-
tinue to seek a drug or maladaptive behavior. These the-
ories can be grouped into the following primary
categories: (1) opponent processes, based on changes in
homeostatic and allostatic levels that change the needs
of the agent (Becker & Murphy 1988; Koob & Le Moal
1997; 2001; 2005; 2006; Solomon & Corbit 1973; 1974);
(2) reward-based processes and hedonic components,
based on pharmacological access to hedonically positive
signals in the brain (Kalivas & Volkow 2005; Volkow
et al. 2003; 2004; Wise 2004); (3) incentive salience,
based on a sensitization of motivational signals in the
brain (Berridge & Robinson 1998; 2003; Robinson & Ber-
ridge 1993; 2001; 2003; 2004); (4) non-compensable dopa-
mine, based on a role of dopamine as signaling an error in
the prediction of the value of taking an action, leading to
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an overvaluation of drug-seeking (Bernheim & Rangel
2004; Di Chiara 1999; Redish 2004); (5) impulsivity, in
which users make rash choices, without taking into
account later costs (Ainslie 1992; 2001; Ainslie & Monter-
osso 2004; Bickel & Marsch 2001; Giordano et al. 2002;
Odum et al. 2002); (6) situation recognition and categoriz-
ation, based on a misclassification of situations that
produce both gains and losses (Custer 1984; Griffiths
1994; Langer & Roth 1975; Redish et al. 2007; Wagenaar
1988); and (7) deficiencies in the balance between executive
and habit systems, in which it becomes particularly
difficult to break habits through cognitive mechanisms
either through over-performance of the habit system
(Robbins & Everitt 1999; Tiffany 1990) or under-perform-
ance of flexible, executive, inhibitory systems (Gray &
McNaughton 2000; Jentsch & Taylor 1999; Lubman
et al. 2004) or a change in the balance between them
(Bechara 2005; Bickel et al. 2007; Everitt et al. 2001;
Everitt & Wolf 2002). (See Table 1.)
Although each of these theories has been attacked as
incomplete and unable to explain all of the addiction
data, the theories are not incompatible with each other.
We argue, instead, that each theory explains a different
vulnerability in the decision-process system, capable of
driving the agent to make an addictive choice. Thus, the
set of theories provides a constellation of potential
causes for addictive choice behavior. Each different drug
of abuse or maladaptive behavior is likely to access a
subset of that constellation of potential dysfunction. Indi-
vidual differences are likely to define the importance of
each vulnerability for an individual’s dysfunction. Success-
ful treatment depends on treating those vulnerabilities
that are driving the individual’s choice. The identification
of addiction as vulnerabilities in the biological decision-
making system means that understanding addiction will
require an understanding of how animals (including
humans) make decisions.
The understanding of decision processes has come
together in recent years to form a unified theory of
decision-making arising from multiple interacting systems
(Cohen & Squire 1980; Daw et al. 2005; Dickinson 1980;
1985; Nadel 1994; O’Keefe & Nadel 1978; Packard &
McGaugh 1996; Redish 1999; Squire 1987). Briefly, a
decision can arise from a flexible planning system capable
of the consideration of consequences or from a less flexible
habit system in which actions are associated with situations
(Daw et al. 2005; Redish & Johnson 2007). Behavioral
control can be transferred from one system to the other
depending on the statistics of behavioral training (Balleine
& Dickinson 1998; Colwill & Rescorla 1990; Killcross &
Coutureau 2003; Packard & McGaugh 1996). Both
systems also require a recognition of the situation in
which the agent finds itself (Daw et al. 2006; Redish et al.
2007; Redish & Johnson 2007). These processes provide
multiple access points and vulnerabilities through which
the decision process can be driven to make maladaptive
choices.
2. Scope of the work
Addiction is a complex phenomenon, with causes that can
be identified from many perspectives (Volkow & Li 2005a;
West 2001), including social (Davis & Tunks 1991),
environmental (DeFeudis 1978; Dickerson & O’Connor
2006; Maddahian et al. 1986; Morgan et al. 2002), legal
(Dickerson & O’Connor 2006; Kleber et al., 1997;
MacCoun 1993), as well as psychological and neurobiolo-
gical (Goldman et al. 1987; 1999; Heyman 1996; 2000;
Koob & Le Moal 2006; Redish 2004; Robinson 2004;
Robinson & Berridge 2003; Tiffany 1990), economic
(Ainslie 1992; 2001; Becker & Murphy 1988; Bernheim
& Rangel 2004; Hursh 1991; Hursh et al. 2005), and
genetic (Crabbe 2002; Goldman et al. 2005; Hiroi & Agat-
suma 2005) perspectives. All of these perspectives have
explanatory power as to the causes of addiction, and all
of them provide suggested methods of treatment of addic-
tion. However, a thorough treatment of addiction from
all of these perspectives is beyond the scope of a paper
such as this one. In this target article, we address an exp-
lanation for addictive decisions based on animal learning
theory, the neuroscience of learning and memory, human
decision-making, and neuroeconomics, which we argue
have converged on a unified theory of decision-making
as arising from an interaction between two learning
systems (a quickly learned, flexible, but computationally
expensive-to-execute planning system and a slowly learned,
inflexible, but computationally inexpensive-to-execute
habit system).
2.1. Our goals
The goal of this target article is to lay out a novel expla-
nation for addiction as “vulnerabilities” in an established
decision-making system. Although many of the vulnerabil-
ities that we describe can be identified closely with current
theories of addiction (see, e.g., Table 5), those theories
have generally arisen from explanations of specific exper-
iments and have all been attacked as incomplete. Our
article is the first to identify them as “failure points” in a
unified decision-making system. This theory has impli-
cations for the taxonomy of addiction, both drug-related
and behavioral, as well as implications for prevention
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and treatment. These implications are addressed at the
end of the article.
Although we do not directly address the social, environ-
mental, or policy-level theories, we believe that our pro-
posed framework will have implications for these
viewpoints on addiction. For example, changes in drug
price, taxes, legality, and level of policing can change the
costs required to reach the addictive substance or behavior
(Becker et al. 1994; Grossman & Chaloupka 1998; Liu
et al. 1999). The presence of casinos can provide cues trig-
gering learned associations (Dickerson & O’Connor 2006).
Acceptability of use and punishments for use will affect the
relationship between rewards and costs (Goldman et al.
1987; 1999). Genetics will shape the person’s vulnerabil-
ities to the potential failure points noted further on and
will have to be an important part of the individual’s treat-
ment plan (Goldman et al. 2005; Hiroi & Agatsuma 2005).
Before proceeding to the implications of this theory, we
first need to lay out the unified model of the decision-
making system (sect. 3). As we go through the components
of this system, we point out the identifiable vulnerabilities
as they arise. In section 4, we then return to each identified
vulnerability in turn and discuss the interactions between
that vulnerability and specific drugs and problematic
behaviors. In section 5, we discuss the implications of
this theory for individual susceptibility to addiction, for
multiple pathways to relapse, and for the necessity of
making available multiple appropriately guided treatment
regimens. In section 6, we turn to social, political, and
clinical implications, lay out open questions, and suggest
future directions for addiction research. Finally, we
include an appendix reviewing the known effects of six
drugs and problematic behaviors, discussed in the light
of the vulnerabilities identified in this article (A: cocaine;
B: opiates; C: nicotine; D: alcohol; E: caffeine; and
F: gambling).
3. Making decisions
Theories of how animals make decisions have been devel-
oped over the last 50 years in the fields of economics
(Ainslie 1992, 2001; Becker & Murphy 1988; Bernheim &
Rangel 2004; Bickel & Marsch 2001; Glimcher &
Rustichini 2004; Petry & Bickel 1998), psychology and
neuroscience (Daw 2003; Glimcher 2003; Hastie 2001;
Herrnstein 1997; Heyman 1996; Kahneman et al. 1982;
Kahneman & Tversky 2000; Sanfey et al. 2006; Slovic
et al. 1977), and machine learning (Sutton & Barto 1998).
These literatures have converged on the concept that
decisions are based on the prediction of value or expected
utility of the decision.1 These terms can be defined as the
total, expected, future reward, taking into account the prob-
ability of receiving the reward and any delay before the
reward is received. In these analyses, costs are typically
included as negative rewards, but they can also be included
separately in some formulations. If the agent can correctly
predict the value (total discounted2 reward minus total
expected cost) of its actions, then it can make appropriate
decisions about which actions to take. The theories of addic-
tion that have been proposed (Table 1) all have the effect of
changing the prediction of value or cost in ways that make
the agent continue to repeatedly return to seeking of the
addictive drug or maladaptive behavior.
There are two potential methods from which one can
derive the value of taking some action (Bernheim &
Rangel 2004; Daw et al. 2005; Redish & Johnson 2007;
Sutton & Barto 1998): forward-search and caching. In
the first case (forward-search), one considers the possible
consequences of one’s actions – the agent realizes that if it
takes this action in this situation, this will occur, and it will
get this reward, but if it does something else, there will be
different consequences, and it will get a different reward.
In the other case (caching), the agent has learned to associ-
ate a specific action with a given situation – over time, the
agent has learned that the best thing to do in this situation
is to take this action. The forward-search system takes time
to execute (because one has to mentally trace down poss-
ible paths), but is very flexible. That flexibility means that it
is safe to learn quickly. Learning potential consequences
of one’s actions does not commit one to an action; rather
it opens the possibility of considering the consequences
of an action before selecting that action. In contrast, the
caching system is very fast to execute (because one
simply has to retrieve the best action for a given situation),
but is very rigid. That inflexibility means that it would be
dangerous to learn the stimulus-action relationships
stored in the habit system too quickly.
Table 1. Theories of addiction
Opponent processes Changes in allostatic and homeostatic needs a
Hedonic processes Pharmacological access to hedonically positive signals b
Incentive salience Sensitization of motivational signals c
Noncompensable DA Leading to an overvaluation of drug-seeking d
Impulsivity Overemphasis on a buy-now, pay-later strategy e
Illusion of control Misclassification of wins and losses f
Shifting balances Development of habits over flexible systems g
Related References:
a. Solomon and Corbit (1973; 1974); Koob and Le Moal (1997; 2001; 2005; 2006).
b. Kalivas and Volkow (2005); Volkow et al. (2003, 2004); Wise (2004).
c. Berridge and Robinson (1998; 2003); Robinson and Berridge (1993; 2001; 2003; 2004).
d. Bernheim and Rangel (2004); Di Chiara (1999); Redish (2004).
e. Ainslie (1992; 2001); Ainslie and Monterosso (2004); Bickel and Marsch (2001); Reynolds (2006).
f. Custer (1984); Griffiths (1994); Langer and Roth (1975); Redish et al. (2007); Wagenaar (1988).
g. Everitt and Wolf (2002); Everitt et al. (2001); Nelson and Killcross (2006); Robbins and Everitt (1999).
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This dichotomy can be related to the question of when to
stop a search process (Nilsson et al. 1987; Simon 1955).
Incomplete search processes may be available in which
temporarily cached values are accessed to cut off parts of
the search tree, similar to heuristic search processes
studied in the classic artificial intelligence literature
(Nilsson et al. 1987; Rich & Knight 1991; Russell &
Norvig 2002). Similarly, one can imagine that only some
of the potential paths are searched in any decision.
Finding an optimal solution takes time, and there is a
tradeoff between search time and the optimality of the sol-
ution found (Simon 1955). From an evolutionary perspec-
tive, a quickly found, acceptable solution may be more
efficient than a slowly found optimal solution (Gigerenzer
2001; Gigerenzer & Goldstein 1996; Simon 1955). A true
caching system, however, does not entail a search process
and should not be considered to be equivalent to a single
step of the search process (Daw et al. 2005; Gigerenzer
2001). A single step of the search process would identify
the consequence of that step, allowing changes in that con-
sequence to change performance without relearning. In
contrast, the caching system compares a stored value with
an action taken in a given situation and does not identify
the consequence during performance, which means that
it cannot change its reactions to changes in the value of
that consequence. This distinction can be seen in the deva-
luation literature, discussed further on.
A number of literatures have converged on a division
between learning systems that match these two systems.
In the animal navigation literature, these two systems are
referred to as the cognitive map and route systems,3
respectively (O’Keefe & Nadel 1978; Redish 1999). In
the animal learning-theory literature, these systems can
be identified as three separate systems, a Pavlovian learn-
ing system (situation-outcome, S!(a) O), an instrumental
learning system (action-outcome, !a O), and a habit
learning system (S!a ).4
They have also been referred to as cognitive and habit
learning systems (Mishkin & Appenzeller 1987; Poldrack
& Packard 2003; Saint-Cyr et al. 1988; Yin & Knowlton
2006), and match closely the distinction made between
declarative and procedural learning (Cohen & Eichen-
baum 1993; Cohen & Squire 1980; Redish 1999; Squire
1987; Squire et al. 1984) and between explicit and implicit
learning systems (Clark & Squire 1998; Curran 1995;
Doyon et al. 1998; Ferraro et al. 1993; Forkstam & Peters-
son 2005; Knopman & Nissen 1987; 1991; Nissen et al.
1987; Willingham et al. 1989), as well as between con-
trolled and automatic processing theories (Kahneman &
Frederick 2002; Schneider & Chein 2003; Schneider &
Shiffrin 1977). We argue that these diverse literatures
have converged on a pair of decision-making systems,
which can be understood as (1) a flexible, cognitive, plan-
ning system and (2) a rigid, automatic, habit-based system.
This dichotomy is related to the historical debate on
“expectancies” in the classic animal learning theory litera-
ture (Bolles 1972; Hull 1943; 1952; Munn 1950; Tolman
1938; 1939; 1948). Tolman (1938; 1939; 1948) argued
that animals maintain an expectancy of their potential
future consequences (including an expectancy of any
rewarding component), and that this provided for latent
learning effects as well as fast changes in choices in
response to changes in provided needs, whereas Hull
(1943; 1952) argued that animals learn simple associations
of stimuli and responses, allowing for the slow development
of automation (Carr & Watson 1908; Dennis 1932). As
noted by Guthrie (1935; see Balleine & Ostlund 2007;
Bolles 1972), one implication of Tolman’s cognitive expec-
tancies theories would be a delay in choosing. Just such a
delay is seen in early learning, particularly in tasks that
require the planning system. At choice points, rats faced
with difficult decisions pause and vicariously sample the
different choices before committing to a decision (Brown
1992; Meunzinger 1938; Tolman 1938; 1939). This “vicar-
ious trial and error” (VTE) behavior is abolished with hip-
pocampal lesions (Hu & Amsel 1995), and is related to
hippocampal activity on hippocampal-dependent tasks
(Hu et al. 2006). Recent neural ensemble recording data
have found that hippocampal firing patterns transiently rep-
resent locations ahead of the animal at choice points during
VTE-like behaviors (Johnson & Redish 2007). Once tasks
have been overtrained, these VTE movements disappear
(Hu et al. 2006; Munn 1950; Tolman 1938), as do the
forward representations (Johnson & Redish 2007),
suggesting that VTEmay be a signal of the active processing
in the planning system (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Johnson
& Redish 2007; Tolman 1938; 1939).
These two systems mirror the classical two-process
theory in psychology (Domjan 1998; Gray 1975) and the
more recent distinction between stimulus-stimulus (SS,
S! O), stimulus-outcome (SO, SAO, S!a O), action-
outcome (AO, !a O), and stimulus-response or stimulus-
action (SA, S!a ) (Balleine & Ostlund 2007; Dickinson
1985) (see Table 2). The first (S!O) entails the recog-
nition of a causal sequence but does not entail an actual
decision. The second (S!a O) is classical Pavlovian con-
ditioning and entails an action taken in response to a situ-
ation in anticipation of a given outcome (Domjan 1998;
Pavlov 1927; Rescorla 1988). The third (!a O) is classical
instrumental conditioning (Balleine & Ostlund 2007;
Domjan 1998; Ferster & Skinner 1957) and entails an
action taken to achieve an outcome, even in the absence
of an immediate stimulus. It is important to note,
however, that action-outcome associations do still
Table 2. Learning theory and decision-making
System Description Learning Theory Expectation
Observation S!O Pavlovian S-S E(O)
Planning S!a O Pavlovian with action S-O E(O)!E(V)
Planning !a O Instrumental A-O E(O)!E(V)
Habit S!a Habit S-R E(V)
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include stimuli in the form of the context (actions are not
taken at all times but rather only within certain facilitating
contexts).5 The fourth (S!a ) entails an association
between a situation and an action and denotes habit learn-
ing (Domjan 1998; Hull 1943; 1952).
These four associations can be differentiated in terms of
their expectancies (Table 2). S!O associations entail an
expectancy of an outcome, but with no decision, there is
no necessary further processing of that outcome, although
there is likely to be an emotional preparation of some sort.
If an animal can do something to prepare for, produce, or
change that outcome, then the association becomes one of
situation-action-outcome (S!a O). If there is no immedi-
ate stimulus triggering the action, then the association
becomes an !a O association. Because !a O associations
continue to include a contextual gating component, the
!a O association is truly an S!a O association. Although
there are anatomical reasons to separate !a O from
S!ðaÞ O associations (Balleine & Ostlund 2007; Ostlund &
Balleine 2007; Yin et al. 2005), for our purposes, they
can be treated similarly: they both entail an expectancy
of an outcome that must be evaluated to produce an
expectancy of a value. This means they both require a
planning component and can be differentiated from
habit learning in which situations are directly associated
with actions (S!a ). In the S!a association, situation-
action pairs entail a direct expectancy of a value, which
can then drive the action, even in the absence of a recog-
nition of the outcome.
Following this distinction, we categorize these four
association systems into three decision systems: an obser-
vation system, which does not make decisions and will
not be discussed further; a planning system, which takes
a given situation (derived from stimuli, context, or a com-
bination thereof), predicts an outcome, and evaluates that
outcome; and a habit system, which takes a given situation
(derived from stimuli, context, or a combination thereof)
and identifies the best remembered action to take.
These systems, of course, exist within overlapping and
interacting structures (Balleine & Ostlund 2007; Corbit
et al. 2001; Dayan & Balleine 2002; Devan & White
1999; Kelley 1999a; 1999b; Voorn et al. 2004; Yin et al.
2006; Yin & Knowlton 2006). The flexible planning
system involves the entorhinal cortex (Corbit & Balleine
2000), hippocampus (O’Keefe & Nadel 1978; Packard &
McGaugh 1996; Redish 1999), the ventral and dorsome-
dial striatum (Devan & White 1999; Martin 2001; Mogen-
son 1984; Mogenson et al. 1980; Pennartz et al. 2004;
Schoenbaum et al. 2003; Yin et al. 2005), prelimbic
medial prefrontal cortex (Jung et al. 1998; Killcross & Cou-
tureau 2003; Ragozzino et al. 1999), and orbitofrontal
cortex (Davis et al. 2006; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad 2006;
Schoenbaum et al. 2003; 2006a; 2006b; Schoenbaum &
Roesch 2005). The habit system involves the dorsolateral
striatum (Barnes et al. 2005; Packard & McGaugh 1996;
Schmitzer-Torbert & Redish 2004; Yin & Knowlton
2004; 2006), the infralimbic medial prefrontal cortex
(Coutureau & Killcross 2003; Killcross & Coutureau
2003) as well as the parietal cortex (DiMattia & Kesner
1988; Kesner et al. 1989) (see Table 3).
3.1. Transitions between decision systems
Behavior generally begins with flexible planning systems
but, for repeated behaviors, can become driven by the
less-flexible (but also less computationally expensive)
habit systems. Examples of this development are well
known from our experiences. For example, the first time
we drive to a new job, we need a travel plan; we pay atten-
tion to street-signs and other landmarks. But after driving
that same trip every day for years, the trip requires less and
less attention, freeing up resources for other cognitive pro-
cesses such as planning classes, papers, or dinner. The
flexible system, however, generally remains available, as
when road construction closes one’s primary route to
work and one now needs to identify a new route. Errors
Table 3. Two systems
Planning System Habit System
Literature
Animal navigation Cognitive map Route, taxon, response
Animal behavior S-O, S-A-O, A-O S-A, S-R
Memory systems Cognitive Habit
Learning and memory Episodic (declarative) Procedural
Cognition Explicit Implicit
Machine learning Forward-search Action-caching
Properties
Flexibility Flexible Rigid
Execution speed Slow Fast
Learning speed Quick Slow
Devaluation? Yes No
Key Anatomical Structures
Striatum Ventral, dorsomedial striatum (accumbens,
head of the caudate)
Dorsolateral striatum (caudate, putamen)
Frontal cortex Prelimbic, orbitofrontal cortex Infralimbic, other components?
Hippocampal involvement Hippocampus (yes) ——— (no)
Dopaminergic inputs Ventral tegmental area Substantia nigra pars compacta
Redish et al.: A unified framework for addiction
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can exist within both systems, as for example, a misjudged
plan or a trip so automatic, that if one is not paying atten-
tion, one might accidentally find oneself having driven to
work even though one planned to go somewhere else.
This interaction is well-studied in the animal literature,
including the overlaying of planning by habit systems
(Dickinson 1980; Hikosaka et al. 1999; Packard &
McGaugh 1996; Schmitzer-Torbert & Redish 2002), res-
toration of planning in the face of changes (Gray &
McNaughton 2000; Isoda & Hikosaka 2007; Sakagami
et al. 2006), and conflict between the two systems (Gold
2004; McDonald & White 1994; Packard 1999; Poldrack &
Packard 2003; Redish et al. 2000).
Four well-studied examples in the animal literature are
the transfer of place strategies to response strategies in the
plus-maze (Chang & Gold 2004; Packard & McGaugh
1996; Yin & Knowlton 2004), the development of the regu-
larity of behavioral paths (Barnes et al. 2005; Jog et al.
1999; Schmitzer-Torbert & Redish 2002), the disappear-
ance of devaluation in animal learning studies (Adams &
Dickinson 1981; Balleine & Dickinson 1998; Colwill &
Rescorla 1985; Tang et al. 2007), and the inhibition of
habitual responses in go/no-go tasks (Gray & McNaugh-
ton 2000; Husain et al. 2003; Isoda & Hikosaka 2007).
In the plus-maze, animals are trained to take an action
that can be solved either by going to a specific place
(Tolman et al. 1946) or by taking an action in response
to being placed on the maze (Hull 1952). These algorithms
can be differentiated by an appropriately designed probe
trial (Barnes et al. 1980; Packard & McGaugh 1996;
Restle 1957). Rats on this task (and on other similar
tasks) first use a place strategy, which then evolves into a
response strategy (McDonald & White 1994; Packard &
McGaugh 1996; Yin & Knowlton 2004). Place strategies
depend on hippocampal, as well as ventral and dorsome-
dial striatal integrity, while response strategies depend
on dorsolateral striatal integrity (Packard & McGaugh
1996; Yin & Knowlton 2004; 2006; Yin et al. 2005).
In tasks in which animals are provided a general task
with specific cases that change from day to day or
session to session, animals can learn the specific instantia-
tions very quickly. In these tasks, behavioral accuracy
improves quickly, followed by a slower development of a
regularity in the actions taken by the animal (rats, Jog
et al. 1999; Schmitzer-Torbert & Redish 2002; monkeys,
Hikosaka et al. 1999; Rand et al. 1998; 2000; humans,
Nissen & Bullemer 1987; Willingham et al. 1989). In
these tasks, the early (accurate, flexible, and slower) beha-
vior is dependent on hippocampal integrity and correlated
to hippocampal activity (Ferraro et al. 1993; Johnson &
Redish 2007; Knopman & Nissen 1987), whereas later
(also accurate, but inflexible and faster) behavior is depen-
dent on dorsolateral striatal integrity and correlated to
dorsolateral striatal activity (Barnes et al. 2005; Doyon
et al. 1998; Hikosaka et al. 1998; Jackson et al. 1995; Jog
et al. 1999; Knopman & Nissen 1991).
The implication of multiple decision-making systems on
the calculation of value can also be seen in the effect of
these two decision systems on changes in the valuation
of a reward (Adams & Dickinson 1981; Balleine & Dickin-
son 1998; Colwill & Rescorla 1985; Dickinson 1980; 1985).
Classically, these differences are measured by (1) training
an agent to take an action (or a sequence of actions) to
receive a reward R, and then, (2) changing the value of
reward R to the agent, usually in a different context. The
value of a reward can be changed by providing excess
amounts of the reward (satiation, Balleine & Dickinson
1998) or by pairing the reward with an aversive stimulus,
such as lithium chloride (devaluation, Adams & Dickinson
1981; Colwill & Rescorla 1985; Holland & Rescorla 1975;
Holland & Straub 1979; Nelson & Killcross 2006; Schoen-
baum et al. 2006a). Finally, (3) the agent is provided the
chance to take the action. If the action-selection process
takes into account the current value of the reward, then
the agent will modify its actions in response to the
change, but if the action-selection process is an association
between the situation and the action (hence does not take
into account the value of the reward), the agent will not
modify its response. Lesions to ventral striatum (Corbit
et al. 2001; Schoenbaum et al. 2006c) and prelimbic
medial prefrontal cortex (Killcross & Coutureau 2003) or
orbitofrontal cortex (Ostlund& Balleine 2007; Schoenbaum
et al. 2006a; 2006b) discourage devaluation, whereas lesions
to dorsolateral striatum (Yin et al. 2004; Yin & Knowlton
2004; Yin et al. 2006) and infralimbic cortex (Coutureau &
Killcross 2003; Killcross & Coutureau 2003) encourage
devaluation processes. Lesions to entorhinal cortex
(Corbit & Balleine 2000) and dorsomedial striatum
(Adams et al. 2001; Ragozzino et al. 2002a; 2002b; Yin
et al. 2005) disrupt flexibility in the face of predictability
changes (contingency degradation), whereas lesions to dor-
solateral striatum do not (Yin & Knowlton 2006).
It is important to note that not all transitions need be
from planning strategies to habit strategies. Because plan-
ning strategies are flexible and learned quickly, while
habit-based strategies are more rigid and learned more
slowly, many tasks are solved in their early stages through
the planning system and in their late stages through the
habit system (Dickinson 1980; Hikosaka et al. 1999;
Packard & McGaugh 1996; Restle 1957). But the habit
system can also learn in the absence of an available planning
system (Cohen & Squire 1980; Day et al. 1999; Knowlton
et al. 1994; Mishkin et al. 1984). Under appropriate
conditions, well-developed automated responses can be
overridden by controlled (planning-like) systems as in go/
no-go tasks (Goldman et al. 1970; Gray & McNaughton
2000; Isoda & Hikosaka 2007; Iversen & Mishkin 1970)
or reversal learning (Hirsh 1974; Mackintosh 1974; Ragoz-
zino et al. 2002a). Which system drives behavior at which
time depends on parameters of the specific task (Curran
1995; McDonald & White 1994; O’Keefe & Nadel 1978;
Redish 1999) and may even differ between individuals
under identical experimental conditions. In many cases,
identical behaviors can be driven by the two systems, and
only specialized probe trials can differentiate them
(Barnes 1979; Curran 2001; Hikosaka et al. 1999).
3.2. The planning system
The planning system requires recognition of a situation
and/or context S, identification of the consequences of
taking action a in situation S (recognition of a means
of achieving outcome O), and the evaluation of the value
of achieving outcome O. This system selects the most
appropriate action by considering the potential conse-
quences of that action. The key behavioral parameters
involved in this system are fast storage and slow retrieval.
As noted earlier, retrieval within this system can be slow
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because the calculation of value at each step requires pro-
cessing through the consideration of possibilities. Because
the consideration of possibilities does not commit one to a
single choice, this system is flexible in its behavioral
choices. Because the value of taking action a in situation
S is calculated from the value of achieving expected
outcome O, which is calculated online from the current
needs of the agent, if the desire (need) for the outcome
is changed (even in another context), the value calculation
can reflect that change.
Computationally, the planning system is likely to
require three interacting components: a situation-recog-
nition component, which classifies the complex interaction
of contexts and stimuli to identify the situation in which
the animal finds itself; a prediction component, which cal-
culates the consequences of potential actions; and an eva-
luative component, which calculates the value of those
consequences (taking into account the time, effort, and
probability of receiving reward).
The situation-recognition component entails a categoriz-
ation process, in which the set of available cues and contexts
must be integrated with the agent’s memory so as to
produce a classification of the situation. This system is
likely to arise in cortical sensory and association systems
through competitive learning (Arbib 1995; Grossberg
1976; Redish et al. 2007; Rumelhart & McClelland 1986).
Mathematically, the cortical recognition system can be
modeled with attractor network dynamics (Durstewitz
et al. 1999; 2000; Kohonen 1984; Laing & Chow 2001;
Redish 1999; Seamans & Yang 2004; Wilson & Cowan
1972; 1973), in which a partial pattern can be completed
to form a remembered pattern through recurrent connec-
tions within the structure (Hebb 1949/2002; Hertz et al.
1991; Hopfield 1982). This content addressable memory
provides a categorization process transforming the observed
set of cues to a defined (remembered) situation that can be
reasoned from (Redish et al. 2007).
The prediction component entails a prediction of the
probability that the agent will reach situation stþ1, given
that it takes action a in situation st: P(stþ1jst, a). This func-
tionality has been suggested to lie in the hippocampus
(Jensen & Lisman 1998; 2005; Johnson & Redish 2007;
Koene et al. 2003) or frontal cortex (Daw et al. 2005). The
hippocampus has been identified with stimulus-stimulus
associations (Devenport 1979; 1980; Devenport & Holloway
1980; Hirsh 1974; Mackintosh 1974; White & McDonald
2002), episodic memory (Cohen & Eichenbaum 1993;
Ferbinteanu & Shapiro 2003; Ferbinteanu et al. 2006;
Squire 1987), flexible behavior (Devenport et al. 1981b;
Gray & McNaughton 2000), including flexible navigation
behavior (the cognitive map, i.e., spatial associations
between stimuli; O’Keefe & Nadel 1978), as well as in
sequence learning (Agster et al. 2002; Cohen & Eichen-
baum 1993; Fortin et al. 2002; Levy 1996; Levy et al.
2005) (see Redish [1999] for review). Similar functionality
has been proposed to lie in the frontal cortex (Daw et al.
2005), which has long been associated with the ability to
recategorize situations (Baddeley 1986; Clark & Robbins
2002; Dalley et al. 2004; Isoda & Hikosaka 2007; Jentsch &
Taylor 1999; Quirk et al. 2006; Rushworth et al. 2007)
with the storage of delayed events (Baddeley 1986;
Fuster 1997; Goldman-Rakic et al. 1990) and the
anticipation of reward (Davis et al. 2006; Fuster 1997;
Watanabe 2007), as well as with sequence planning
(Averbeck & Lee 2007; Kolb 1990; Mushiake et al. 2006;
Owen 1997).
The evaluative component allows the calculation of value
with each predicted outcome. Anatomically, the evaluative
component is likely to include the amygdala (Aggleton
1993; Dayan & Balleine 2002; Phelps & LeDoux 2005;
Rodrigues et al. 2004; Schoenbaum et al. 2003), the
ventral striatum (nucleus accumbens) (Daw 2003; Kelley
1999a; 1999b; Kelley & Berridge 2002; Mogenson 1984;
Pennartz et al. 1994; Stefani & Moghaddam 2006; Wilson &
Bowman 2005) and associated structures (Tindell et al.
2004; 2006), and/or the orbitofrontal cortex (Feierstein
et al. 2006; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad 2006; Plassmann
et al. 2007; Sakagami & Pan 2007; Schoenbaum et al.
2003; 2006a; Volkow et al. 2003). Neurons in the ventral
striatum show reward correlates (Carelli 2002; Carelli
et al. 2000; Carelli & Wondolowski 2003; Lavoie & Mizu-
mori 1994; Martin & Ono 2000; Miyazaki et al. 1998) and
anticipate predicted reward (Martin & Ono 2000; Miyazaki
et al. 1998; Schultz et al. 1992; Yun et al. 2004). Neurons in
the ventral pallidum are associated with the identification of
hedonic signals (Tindell et al. 2004; 2006). Both the hippo-
campus and prefrontal cortex project to ventral striatum
(Finch 1996; McGeorge & Faull 1989; Swanson 2000),
and ventral striatal firing patterns reflect hippocampal and
prefrontal neural activity (Goto & Grace 2005a; 2005b;
Kalivas et al. 2005; Martin 2001; Pennartz et al. 2004).
Neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex encode parameters
relating the value of potential choices (Padoa-Schioppa &
Assad 2006; Schoenbaum & Roesch 2005).
These structures all receive strong dopaminergic input
from the ventral tegmental area. Neurophysiologically,
dopamine signals in the ventral striatum – measured by
neural recordings from dopaminergic projection neurons
(Schultz 1998; 2002) and from voltammetry signals in the
ventral striatum itself (Roitman et al. 2004; Stuber et al.
2005) – show increased firing to unexpected rewards and
to unexpected cues predicting rewards. In computational
models of the habit system, these signals have been hypoth-
esized to carry value-prediction error information (see
further on). Much of the data seems to support a similar
role for dopamine from ventral tegmental sources (de la
Fuente-Fernandez et al. 2002; Ljungberg et al. 1992;
Roitman et al. 2004; Stuber et al. 2005; Ungless et al.
2004). However, detailed, anatomically instantiated compu-
tational models are not yet available for the planning system.
Theories addressing dopamine’s role in the planning system
have included motivation and effort (Berridge 2006; Ber-
ridge & Robinson 1998; 2003; Niv et al. 2007; Robbins &
Everitt 2006; Salamone & Correa 2002; Salamone et al.
2005; 2007) and learning (Ikemoto & Panksepp 1999; Rey-
nolds et al. 2001). An important open question, however, is
to what extent dopamine is carrying the actual signal of
motivation (Berridge 2007) and to what extent dopamine’s
effects are dependent on corticostriatal synapses (Anagnos-
taras et al. 2002; Li et al. 2004; McFarland & Kalivas 2001;
McFarland et al. 2003; Nicola &Malenka 1998; Reynolds &
Wickens 2002). Finally, dopamine in the prefrontal cortex
has also been hypothesized to have a role in controlling
the depth of the categorization process (Durstewitz et al.
1999; 2000; Redish et al. 2007; Seamans et al. 2001;
Seamans & Yang 2004; Tanaka 2002; 2006).
Neuropharmacologically, these systems, particularly the
ventral striatum, are also highly dependent on mechanisms
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involving opioid signaling. Opioid signaling has been hypo-
thesized to be involved in hedonic processes (Berridge &
Robinson 1998; 2003; Kelley et al. 2002). Consistent with
these ideas, Levine and colleagues (Arbisi et al. 1999;
Levine & Billington 2004) report that opioid antagonists
directly interfere with the reported qualia of hedonic plea-
sure in humans eating sweet liquids, without interfering in
taste discrimination. We have suggested that the multiple
opioid receptors in the mammalian brain (m, k, d; De
Vries & Shippenberg 2002; Herz 1997; 1998) are associated
with an evaluation process identifying positive (euphori-
genic, signaled by m-opioid activation) and negative (dys-
phorigenic, signaled by k-opioid signaling) evaluations
(Redish & Johnson 2007). Whereas m-receptor agonists
are rewarding, euphorigenic, and support self-adminis-
tration, k-receptor agonists are aversive, dysphoric, and
interfere with self-administration (Bals-Kubik et al. 1989;
Chavkin et al. 1982; De Vries & Shippenberg 2002; Herz
1997, 1998; Kieffer 1999; Matthes et al. 1996; Meyer &
Mirin 1979; Mucha & Herz 1985).6
We have also proposed that part of the evaluation mech-
anism occurring during the search process (calculating the
expected value from the agent’s needs and the expected
outcomes given a S!ðaÞ O relation) may also involve the
opioid system (Redish & Johnson 2007). This would
predict a release of m-opioid agonists (e.g., enkephalins)
in anticipation of extreme rewards. Rats placed in a
drug-associated location show a dramatic increase in
released enkephalin in the nucleus accumbens relative to
being placed in a saline-associated compartment, presum-
ably in anticipation arising from the drug-associated com-
partment (Mas-Nieto et al. 2002).7
3.2.1. Potential vulnerabilities in the planning system. The
planning system provides potential failure points in
changes in the definition of the perceived needs N of the
animal, in incorrect identification of satisfaction of that
need (mimicking reward), in incorrect evaluation of the
expected value of the outcome, and in incorrect search
of the S!ðaÞ O relationships themselves, as well as a poten-
tial failure point in misclassification of situations.
Vulnerability 1: Homeostatic changes: Changing the defi-
nition of the needs N
Vulnerability 2: Allostatic changes: Changing the defi-
nition of the needs N
Organisms have evolved to maintain very specific levels
of critical biological parameters (temperature, hormonal
levels, neurotransmitter levels, etc.) under large challenge
variations. Because these specific levels (“set-points”) can
change under contextual, biological, social, and other
factors, such as with a circadian or seasonal rhythm,
some authors have suggested the term allostasis over the
more classic term homeostasis, reserving homeostasis for
a constant set point (Koob & Le Moal 2006). Drugs and
other manipulations can change the needs of an animal
either by moving the system away from the homeostatic
set-point itself (say, in a withdrawal state after drug use),
requiring drugs to return the system to homeostasis, or
by changing the system’s desired set-point itself, thus
requiring drugs to achieve the new inappropriate set-
point (Koob & Le Moal 2006). In either case, these
changes will change the perceived needs of the agent,
and will thus change the evaluated value of expected
outcomes.
Vulnerability 3: Overvaluation of the expected value of a
predicted outcome – mimicking reward
As noted earlier, the planning system requires a com-
ponent that directly evaluates the expected outcome.
This evaluation process is, of course, a memory process
that must take into account the history of experience
with the expected outcome. This means that there must
be a biological signal that recognizes the value of outcomes
when the agent achieves the outcome itself (thus satisfying
the perceived need). This signal is likely to be related to
the qualia of euphoric pleasure and dysphoric displeasure
(Berridge & Robinson 1998; 2003). We can thus identify
this signal with subjective hedonic signals. It is likely that
when the agent searches the consequences of the potential
S!ðaÞ O action-sequence, the same evaluative process
would be used, which could implicate these same signals
in craving (Redish & Johnson 2007). This signal is likely
to be carried in part by endogenous opioid signals (Ber-
ridge & Robinson 1998; 2003; Kelley et al. 2002), poten-
tially in the ventral basal ganglia (Tindell et al. 2004;
2006). Additionally, the memory of value depends on the
remembered values of experiences, which tend to be
remembered as generally more positive than they really
were due to biases in representation (Kahneman & Fre-
derick 2002; Schreiber & Kahneman 2000). Social
factors can also affect remembered values of actual dys-
phoric events (Cummings 2002; Goldman et al. 1999;
Jones et al. 2001).
Vulnerability 4: Overvaluation of the expected value of a
predicted outcome in the planning system
In fact, any mechanism by which the value of a pre-
dicted outcome is increased will have vulnerabilities
leading the planning system to over-value certain out-
comes. At this point, computational models of the plan-
ning system are insufficiently detailed to lead to specific
predictions or explanations of the mechanisms by which
outcomes are over-valued, but experimental evidence
has suggested a role for dopamine release in the nucleus
accumbens as a key component (Ikemoto & Panksepp
1999; Robinson & Berridge 1993; Roitman et al. 2004; Sal-
amone et al. 2005; see Robinson & Berridge 2001; 2003,
for reviews). The orbitofrontal cortex has also been
implicated in the evaluation of potential rewards
(Padoa-Schioppa & Assad 2006; Sakagami & Pan 2007;
Schoenbaum & Roesch 2005), and incorrect signals
arriving from the orbitofrontal cortex could also drive
overvaluation of expected drug- or behavior-related out-
comes (Kalivas & Volkow 2005; Schoenbaum et al.
2006a; Volkow et al. 2003). Changes in activity in the orbi-
tofrontal cortex (Stalnaker et al. 2006; Volkow & Fowler
2000) and the ventral striatum (Carelli 2002; German &
Fields 2007b; Peoples et al. 1999) are likely to play import-
ant roles in this vulnerability.
Vulnerability 5: Incorrect search of S!ðaÞ O relationships
The prediction component of the planning system is
also a memory process, requiring the exploration of
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multiple consequences from situation S. If a drug or other
process were to increase the likelihood of retrieving a
specific S!ðaÞ O relationship, then one would expect this
to limit the set of possibilities explored, which would
appear as a cognitive blinding to alternatives (Redish &
Johnson 2007). Because action-decisions in the planning
system must be made through the comparison of available
alternatives, this vulnerability would also mean that when
an agent is returned to situation S, it would be more likely
to remember the availability of outcome O than other
potential outcomes, which would make it more likely to
remember the high value associated with outcome O
(see Vulnerabilities 3 and 4), and thus more likely to
experience craving in situation S. This craving would
then lead to a recurring search of the same S!(a) O path,
which would appear as a cognitive blinding or obsession.
This process could also lead to an increase in attention
to drug-related cues, which has been seen in both
alcohol and heroin addicts (Lubman et al. 2000; Schoen-
makers et al. 2007).
Vulnerability 6: Misclassification of situations
In order to retrieve an S!ðaÞ O relation, the agent must
recognize that the situation it is in is sufficiently similar to a
previous one to successfully retrieve the relation, predict
the outcome, and evaluate it. The S!ðaÞ O relations are,
of course, dependent on the predictability of the
outcome for a given situation, and therfore are sensitive
to contingency degradation, in which the predictability
of an outcome from a given situation-action pair is
decreased (thus changing the S!ðaÞ O relationship;
Corbit & Balleine 2000; Corbit et al. 2002; Devenport &
Holloway 1980). These relationships can be misunder-
stood either by over-categorization, in which two situations
that are actually identical are miscategorized as different,
or by over-generalization, in which two situations that
are actually separate are miscategorized as the same.
Over-categorization. Thus, for example, if gambling
losses are not recognized as occurring in the same situation
as previous gambling wins, an agent can potentially
(incorrectly) learn two S!ðaÞ O relations, one leading
from situation S1 to a winning outcome and one leading
from situation S2 to a losing outcome. If the agent can
identify cues that separate situation S1 from situation S2,
then it will (incorrectly) predict that it can know when it
will achieve a winning outcome. This has been referred
to as “the illusion of control” (Custer 1984; Griffiths
1994; Langer & Roth 1975; MacKillop et al. 2006;
Redish et al. 2007; Wagenaar 1988).
Over-generalization. An inability to recategorize situ-
ations (by recognizing actual changes) can lead to the
perseveration of responses and an inability to switch
responses in the face of failures and losses. Many drug
users and pathological gamblers show failures to reverse
or switch action-selection choices in response to novel
adverse conditions (Bechara et al. 2001; Clark & Robbins
2002; Everitt et al. 1999; Grant et al. 2000; Jentsch et al.
2002; Verdejo-Garcia et al. 2006). Developing abilities to
recategorize situations has been suggested as one means
of treating addictions (McCaul & Petry 2003; Sylvain
et al. 1997). Simulated agents with deficiencies in the
ability to recategorize cues find difficulty in breaking cue-
addiction associations8 (Redish et al. 2007).
3.3. The habit system
In contrast to the complexity of the planning system, the
habit system entails a simple association between situation
and action. Thus, the habit system requires recognition of
a situation S, and a single, identified action to take within
that situation. This simplicity allows the habit system to
react quickly. However, this simplicity also makes the
habit system rigid. A learned association essentially
commits the agent to take action a in situation S. This
means that it would be dangerous to store an association
that was not reliable. Therefore, habit associations
should only be stored after extensive experience with a
consistent relation.
In contrast to the planning system, the habit system
does not include any consideration of the potential
outcome (i.e., there is no O term in the S!a relation;
Table 2). Therefore, in contrast to the planning system,
the habit system does not include a prediction of available
outcomes and cannot evaluate those potential outcomes
online. Hence, it cannot take into account the current per-
ceived needs (desires) of the agent. The habit system is still
sensitive to the overall arousal levels of the agent. Thus, a
hungry rat will run faster and work harder than a satiated
rat (Bolles 1967; Munn 1950; Niv et al. 2007). However,
because the habit system does not reflect the current
desires of the agent, the habit system will not modify
responses when a reward is devalued. Similarly, the
habit system cannot select multiple actions in response
to a single situation.9 This means that in navigation, the
habit system can only take a single action in response to
a given situation. For example, a rat with a damaged plan-
ning system cannot decide to turn left for water when it
is thirsty on one day and turn right for food when it is
hungry on the next day.10
Computationally, there are very good models of how the
habit system might work. These models have generally
been based on the temporal difference instantiation of
reinforcement learning (Daw 2003; Daw et al. 2005;
2006; Dayan et al. 2000; Doya 2000b; Montague et al.
1996; Redish 2004; Schultz et al. 1997; Suri & Schultz
1999; Sutton & Barto 1998). In the simplest version of
this model, each situation-action pair is associated with a
value (termed Q(S, a); Sutton & Barto 1998).11 When an
agent takes an action from a situation, the agent can
compare the expected value of taking action a in situation
S (i.e., Q(S, a)) with the observed value (the reward
received minus the cost spent plus the value of being in
the state the agent ended up in):
(1) d ¼ R(t) C(t)þ gmax
a
½Q(Snew, a) Q(Sold, a)
where R(t) is the reward observed, C(t) the cost spent,
max
a
½Q(Snew, a) the most value one can get from the situ-
ation the agent finds itself in (Snew), and Q(Sold, a) is
the estimated value of taking action a in the situation the
agent was in (Sold). By updating Q(Sold, a) by d, the
agent moves its estimate Q(Sold, a) closer to its true
value; g is a discounting parameter (g , 1) which
ensures that the time required to reach future rewards is
taken into account (Daw 2003; Sutton & Barto 1998).
These models can be trained to learn complex situation-
action sequences.
The slow development of a habit association has been
most studied in contrast to the fast planning system.
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Lesions or inactivation of the dorsolateral striatum (Yin &
Knowlton 2004; Yin et al. 2004; Yin et al. 2006) and the
infralimbic cortex (Coutureau & Killcross 2003; Killcross
& Coutureau 2003) prevent the loss of devaluation with
experience. Lesions or inactivation of the dorsolateral stria-
tum (McDonald &White 1994; Packard &McGaugh 1992;
1996; Potegal 1972; White & McDonald 2002; Yin &
Knowlton 2004) or the parietal cortices (DiMattia &
Kesner 1988; Kesner et al. 1989) shift rats from response
strategy to map strategies in navigation tasks.
As in the planning system, the habit system requires a
situation-recognition component, in which the set of
cues and contexts is integrated with the agent’s memory
to classify the situation, to allow retrieval of the correct
S!a association. As with our discussion in the planning
system, we suggest that cortical sensory and association
systems classify situations through competitive learning
processes (Arbib 1995; Grossberg 1976; Redish et al.
2007; Rumelhart & McClelland 1986). Although there
are no neurophysiological data suggesting that this situ-
ation categorization system is anatomically separate from
that used for the planning system, the identification of
the habit system with networks involving dorsal and
lateral aspects of striatum, and the planning system with
networks involving more ventral and medial aspects of
striatum, suggest that the specific cortical systems involved
may differ. The S!a association itself, including the
mechanisms by which the situation signals are finally cate-
gorized to achieve a single action decision, have been
hypothesized to include the afferent connections from
cortex to dorsolateral striatum (Beiser et al. 1997; Houk
et al. 1995; Samejima et al. 2005; Wickens 1993; Wickens
et al. 2003).
Neuropharmacologically, the habit system receives
strong dopamine inputs from the substantia nigra pars
compacta (SNpc). The dopamine signal has been well
studied in the primate (Bayer & Glimcher 2005; Ljung-
berg et al. 1992; Mirenowicz & Schultz 1994; Schultz
1998; 2002; Waelti et al. 2001). Like the dopamine
neurons in the ventral tegmental area, dopamine
neurons in SNpc increase firing in response to unexpected
increases in expected value (via unexpected rewards or via
cues that lead to an increased expectation of reward), and
decrease firing in response to unexpected decreases in
value (via lack of expected reward or via cues that lead
to a decrease in the expectation of reward). This signal
has been identified with the value-error signal d in the
temporal difference reinforcement learning algorithm
(Barto 1995; Montague et al. 1995; 1996; Schultz et al.
1997), which can provide dopamine a role in training up
S!a associations. Dopamine has been shown to be criti-
cal to the learning of habitual S!a associations (Faure
et al. 2005). However, the role of dopamine in learning
and performance is still controversial (Berridge 2007; Cag-
niard et al. 2006; Frank et al. 2004; Niv et al. 2007).
Cellularly, neurons in the dorsal striatum have been
found to represent key parameters of the temporal differ-
ence reinforcement learning algorithm: for example, situ-
ation-action associations (Barnes et al. 2005; Carelli &
West 1991; Daw 2003; Gardiner & Kitai 1992; Hikosaka
et al. 1999; Hikosaka et al. 2006; Jog et al. 1999;
Kermadi et al. 1993; Kermadi & Joseph 1995; Matsumoto
et al. 1999; Miyachi et al. 1997; Schmitzer-Torbert &
Redish 2004; Tremblay et al. 1998); reward delivery
(Daw 2003; Schmitzer-Torbert & Redish 2004; White &
Hiroi 1998;); and value signals (Daw 2003; Kawagoe
et al. 2004; Nakahara et al. 2004). These signals develop
in parallel with the development of automated behaviors
(Barnes et al. 2005; Itoh et al. 2003; Jog et al. 1999; Same-
jima et al. 2005; Schmitzer-Torbert & Redish 2004; Tang
et al. 2007), through an interaction with dopamine
signals (Arbuthnott & Wickens 2007; Centonze et al.
1999; Picconi et al. 2003; Reynolds & Wickens 2002).
Functional imaging data from humans playing sequential
games show similar correlates to value, d, and other par-
ameters of these models (McClure et al. 2003; 2004;
O’Doherty 2004; O’Doherty et al. 2004; Seymour et al.
2004; Tanaka et al. 2004a).
3.3.1. Potential vulnerabilities in the habit system. The
primary failure point of the habit system is the overvalua-
tion of a habit association through the delivery of dopa-
mine (Bernheim & Rangel 2004; Di Chiara 1999; Redish
2004). As with the planning system, a misclassification of
the situation can also provide a potential vulnerability in
the habit system (see Vulnerability 6).
Vulnerability 7: Overvaluation of actions
With natural rewards, once the value of the reward has
been correctly predicted, the value-error term d is zero
and learning stops (Rescorla & Wagner 1972; Schultz &
Dickinson 2000; Waelti et al. 2001). However, when dopa-
mine is produced neuropharmacologically, sidestepping the
calculation of d, each receipt of the drug induces a positive d
signal, the value associated with taking action a in situation
S continues to increase, producing an overvaluation (Redish
2004). Because the S!a association is a habitual, automatic
association, choices driven by S!a relationships will be
unintentional, robotic, perhaps even unconscious.
3.4. Interactions between planning and habit systems
Generally, the planning system is engaged early; but with
experience, behavioral control in repetitive tasks is trans-
ferred to the habit system. This has been observed in the
navigation (O’Keefe & Nadel 1978; Packard & McGaugh
1996; Redish 1999), animal conditioning (Balleine & Dick-
inson 1998; Dickinson 1985; Yin et al. 2006), and human
learning (Jackson et al. 1995; Knopman & Nissen 1991;
Poldrack et al. 2001) literatures. However, in tasks which
require behavioral flexibility, behavioral control can
remain with the planning system, even in highly trained
animals (Gray & McNaughton 2000; Killcross & Cou-
tureau 2003; McDonald & White 1994; Morris et al.
1982; White & McDonald 2002).
For many tasks, both systems can drive behavior in the
absence of the other (Cohen & Squire 1980; Nadel 1994;
O’Keefe & Nadel 1978; Squire 1987), but some tasks can
only be solved by one system or the other. For example,
the water maze requires a flexible response to reach a
hidden platform and requires hippocampal integrity to
be learned quickly (Morris et al. 1982; for a review, see
Redish 1999). If the flexibility of the required response
is decreased (by, for example, starting the animal in the
same location each trial), then the hippocampus no
longer becomes necessary to reach the platform (Eichen-
baum et al. 1990). Other tasks, such as mirror-writing or
the serial reaction time task, require the slow recognition
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of regularities in situation-action associations, and they are
learned at similar speeds by patients with damaged and
intact planning systems (Cohen & Squire 1980; Ferraro
et al. 1993; Knopman & Nissen 1987). Patients with
damaged lateral striatal systems are impaired on these
habit-based tasks (Doyon et al. 1998; Ferraro et al. 1993;
Knopman & Nissen 1991; Smith et al. 2000; Yin & Knowl-
ton 2006). For some tasks, the planning system can “train
up” the habit system, potentially through replay events
occurring during subsequent sleep states (Buzsa´ki 1996;
Hoffmann & McNaughton 2002; Marr 1971; Pavlides &
Winson 1989; Redish 1999; Redish & Touretzky 1998;
Wilson &McNaughton 1994). This transfer of information
between systems can explain observations of incomplete
retrograde amnesia with certain lesions (consolidation,
Cohen & Squire 1980; Nadel & Bohbot 2001; Nadel &
Moscovitch 1997; Redish 1999; Squire 1987) but predicts
that “consolidated memories” will be less flexible than
unconsolidated memories (Redish & Touretzky 1998).
The question of which system drives behavior when the
two are put into conflict has only begun to be addressed
computationally (Daw et al. 2005) and experimentally
(Isoda & Hikosaka 2007), but there is a large literature
on behavioral inhibition, in which a changed, novel, or
potentially dangerous or costly behavior is inhibited
(Gray & McNaughton 2000). This system seems to
involve the prefrontal (Sakagami et al. 2006) and/or the
hippocampal system (Gray & McNaughton 2000), depen-
ding on the specific conditions involved. Whether the
interaction entails the planning system overriding a devel-
oped habit (Gray & McNaughton 2000) or an external
system that mediates control between the two (Isoda &
Hikosaka 2007) is still unresolved. Whether such an exter-
nal mediator can be identified with executive control (pre-
sumably, in the prefrontal cortex, Baddeley 1986; Barkley
2001; Barkley et al. 2001) is still a matter of open research.
Vulnerability 8: Selective inhibition of the planning system
The habit system is inflexible, reacts quickly, “without
thinking,” whereas the planning system is highly flexible
and allows the consideration of possibilities. The habit
and planning systems consist of different anatomical sub-
strates. Pharmacological agents that preferentially impair
function in structures involved in the planning system or
preferentially enhance function in structures involved in
the habit system would encourage the automation of
behaviors. A shift back from habits to planned behaviors
is known to involve the prefrontal cortex (Dalley et al.
2004; Husain et al. 2003; Isoda & Hikosaka 2007;
Iversen & Mishkin 1970), and has been hypothesized to
involve executive function (Barkley 2001; Barkley et al.
2001; Tomita et al. 1999). If pre-existing dysfunction
exists within the inter-system control or if pharmacological
agents disrupt this inter-system control, then the agent
would develop habits quickly and would have difficulty
disrupting those established habits. This vulnerability is
distinguishable from the specific planning and habit vul-
nerabilities by its disruption of function of the planning
system and/or its disruption of the inter-system conflict
resolution mechanism. Thus, the other vulnerabilities
affecting the planning system lead the planning system
to make the incorrect choice; Vulnerability 8 makes it dif-
ficult for the planning system to correct a misguided habit
system (Bechara 2005; Bechara et al. 2001; Bickel et al.
2007; Gray & McNaughton 2000; Jentsch & Taylor 1999;
Lubman et al. 2004; Verdejo-Garcia et al. 2006).
3.5. Summary: Decision-making systems
The decision-making system in the mammal is hypoth-
esized to consist of two subsystems: a planning system,
based on the evaluation of potential possibilities (e.g.,
S!ðaÞ O relationships), and a habit system, based on the
association of specific actions with specific situations
(e.g., S!a associations), both of which require a situ-
ation-recognition system, in which observed cues are cate-
gorized into situations (e.g., the S terms in the previous
formulations). Correct decision-making depends on the
integrity of each of these systems (see Figure 1).
3.6. Additional failure points
The eight vulnerabilities identified so far are certainly an
incomplete list of the potential failure points of the
decision-making system. The description of the decision-
making system is, by necessity, incomplete. For example,
we have not addressed the question of discounting and
impulsivity. Nor have we addressed the question of learn-
ing rates.
Vulnerability 9: Over-fast discounting processes
Both the planning and habit systems need to take into
account the probability and the delay before an expected
goal will be achieved (Ainslie 1992; 2001; Mazur 2001; Ste-
phens & Krebs 1987). In the planning system, this can be
calculated online from the expected value of the expected
goal given the searched sequence; in the habit system, this
would have to be cached as part of the stored value func-
tion. The specific mechanism (and even the specific dis-
counting function) are still a source of much controversy
(for a review, see Redish & Kurth-Nelson [in press] in
Madden et al. [in press]), but the long-term discounting
of future rewards is well established. If an agent discounts
too strongly, it will overemphasize near-term rewards and
underemphasize far-future costs. Because addictions often
Figure 1. Structure of decision making in mammalian agents.
Components of the more flexible, planning-based system are
shown in light gray; components of the less flexible, habit-
based system are shown in dark gray. Components involved in
both are shown in gradient color.
Redish et al.: A unified framework for addiction
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:4 425
involve near-term pleasures and far-future costs, faster-
than-normal discounting could drive an agent to underes-
timate the far-future costs and to choose those near-term
pleasures. A number of studies have found that addicts
discount faster than non-addicts (Alessi & Petry 2003;
Bickel & Marsch 2001; Kirby et al. 1999; Madden et al.
1997; Madden et al. 1999; Odum et al. 2002; Petry 2001;
Petry & Bickel 1998; Petry et al. 1998; Vuchinich &
Simpson 1998).
Vulnerability 10: Changes in learning processes
Other unincorporated components include changes in
learning processes (such as over-attention to cues or learn-
ing rates being too high or too low). More detailed models
of each of the systems will be required before it will be
possible to make strong claims about the consequences
of such a potential failure point.
However, the hypothesis put forward in this paper that
addiction is a consequence of falling victim to vulnerabil-
ities (failure modes) in the decision-making system lays
out a research paradigm with important consequences
both for what (and how) research questions should be
addressed as well as for drug-treatment paradigms and
drug-control policies.
These vulnerabilities in the decision-making systemmay
arise from individual predisposition (either due to genetic
or social/environmental factors) as well as from drug- or
behavior-driven interactions with the decision system. In
the second half of this article, we address the interactions
and implications of each of the previously identified vul-
nerabilities with drugs and behaviors of abuse as well as
the policy and treatment consequences of the theory.
4. Addiction as vulnerabilities in decision-making
The unified framework for decision-making described
above has potential access points through which it can
be driven to make maladaptive choices, particularly
choices which entail seeking of certain drugs or behaviors.
Ten key vulnerabilities can be directly identified with this
unified decision-making system as outlined earlier. They
are summarized in Table 4 and related to the current the-
ories in Table 5.
Some of these failure modes exist as prior conditions,
making an agent more vulnerable to the addictive
process, whereas other failure modes are driven by
direct interactions with the drugs themselves.
4.1. Vulnerability 1: Deviations from homeostasis
A classic example of deviations from homeostasis that will
produce changing needs is the well-known “crash” after
the euphoria of an opiate experience (Koob & Le Moal
2006). These negative effects can occur after even a single
dose of morphine (Azolosa et al. 1994; Harris & Gewirtz
2005; Koob & Le Moal 2006). Such a negative affect would
drive an agent to attempt to compensate by returning to
the positive qualia occurring during the drug use. Deviations
from homeostasis also lead to the well-known withdrawal
symptoms (Altman et al. 1996; Lowinson et al. 1997) seen
in reaction to nicotine (Benowitz 1996; Hanson et al. 2003;
Hughes & Hatsukami 1986), alcohol (Kiefer & Mann 2005;
Littleton 1998; Moak & Anton 1999), opiates (Altman et al.
1996; Koob & Bloom 1988; Schulteis et al. 1997), and caf-
feine (Daly & Fredholm 1998; Evans 1998) addictions.
4.2. Vulnerability 2: Changes in allostatic set-points
Drug use, particularly repeated drug use, can also produce
changes in the set-point itself (referred to as “changes in
allostasis,” most likely through long-term changes in
receptor levels and changes in levels of endogenous
ligands released during normal behaviors; Koob & Le
Moal 2006). Animals given prolonged access to drugs, par-
ticularly access over many days to long periods of drug
availability, develop greatly increased drug-intake levels
(Ahmed & Koob 1998; 1999). This has been hypothesized
Table 4. Failure modes in the decision-making system provide a taxonomy of vulnerabilities to addiction
Failure Point Description Key Systems Clinical Consequence
Vulnerability 1 Moving away from homeostasis Planning Withdrawal
Vulnerability 2 Changing allostatic set points Planning Changed physiological set points, craving
Vulnerability 3 Mimicking reward Planning Incorrect action-selection, craving.
Vulnerability 4 Sensitization of motivation Planning Incorrect action-selection, craving.
Vulnerability 5 Increased likelihood of retrieving
a specific S!ðaÞ O relation
Planning Obsession
Vulnerability 6a Misclassification of situations:
overcategorization
Situation-recognition Illusion of control, hindsight bias
Vulnerability 6b Misclassification of situations:
overgeneralization
Situation-recognition Perseveration in the face of losses
Vulnerability 7 Overvaluation of actions Habit Automated, robotic drug-use
Vulnerability 8 Selective inhibition of the planning system System-Selection Fast development of habit learning
Vulnerability 9 Overfast discounting processes Planning, habit Impulsivity
Vulnerability 10 Changes in learning rates Planning, habit Excess drug-related cue associations
Note. Because Vulnerability 6 affects the situation S term in both planning and habit systems, we identify it as affecting “situation-recognition.”
Vulnerability 8 affects the interaction between the planning and habit systems. Vulnerabilities 9 and 10 can affect components of the planning
and habit systems. Detailed models of the effects of these last two vulnerabilities on the systems are as yet unavailable.
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to arise from developing allostatic changes (Ahmed &
Koob 2005; Koob & Le Moal 2006).
Pharmacologically, chronic nicotine use changes levels of
cholinergic receptors in the brain (Flores et al. 1997; Marks
et al. 1992). Chronic alcohol use changes function and
expression of gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABAA) and N-
methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptors (Hunt 1998;
Littleton 1998; Valenzuela & Harris 1997). Repeated
cocaine (Hurd & Herkenham 1993; Steiner & Gerfen
1998), alcohol (Ciraulo et al. 2003), and opiate (Cappendijk
et al. 1999; Weissman & Zamir 1987) treatment all produce
changes in endogenous opioid release and in opiate receptor
expression. Many smokers titrate the number of cigarettes
smoked throughout the day, ensuring a relatively constant
blood-plasma level of nicotine (Schmitz et al. 1997).
These neurobiological changes change the identified
needs of the agent, and thus imply changes in the evalu-
ation of expected outcomes of drug-taking (or abstinence),
which will change action-selection in the planning
system.12 This vulnerability is identifiable by changes in
long-term set-points of physiological variables.
4.3. Vulnerability 3: Overvaluation of the expected value
of a predicted outcome – mimicking reward
The planning system requires a signal that directly evalu-
ates the successful achievement of a perceived need
(thus leading to the qualia of pleasure). A number of
authors have suggested that this may reside within the
opiate system (Berridge & Robinson 2003; Redish &
Johnson 2007). m-Opiate agonists (such as heroin, mor-
phine, etc.) are generally highly euphorigenic (Jaffe et al.
1997; Mark et al. 2001; Meyer & Mirin 1979). Even
though exogenously delivered m-opiate agonists (such as
heroin or morphine) are not a true reward that the
system evolved to recognize, they can mimic the reward
system and trick the system into believing that it just
received a strong reward, which it will learn to return to.
Drugs accessing this vulnerability are likely to be highly
euphorigenic, particularly with initial use. Heroin and
morphine produce profound euphoria very quickly after
injection (Koob & Le Moal 2006). This reward signal
will be stored in memories associated with the planning
system, which would lead to the recall of highly euphoric
signals when the planning system recognizes a path to
achieve these reward-mimicking drugs. This vulnerability
is recognizable by strong craving when agents recall
those euphoric events.
4.4. Vulnerability 4: Overvaluation in the planning
system
As reviewed earlier, the planning system consists of recog-
nition (memory), search through, and evaluation of
Table 5. Relation between identified vulnerabilities and current theories of addiction
Current Theory Related Vulnerabilities
Homeostatic changesa Deviations from homeostatic set-points drives the system
to restore original homeostatic levels.
Vulnerability 1
Allostatic changesb Changes in the homeostatic set-points drives the system to
achieve incorrect homeostatic levels.
Vulnerability 2
Reward-based processing c Pharmacological access to reward signals drives the return
to those signals
Vulnerability 3
Incentive-salienced Sensitization of motivational signals drives excess
motivation for certain events
Vulnerability 4
Unmitigated craving e Increased expectation of reward with experience drives
craving
Vulnerabilities 3, 4
Noncompensable dopamine f Excess positive value-error signals lead to an over-
valuation of drug-seeking
Vulnerability 7
The illusion of controlg Incorrect expectations of control of situations leads to a
willingness to gamble
Vulnerability 6a
Impulsivityh Unwillingness to weigh future events leads to impulsive
choices
Vulnerabilities 8, 9
Decreased executive functioni An inability to plan makes it difficult to break habits
through cognitive mechanisms
Vulnerabilities 6b, 8
Alcohol expectancy theory j Expectance of positive rewards are associated with alcohol
consumption. These expectancies develop into
automated processes under certain conditions
Vulnerabilities 3, 8
aBecker and Murphy (1988); Harris & Gewirtz (2005); Koob and Le Moal (2006).
bBecker and Murphy (1988); Koob and Le Moal (1997; 2001; 2005; 2006); Solomon and Corbit (1973; 1974).
cKalivas and Volkow (2005); Volkow et al. (2003; 2004); Wise (2004).
dBerridge and Robinson (1998; 2003); Robinson and Berridge (1993; 2001; 2003; 2004).
eDrummond (2001); Goldman et al. (1987; 1999); Halikas (1997); Hommer (1999).
fBernheim and Rangel (2004); Di Chiara (1999); Redish (2004).
gCuster (1984); Griffiths (1994); Langer and Roth (1975); Redish et al. (2007); Sylvain et al. (1997); Wagenaar (1988).
hAinslie (1992; 2001); Ainslie and Monterosso (2004); Bickel and Marsch (2001); Giordano et al. (2002); Odum et al. (2002).
iBickel et al. (2007); Everitt et al. (2001); Everitt and Wolf (2002); Nelson and Killcross (2006); Robbins & Everitt (1999).
jGoldman et al. (1987; 1999); Jones et al. (2001); Oei and Baldwin (2002).
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S!ðaÞ O relationships. A fundamental vulnerability of this
relationship is in the valuation of the outcome, which is
calculated from the level of “need” and the “value” of
the outcome satisfying that perceived need, presumably
learned through dopaminergic signals (Robinson & Ber-
ridge 1993; 2001; 2003; 2004) projecting to the ventral
striatum and orbitofrontal cortex. Dopamine firing pat-
terns in the ventral tegmental area (projecting to the
ventral striatum and orbitofrontal cortex) indicate
changes in the amount of expected or just-received
reward (Pan et al. 2005; Roesch et al. 2007; Schultz
2002; Schultz et al. 1997), analogous to the d signal
required for the Q-learning algorithm described in the
habit system. Although no computational theories are as
yet available describing how these dopaminergic signals
translate into changes in evaluation in the planning
system, voltammetry recordings from the ventral striatum
have shown dopamine signals occurring before both cued
and self-initiated actions leading to drug receipt (Phillips
et al. 2003; Roitman et al. 2004; Stuber et al. 2004;
2005). These changes presumably modulate the cortico-
and hippocampo-ventral-striatal synapses, both during
learning (Thomas et al. 2001) and during performance
(Goto & Grace 2005a; 2005b; Lisman & Grace 2005;
Yun et al. 2004).
Other researchers have suggested that this evaluation
process may arise in the orbitofrontal cortex (Padoa-
Schioppa & Assad 2006; Plassmann et al. 2007; Schoen-
baum et al. 2006a) and that overvaluation in the orbito-
frontal cortex can lead to overvaluation of expected
rewards (Kalivas & Volkow 2005; Volkow et al. 2003). In
rats with a past history of cocaine intake, the orbitofrontal
cortex becomes less capable of predicting adverse out-
comes than in normal rats (Stalnaker et al. 2006), implying
a potential difficulty in identifying negative consequences.
Nevertheless, an overvaluation of expected drug outcomes
would produce craving (Redish & Johnson 2007) and an
increased likelihood of taking actions leading to those
expected drug outcomes (German & Fields 2007a).
4.5. Vulnerability 5: Incorrect search of S!ðaÞ O
relationships
As noted earlier, the prediction component of the planning
system is also a memory process, requiring the exploration
of multiple consequences from a given situation S. This
prediction process has been suggested to require the hip-
pocampus (Jensen & Lisman 1998; 2005; Johnson &
Redish 2007) and the prefrontal cortex (Daw et al.
2005), but the specific mechanism is still unknown.
Although the specific mechanisms of storage and access
of S!ðaÞ O relationships are unknown within the hippo-
campus and prefrontal cortex, Vulnerability 5 can occur
due to maladaptive and often subtle modifications of
system storage and access functions rather than system
failure. These systemic modifications may occur as a
result of changes in the cell morphology within these
areas and plasticity mechanisms within the hippocampus
and prefrontal cortex. A number of addictive substances
produce such changes. Both hippocampus and prefrontal
cortex receive dopaminergic inputs, which are known to
change the sensitivity to synaptic plasticity (Huang et al.
1995; Seamans & Yang 2004) and to modulate represen-
tations (Kentros et al. 2004; Seamans & Yang 2004) and
performance (Arnsten et al. 1994; Murphy et al. 1996).
Similarly, morphine and other opiate agonists increase
synaptic spine formation in cell culture (Liao et al. 2005)
and development (Hauser et al. 1987; 1989). Long-term
drug exposure also increases the spine formation in the
hippocampus and prefrontal cortex in vivo (Robinson &
Kolb 1999; Robinson et al. 2001; 2002). These changes
may affect the prediction process, possibly driving it to
preferentially search the drug-related potential choices,
which would appear clinically as an over-sensitivity to
drug-related cues and obsessive consideration of choices
leading to drug receipt.
4.6. Vulnerability 6: The illusion of control
When faced with reward distributions that change over
time, agents can react in one of two ways: The agent can
identify itself as being in a new situation with a different
reward distribution, or the agent can identify itself as
being in the same situation, but change the expectation
of the likelihood of receiving reward. If the agent incor-
rectly classifies the same situation as different or different
situations as the same, the agent may find itself making
incorrect decisions.
Misclassification of situations has been primarily ident-
ified as a potential cause for problem gambling, in which
agents incorrectly identify a statistically unlikely sequence
of wins as a separate situation from more-commonly
experienced losses (Custer 1984; Langer & Roth 1975;
Redish et al. 2007; Wagenaar 1988). This provides the
agent with the illusion that certain cues can identify
winning situations while other cues identify losing situ-
ations (referred to as the “illusion of control”; Langer &
Roth 1975; Redish et al. 2007; Sylvain et al. 1997; Wagen-
aar 1988). Problem gamblers tend to have experienced a
statistically unlikely sequence of wins followed by devas-
tating losses (Custer 1984; Wagenaar 1988). This mis-
classification may arise from excessive recognition of cue
changes between the winning and losing experiences
(Redish et al. 2007). Problem gamblers are often observed
to “explain away” losses by post hoc identification of differ-
ences in cues between the losses and memories of wins
(also referred to as “hindsight bias”; Custer 1984; Dicker-
son & O’Connor 2006; Wagenaar 1988). Similarly, near
misses, in which gamblers lose but come close to the
winning situation, encourage continued play (Parke &
Griffiths 2004). These near misses may provide illusory
support for the hypothesis that certain noisy cues have a
relationship to the predictability of the reward.
4.7. Vulnerability 7: Overvaluation in the habit system
In the habit (S!a ) system, phasic (bursting) dopamine
signals are correlated with the value-prediction error
signal d, needed by the temporal difference reinforcement
learning algorithm to learn situation-action sequences
(Barto 1995; Daw 2003; Montague et al. 1995; 1996).
With natural rewards, as the value-prediction system
learns to predict those rewards correctly, the value-predic-
tion compensates for the reward, and dopamine at the
time of correctly predicted reward decreases to zero
with learning (Schultz 1998). Drugs that produce dopa-
mine neuropharmacologically (like cocaine or amphet-
amine) will bypass that value-compensation system,
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providing a constant “better-than-expected” d signal. This
non-compensable dopamine signal leads to overvaluation
in the S!a system (Bernheim & Rangel 2004; Redish
2004). Cocaine and many other abused drugs produce
large increases of dopamine pharmacologically throughout
the striatum (Ito et al. 2002; Kuhar et al. 1988; Roitman
et al. 2004; Stuber et al. 2005). This mechanism can lead
to the formation of habits, which have been suggested as
a key process in late stages of drug addiction (Altman
et al. 1996; Di Chiara 1999; Everitt & Robbins 2005;
Robbins & Everitt 1999; Tiffany 1990). Clinically, such
users would be unlikely to show strong craving and
would manifest a robotic drug use, without conscious plan-
ning or statements of drug-seeking. Habit-based drug use
could well be uncorrelated to the qualia of pleasure.
4.8. Vulnerability 8: Selective inhibition of the planning
system
Exposure to drugs can shift the normal balance between
systems, emphasizing one system over the other. For
example, pretreatment with amphetamine shifts rats to
preferentially use systems that do not show devaluation
(i.e., habit-based over planning-based systems) (Nelson &
Killcross 2006). Alcohol, as another example, has been
hypothesized to preferentially impair hippocampal (Hunt
1998; White 2003) and prefrontal (Oscar-Berman &
Marinkovic 2003) function, which would shift the normal
balance from the planning to the habit systems. Dickinson
et al. (2002) found that alcohol-seeking in rats is driven
primarily by S!a mechanisms and does not show deva-
luation. Similarly, Miles et al. (2003) found that including
cocaine in a sucrose solution prevents devaluation. Such
distinctions would appear as a fast increase in habitual
responses over planning-based responses.
Following from the hypothesis that prefrontal (execu-
tive) systems are involved in the shift from habit back to
planning systems (Baddeley 1986; Barkley 2001; Barkley
et al. 2001; Dalley et al. 2004; Isoda & Hikosaka 2007),
deficits in this executive system would lead to a difficulty
in breaking habits (Bechara et al. 2001; Jentsch & Taylor
1999; Lubman et al. 2004). Following from the hypothesis
that extinction follows from a reinterpretation of situations
(Bouton 2002; Capaldi 1957; Quirk et al. 2006; Redish
et al. 2007), this would suggest a difficulty in extinguishing
drug-taking. It is certainly possible to extinguish drug-
taking in animals (Kalivas et al. 2006; Olmstead et al.
2001), but those extinguished behaviors are particularly
susceptible to relapse and reinstatement (McFarland &
Kalivas 2001; Shalev et al. 2002). Whether it is more diffi-
cult to extinguish some drug-taking behavior in certain
agents due to selective inhibition of the planning system
or excitation of the habit system is still unknown. Agents
falling victim to this vulnerability would show a particu-
larly strong, uncontrolled relapse, likely cue-dependent,
and possibly independent of explicitly identified cravings.
4.9. Vulnerability 9: Overfast discounting
As reviewed earlier, there is strong evidence that addicts
discount faster than non-addicts (Bickel & Marsch 2001;
Reynolds 2006). An important question that is still unre-
solved is whether these faster discounting factors exist as
preconditions or develop with experience. Impulsivity
shows a strong heritability that has been hypothesized to
underlie a pre-existing factor in addiction (Kreek et al.
2005). Impulsivity has been identified with changes in
neuromodulators, particularly serotonin13 (Chamberlain
et al. 2006); changing serotonin levels can lead to online
changes in discounting rates (Schweighofer et al. 2004;
Tanaka et al. 2004b). (Computationally, serotonin has
been explicitly modeled as controlling the discounting
factor in temporal-difference learning; Doya 2000a; 2002.)
Many drugs of abuse, such as cocaine, directly affect
serotonin levels (Paine et al. 2003; Ritz et al. 1987), while
in other substances, such as alcohol, self-administration
levels reflect serotonin levels (Chastain 2006; Valenzuela
& Harris 1997). It is currently unknown whether the
excess discounting seen in addicts is a pre-existing condition
or a consequence of the addictive process itself (Reynolds
2006). As with many of these vulnerabilities, it is possible
to have a positive feedback, in which pre-existing conditions
support the entrance to addiction (Kreek et al. 2005; Perry
et al. 2005; Poulos et al. 1995), and then post-addictive
consequences arising from pharmacology or experience
exacerbate it (Paine et al. 2003).
4.10. Vulnerability 10: Changes in learning rates
The decision-making system reviewed earlier depends on
learning associations among situations, outcomes, and
actions. These systems depend on specific learning rates.
Neuromodulators such as acetylcholine and dopamine
have been hypothesized to control learning rate par-
ameters (Doya 2000a; 2002; Gutkin et al. 2006; Hasselmo
1993; Hasselmo & Bower 1993; Yu & Dayan 2005).
Pharmacological substances that manipulate these learn-
ing rates can produce enhanced associations, leading to
overdeveloped expectations or habits. For example, nic-
otine enhances the presence of already available phasic
dopaminergic signals in vitro (Rice & Cragg 2004). Follow-
ing from a hypothesized role of phasic dopamine signals in
identifying high-value associations to be stored (Montague
et al. 1996; Schultz et al. 1997), this would predict that
nicotine would enhance small learning signals, further
increasing the likelihood of making cue-related associ-
ations. Although there is as yet no direct evidence for a
general role of nicotine in learning, if nicotine did gener-
ally enhance learning signals, this would make smokers
particularly susceptible to cue-driven associations (Chia-
mulera 2005). Multiple drugs taken simultaneously may
interact with each other, and drugs may interact with
natural rewards as well.
5. Drugs and the taxonomy of vulnerabilities
The 10 vulnerabilities listed here provide a taxonomy of
potential problems with decision processes.14 Because
neuromodulators (such as acetylcholine, serotonin,
norepinephrine, and dopamine) are involved throughout
the decision-making system (learning S!a relations,
storing and evaluating S!(a) O relations, recognition of
situations S, etc.), drugs of abuse are unlikely to access
only one subsystem. Because there are differences in
these vulnerabilities, any specific drug is also unlikely to
access all 10 vulnerabilities. Because behavioral control
involves the entire decision-making systems, behavioral
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problems such as gambling are likely to arise from an
interaction of vulnerabilities. Although each vulnerability
can drive an agent to return to the addictive choice, each
vulnerability also produces a characteristic symptomol-
ogy and can thus be separately identifiable within an
agent.
Different drugs are likely to access different vulnerabil-
ities. For example, whereas opiates are generally euphori-
genic on initial use (Koob & Le Moal 2006; Vulnerability
3), nicotine is often dysphoric on initial use (Heishman &
Henningfield 2000; Perkins 2001; Perkins et al. 1996;
making Vulnerability 3 unlikely). However, continued use
of nicotine can produce strong allostatic changes (Benowitz
1996; Koob & Le Moal 2006; Vulnerability 2), which
produce a very strong need to return levels to normal
(Fiore 2000). Nicotine also produces increases in the firing
of dopaminergic neurons (Balfour et al. 2000; Dani &
Heinemann 1996; Pidoplichko et al. 1997), which suggests
that it can also accesses the S!a overvaluation vulnerability
(Vulnerability 7). Cocaine use automates particularly quickly
(Miles et al. 2003) and produces a very strong cued relapse
(Altman et al. 1996; Childress et al. 1992; 1993; O’Brien
et al. 1992), suggesting that it also accesses the S!a over-
valuation vulnerability (Redish 2004; Vulnerability 7),
presumably through its direct effects on dopamine (Kuhar
et al. 1988; Ritz et al. 1987; Stuber et al. 2004; 2005).
However, chronic cocaine use can also produce long-term
changes in m- and k-opiate receptor levels (Shippenberg
et al. 2001), suggesting it can also access the allostatic vulner-
ability (Vulnerability 2). The appendix provides more details
on drugs and the potential vulnerabilities involved with each.
5.1. Individual vulnerabilities
One of the main thrusts of addiction research right now is
the question of why some people become addicted and
some do not (Deroche-Gamonet et al. 2004; Koob & Le
Moal 2006; Tarter et al. 1998; Volkow & Li 2005b).
These individual differences arise from an interaction
between the genetics of the individual, the development
environment (social and physical), the developmental
stage of the individual, and the behavioral experience
with the addictive substance (Koob & Le Moal 2006;
Kreek et al. 2005; Volkow & Li 2005a; 2005b). Laying
out the complete details of individual vulnerabilities are
beyond the scope of this article (and are in large part
still unknown), but the multiple-vulnerabilities hypothesis
put forward here suggests a plan of attack to the problem.
Addiction research has been historically aimed at pro-
blems with a single drug (e.g., nicotine, heroin, alcohol,
etc.) or at unifying parameters across drugs (e.g., the
role of dopamine). The multiple-vulnerabilities hypothesis
suggests that we should look, instead, at the potential vul-
nerabilities within the natural learning system.
These vulnerabilities are likely to depend on a number of
specific individual parameters. For example, imagine an
individual who was particularly sensitive to rewards and
punishments. That individual would be more susceptible
to Vulnerability 3 in which a drug of abuse produced a
euphorigenic signal. Imagine an individual who was more
likely to treat a slightly new situation as new. Such an indi-
vidual would be more susceptible to Vulnerability 6 in
which wins and losses are not matched. Or imagine an indi-
vidual in which the effect of nicotine on dopamine was
increased. Such an individual would receive a strong dopa-
mine kick with each puff of a cigarette and become particu-
larly vulnerable to Vulnerability 7. Perhaps, in some
individuals, nicotine produces excessive dopamine release
(Vulnerability 7), leading to a habit-like addiction,
whereas in others, nicotine produces allostatic changes
(Vulnerability 2), leading to a maintenance-of-levels addic-
tion. Other individuals may have neither of these vulner-
abilities, leaving them more resistant to becoming
addicted to nicotine.
5.2. Interactions among vulnerabilities
The failure points identified here are not mutually exclu-
sive; they can co-occur. For example, excess dopamine
delivered simultaneously to the ventral striatal regions
(hypothesized to be involved in the planning system), to
the dorsal striatal regions (hypothesized to be involved
in the habit system), and to the frontal cortices and hip-
pocampus (hypothesized to be involved in situation-cat-
egorization mechanisms) could drive an individual into
a host of vulnerabilities. Increased dopamine in the plan-
ning system has been hypothesized to lead to increased
motivational salience (Robinson & Berridge 2001; 2003;
2004; Vulnerability 4). Increased dopamine to the habit
system has been hypothesized to lead to overvaluation
of S!a associations (Bernheim & Rangel 2004; Redish
2004; Vulnerability 7). Increased dopamine to the situ-
ation-categorization system has been hypothesized to
change the stability of categorization systems (Redish et al.
2007; Seamans & Yang, 2004; Vulnerability 6). Thus, a
single effect of a single drug can access multiple failure
points.
Drugs can also produce multiple effects, which can
lead to multiple vulnerabilities all leading to maladaptive
decisions. For example, cocaine, amphetamine, and
methamphetamine pharmacologically block the dopa-
mine transporter (Kuhar et al. 1988; Ritz et al. 1987)
leading to increases in dopamine in the ventral striatum
(Stuber et al. 2005), but long-term exposure also leads
to changes in dopamine receptor levels (Letchworth
et al. 2001; Porrino et al. 2004a; 2004b), to a decrease
in dopamine release caused by other mechanisms
(Martinez et al. 2007), and to changes in long-term
depression (LTD) and long-term potentiation (LTP) in
ventral (Thomas et al. 2001) and dorsal (Nishioku et al.
1999) striatum. But long-term exposure to cocaine also
produces changes in opioid-receptor distributions
(Shippenberg et al. 2001). Each of these effects can
lead to an agent falling victim to a different vulnerability,
which can lead to separate mechanisms driving maladap-
tive decisions.
Similarly, nicotine has multiple access points through-
out the brain (Ikemoto et al. 2006). Repeated nicotine
use can lead to allostatic changes in response to the flood-
ing of the system with cholinergic agonists (Benowitz
1996; Koob & Le Moal 2006), but it also leads directly
to dopamine release (Pidoplichko et al. 1997), increases
the effect of glutamatergic inputs to the ventral tegmental
area (Mansvelder &McGehee 2000), and strengthens the
effect of already present phasic dopaminergic signals
(Rice & Cragg 2004). This combination of vulnerabilities
could lead to the subject falling victim to Vulnerability 2
(allostasis), to Vulnerability 7 (overvaluation in the habit
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system), and to Vulnerability 10 (increased learning rates
of drug-related cues) simultaneously. Treatment of only
the allostatic component (such as through nicotine repla-
cement therapy, Hanson et al. 2003; Rose et al. 1985)
would not treat the simultaneous problem arising from
the other vulnerabilities.
The fact that these vulnerabilities can interact implies
interactions between drugs which can lead to polydrug
abuse. Drugs may be synergistic in their effects on a
single vulnerability or they may involve multiple vulner-
abilities simultaneously. Cocaine and heroin both affect
the opiate system, and allostatic changes made in response
to one drug may affect the neurobiological response to
another (Leri et al. 2003). Nicotine enhances already
present dopaminergic signals (Rice & Cragg 2004), thus
the presence of nicotine (potentially changing learning
rates, Vulnerability 10) may enhance the ability of other
drugs to drive dopamine-produced overvaluation in the
planning (Vulnerability 4) or habit systems (Vulnerability
7). Similarly, amphetamine can sensitize cue-driven moti-
vational signals (Wyvell & Berridge 2000), which may
explain some of the interaction between cocaine and
methamphetamine addiction and sexual behavior (Schnei-
der & Irons 2001). Our theory suggests that polydrug
abuse arises from the same causes as drug abuse: Inter-
actions between the agent’s environment (drugs, cues,
and experience) and the agent’s internal decision-making
system (genetics, planning, and habit systems) lead to
the agent falling victim to vulnerabilities in the decision-
making system, leading to the continued use of proble-
matic drugs and behaviors.
We are not the first to suggest that decisions to take
drugs or to gamble can arise as a consequence of multiple
processes. These multiple-process theories are generally
discussed in terms of a transition sequence frommore cog-
nitive, “planned” processes to less cognitive, more “auto-
matic” processes. For example, Everitt and Robbins
(2005) suggest a transition sequence of “actions to habits
to compulsion.” Oei and Baldwin (2002) suggest a tran-
sition in alcohol consumption from a controlled process
to a more automatic habit-based process.
In contrast, it is our contention that there are many
paths through these vulnerabilities. It is not always a tran-
sition from flexible planning strategies to automated habit-
ual strategies.
Animal experiments have found numerous methods
through which animals can appear to lose control over
drug-taking, including escalation due to extended
exposure to drug availability (Ahmed & Koob 1998;
1999; 2004; 2005; Vanderschuren & Everitt 2004), incu-
bation by separation after exposure to drugs (Bossert
et al. 2005; Grimm et al. 2001), relapse due to stress
(Shaham et al. 2000; Shalev et al. 2000), relapse due to
reinstatement (de Wit & Stewart 1981; McFarland &
Kalivas 2001), and even that susceptibility time-courses
can change between individuals due to unknown (poten-
tially genetic) factors (Deroche-Gamonet et al. 2004;
Goldman et al. 2005; Hiroi & Agatsuma 2005; Ranaldi
et al. 2001).
Agents can show addictive decisions through vulnerabil-
ities in planning systems or through vulnerabilities in habit
systems or through vulnerabilities in the interaction
between them. Our suggestion is that there are many vul-
nerabilities in the decision-making system and thus many
ways for an agent to become addicted. This means that
there are many transition sequences as well.
5.3. Transitions
Clinically, the transition to addiction is usually described
in terms of three stages: initial exploratory or trial use, sub-
sequent maintenance of drug use associated with the
beginning of strong desires (craving), followed in some
users by a strong, habitual use in which the user loses
control of the drug use (Altman et al. 1996; Everitt &
Robbins 2005; Kalivas & Volkow 2005; Lowinson et al.
1997; Oei & Baldwin 2002; Robbins & Everitt 1999).
This sequence can be described as a path through the
vulnerabilities of the decision systems: once the drug
or behavior has been sampled, it will be repeated due
to euphorigenic, pharmacological, or socially positive
effects. Euphorigenic effects will drive repeated use due
to associated reward signals (Vulnerability 3). Pharmaco-
logical effects will drive repeated use due to fast homeo-
static changes (Vulnerability 1). It is also possible for
drugs that are not euphorigenic to be driven by associated
socially positive associations, such as has been hypoth-
esized for tobacco (Bobo & Husten 2001; Cummings
2002), alcohol (Bobo & Husten, 2001; Goldman et al.
1987; 1999), and caffeine (Greden & Walters 1997),
which we might categorize under Vulnerability 3.
However, repeated use will lead to potentiation of the
S!ðaÞ O relationship in the planning system (Vulnerability
4) and to the development of allostatic changes (Vulner-
ability 2), which will lead to strong desires and craving.
With sufficient habitual use, actions leading to drug use
can become over-valued in the habit system through
increased value associated with an S!a relationship (Vul-
nerability 7). This sequence parallels many examples of
normal learning, proceeding from ventral to dorsal striatal
systems (Balleine & Dickinson 1998; Everitt et al. 2001;
Haber et al. 2000; Letchworth et al. 2001; Packard &
McGaugh 1996).
This sequence will not be followed by all individuals or
via all drugs of abuse. The timeline with which individuals
make these transitions from vulnerability to vulnerability
likely depends on a complex interaction between the gen-
etics, development, and drug experience of the individual.
We do not expect all addicts to take the same path through
this maze of vulnerabilities.
Just as different tasks entail different interactions
between planning and habit systems (some tasks entail
transitions from planning to habit, other tasks always
require the planning system, other tasks require the
habit system, and other tasks can entail transitions from
habit to more flexible planning systems), we expect differ-
ent agents (with different genetics, different experiences,
etc.) to take different paths through these vulnerabilities.
In addition, just as some tasks entail an overlaying of
automated habit-like strategies on top of planning-based
strategies (e.g., Packard & McGaugh 1996), treating the
habit-based vulnerability of a patient may uncover
earlier planning-based vulnerabilities. Other agents can
show addictive decisions through vulnerabilities in habit
or interactive systems without ever passing through plan-
ning systems. It is also possible that habit-based addictive
decisions may shift to planning-based addictive decisions
(e.g., when obstacles are put into place). We argue that,
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in order to understand and treat the issue of addiction, we
need to know not only where the patient is in his or her tra-
jectory through these vulnerabilities, but also which vul-
nerability (vulnerabilities) the patient has fallen victim to.
5.4. Relapse
The fundamental issue with addiction is that of relapse,
which can be defined as drug-seeking or the making of
the addictive choice, even after a period of abstinence.
Relapse has been studied both clinically by measuring
populations remaining abstinent from drug use and in
animals identifying the return to responding for drug
after forced removal (extinction, forced abstinence). In
humans, relapse can occur after re-exposure to the drug,
to cues associated with drug-taking and drug-seeking,
and to stress (Self & Nestler 1998; Shalev et al. 2002).
Relapse to behavioral addictions (such as gambling) has
not been studied in the same detail, but we have suggested
that gambling addiction may be related to the reinstate-
ment of responding seen after extinction of normal
rewards (Redish et al. 2007, see also Bouton 2002;
2004). In animals, a return to responding can occur due
to acute re-exposure to the drug, to cues associated with
drug-taking and drug-seeking, and to stress (Bossert
et al. 2005; Kalivas et al. 2006; Shaham et al. 2003). The
validity of the reinstatement paradigm as a model of absti-
nence and relapse is still controversial (Kalivas et al. 2006;
Katz & Higgins 2003); nevertheless, the reinstatement
paradigm can provide an understanding of mechanisms
by which relapse could occur (Epstein & Preston 2003).
All of the vulnerabilities noted earlier can potentially
drive relapse to the addictive behavior, but the path to
relapse will differ depending on the vulnerabilities
involved.
For example, relapse driven via homeostatic needs
(Vulnerability 1) should occur through the natural time-
course of the homeostatic change. Relapse driven
through allostatic needs (Vulnerability 2) can be driven
by changes in physiological set-points, driven in part by
cues or by circadian or other rhythmic changes. The
natural time-course of these changes can be seen in
some smokers who show a circadian time-course of
craving (Benowitz 1996; Perkins 2001; Schmitz et al.
1997). Allostatic set-points driving expectation can also
be cue-driven (Ehrman et al. 1992; Hunt 1998; Meyer &
Mirin 1979; Siegel 1988). Experienced users can show
preparation tolerance with cues associated with heroin
(Meyer & Mirin 1979; O’Brien et al. 1977; Siegel 1988).
Similarly, alcohol users show fewer coordination deficits
under the influence of alcohol in alcohol-associated
environments (such as bars) than in non-alcohol-associ-
ated environments (such as offices) (Hunt 1998). A
number of authors have suggested that relapse under
stress may be due to cue-driven deviations from homeo-
static set-points (Ahmed & Koob 1997; Shaham et al.
2000; Shalev et al. 2000; Weiss et al. 2001).
Relapse caused by expectation (overvaluation in the
planning system, Vulnerabilities 3 and 4) can be identified
by “craving.” Such relapse can be triggered by a recall of
an S!ðaÞ O association, in which the agent recognizes an
action-sequence that can get the agent from the situation
the agent is currently in (S) to an over-valued outcome
(O). The recognition can be cue-driven or may arise
spontaneously, but in either case will entail an expectancy
of the outcome. As noted earlier, correct decision-making
within the planning component requires a search of mul-
tiple possibilities. It is likely that once a pathway to a
highly valued outcome is recognized, the search will
keep returning to that possibility, producing cognitive
blinding and obsession (Vulnerability 5). Both craving
and obsession are common to pre-relapse conditions in
some (but not all) patients (Altman et al. 1996; Childress
et al. 1988; Grant et al. 2006; MacKillop & Monti 2007;
O’Brien 2005; Sayette et al. 2000).
Note that our theory predicts that craving should be
clinically separable from relapse: Because the planning
system is flexible, recognition of a path to an outcome
(in our theory, craving is recognition of a path to a high-
valued outcome) does not necessarily lead to taking that
path. Thus, craving can occur without relapse. Because
the habit system does not include recognition of an
outcome, in our theory, it does not produce craving.
Thus, relapse caused by overvaluation in the habit
system (Vulnerability 7) may be robotic, without craving,
perhaps without even conscious recognition (Everitt &
Robbins 2005; Robbins & Everitt 1999). (Retrospectively,
the addict may believe he or she craved the drug, whether
or not any actual craving occurred prospectively; Sayette
et al. 2000.)
Multiple vulnerabilities can cause a relapse to the addic-
tive choice, but the pathway to that relapse may be differ-
ent, depending on the vulnerability involved. Therefore,
prevention of relapse will also depend on treating the vul-
nerabilities involved.
5.5. Treatment
Each vulnerability drives the decision-making process
towards the addictive choice and provides a potential
access-point for the addiction to relapse, but each vulner-
ability is a different failure-point of the decision process
and leads decision-making to error through a different
mechanism. Thus, each vulnerability is likely to require a
different treatment regimen. This concept (of different
treatments for different vulnerabilities) has enjoyed
some recent success and been used to explain historical
treatment failures. For example, in a recent study (Grant
et al. 2006), significant success was found in treating a
subset of pathological gamblers that showed strong urges
(craving). Irvin and colleagues (Irvin & Brandon 2000;
Irvin et al. 2003) suggest that the well-documented
decreasing success of smoking cessation in tobacco
studies is due to the presence of available over-the-
counter cessation-aid products and thus a changing distri-
bution of smokers participating in the studies.
Treatment of the homeostatic deviations and allostatic
changes in nicotine through nicotine replacement therapy
has been extremely successful (Balfour & Fagerstro¨m
1996; Benowitz 1996; Hanson et al. 2003; O’Brien 2005;
Rose et al. 1985). However, long-term relapse after these
treatments is notoriously high (Balfour & Fagerstro¨m
1996; Hanson et al. 2003; Monti & MacKillop 2007). This
is likely a consequence of the fact that nicotine replacement
therapy does not address the other vulnerabilities involved
in nicotine addiction (e.g., Vulnerability 7).
Treatment of the planning vulnerabilities (Vulnerabil-
ities 3, 4, and 5), which lead to excess expectation of
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positive outcomes (see above) and may be identifiable
through craving and obsession (Redish & Johnson 2007),
may depend on blocking the misevaluation process.
Opiate antagonists have been used to reduce craving in
alcohol addictions (Kiefer & Mann 2005; O’Brien et al.
1996) and in gambling (Grant et al. 2006). Many heroin
abusers on naltrexone report no craving (Meyer & Mirin
1979; O’Brien 2005, but see Halikas 1997 for another
view). Whether this is due to controlling allostatic effects
(Koob & Le Moal 2006) or to the blocking of craving
and the recognition of future rewards (O’Brien 2005) is
still unresolved. Naltrexone treatment of cocaine addicts
failed to find a significant effect on craving (Schmitz
et al. 2001). It is clear that there is still work to be done
to completely elucidate the specific relationship among
clinically tested treatments, the qualia identified as
craving, and the potential vulnerabilities identified in
this article.
Treatment of each vulnerability requires a regimen
specifically designed to address that vulnerability. For
example, the homeostatic and allostatic vulnerabilities (Vul-
nerabilities 1 and 2) likely require pharmacological treat-
ment to rebalance the system. Overvaluation in the
planning system (Vulnerabilities 3, 4, and 5) likely requires
treatment to change the recall and re-evaluation processes,
either through pharmacological means or through cognitive
behavioral re-training, or some combination of the two.
Overvaluation and over-strengthening in the habit system
(Vulnerabilities 7 and 8) likely require mechanisms with
which to strengthen alternative choices available in the
planning system. Miscategorization of situations (Vulner-
ability 6) likely requires treatments aimed at executive func-
tion and its role in re-categorizing situations. Although we
have not proposed specific treatments for any of these vul-
nerabilities, it is our contention that these failure modes are
treatable and that treatments aimed at these specific modes
are more likely to be successful than general treatments
aimed at the general addicted population.
In general, we propose that the clinical treatment of
addiction should not be addressed to the general addicted
population, or to specific drugs of abuse. Instead, we
propose that treatment should first entail the identification
of which vulnerabilities have been triggered within the
individual, and then treatment should be addressed to
the specific constellation of vulnerabilities into which the
addicted patient has fallen.
6. Future work is still needed
The thesis of this review is that addiction arises from vul-
nerabilities inherent in the decision-making system within
the brain. Susceptibility to these vulnerabilities arises
through an interaction among the genetics of the individ-
ual, the development environment, the social milieu, and
the behavioral experience of the individual. We have
outlined several vulnerabilities that arise from current
theories of the mammalian decision-making system.
However, it is important to note that the understanding
of that decision-making system is still incomplete.
Exactly what differentiates the planning and habit
systems is still being debated (e.g., Daw et al. 2005;
Dayan & Balleine 2002; Redish & Johnson 2007). Detailed
computational models of the habit system have been
developed (Montague et al. 1996; Samejima et al. 2005;
Suri & Schultz 1999, but see Berridge 2007, for an alternate
view), including how those systems could produce addic-
tion-like behavior (Bernheim & Rangel 2004; Redish
2004). But computational models of the planning system
are still in their earliest stages (Daw et al. 2005; Johnson
& Redish 2005; Zilli & Hasselmo, 2008). How these
systems interact to produce behavior is still unknown.
A number of open questions still remain. For example,
the decision-making theories discussed in this article are
primarily about reinforcement (delivery of unexpected
reward) and disappointment (non-delivery of expected
reward). The role of aversion (delivery of punishment)
and relief (non-delivery of expected punishment) in
these decision-making systems is still unresolved. Negative
symptoms clearly play important roles in addiction (Gawin
1991; Jaffe 1992; Koob & Le Moal 2001; 2005; 2006;
O’Brien et al. 1992). How to incorporate those negative
symptoms beyond homeostatic (Vulnerability 1) and allo-
static (Vulnerability 2) effects is still unclear. Detailed
decision-making models in the face of aversion and relief
may help elucidate these issues. The fear-conditioning
and extinction literature (Domjan 1998; Myers & Davis
2002; 2007) and the roles of the amygdala (Pare´ et al.
2004; Phelps & LeDoux 2005; Rodrigues et al. 2004)
and prefrontal cortex (Milad & Quirk 2002; Quirk et al.
2006) therein are likely to be important starting points
for these models.
Similarly, the key parameters that underlie individual
differences are still unknown, including whether those
key parameters are genetic, environmental, or some com-
bination thereof (Kreek et al. 2005; Volkow & Li 2005b).
Models of decision-making can provide candidate vari-
ables that may vary across the population, which may
change susceptibilities to specific vulnerabilities and
would lead to individual reactions to drugs of abuse or
potentially addictive behaviors.
The key social definition of a problem addiction relates to
the cost to the individual and to society of the addiction.
Whereas methamphetamine addiction is a terrible burden
on society and thus leads to extreme measures taken to
prevent it, caffeine addiction leads to a minor inconveni-
ence to an individual and little or no burden on society.
In part, we believe that these differences arise from the
different vulnerabilities impacted by these drugs. Problem
gambling is often classified as an addiction due in large
part to the extreme costs paid by “addicted” individuals.
Whether other behaviors, such as shopping or Internet
use, should be counted as addictions is an open question
(Holden 2001). In this article, we have proposed a new fra-
mework for understanding addiction. This new framework
provides a new definition of addiction itself as decisions
made due to failure modes in the decision-making system.
How serious each failure mode is, whether it should be
treated, and how it should be treated, are clinical and
policy issues that need to be addressed in the future.
The list of vulnerabilities laid out in this target article are
certainly incomplete. There are likely to be other processes
beyond decision-making that can drive errors, including
errors in probability recognition (Kahneman et al. 1982),
different responses to gains and losses (Kahneman &
Tversky 2000), and errors in memory itself (Schacter
2001). We have not fully explored the potential interactions
between the decision-making vulnerabilities, nor have we
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fully explored the interaction between decision-making vul-
nerabilities and other memory-based errors.
Clinically, we cannot yet relate these potential vulnerabil-
ities to other action-selection and decision-making disorders
such as obsessive-compulsive disorder, Tourette’s syn-
drome, depression, mania disorders, anxiety disorders,
impulsivity disorders, and so on. However, we believe that
the paradigm laid out in this article (taking a basic-science
understanding of action-selection and decision-making and
identifying failure modes) is likely to be fruitful for under-
standing many other psychiatric disorders beyond addiction.
More importantly, however, we do not yet have specific
clinical instruments with which to identify the presence or
absence of each vulnerability within an individual, nor do
we have specific clinical treatments (pharmacological,
behavioral, or otherwise) to suggest. Our hope, however,
is that the framework laid out in this article and the identi-
fication of these vulnerabilities can lead to research aimed
at identification and treatment.
More work elucidating an understanding of the mamma-
lian decision-making system is clearly needed, but we
believe that the current understanding of this system can
already illuminate addictive processes. It is our belief that
an interaction between basic science research on decision-
making, basic science research on the neurophysiological
effects of addictive substances and behaviors, and the clini-
cal consequences of addiction will illuminate both processes
and will provide new avenues for the treatment of addiction.
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APPENDIX
The vulnerabilities hypothesis laid out in this target article pro-
vides a taxonomy of addictive processes. This means that it
should be possible to characterize the effects of drugs of abuse
(and problematic behaviors) in terms of these vulnerabilities in
the decision-making system. In this appendix, we address the clini-
cal and neurophysiological effects of known drugs of abuse in the
light of the vulnerabilities identified in the text: cocaine and psy-
chostimulants (A), opiates (B), nicotine (C), alcohol (D), and caf-
feine (E). Finally, we discuss problem gambling (F).
A. Cocaine and the psychostimulants
The primary neurobiological effect of cocaine and the psychosti-
mulants is to produce large increases of dopamine pharmacologi-
cally, by blocking dopamine reuptake (cocaine, Chen et al. 2006;
Kuhar et al. 1988; Ritz et al. 1987)15 or releasing dopamine-con-
taining vesicles (amphetamine, Sulzer et al. 2005). These can be
measured quantitatively throughout the dorsal and ventral stria-
tum, and continue to appear, even after cocaine is well predicted
(Ito et al. 2002; Roitman et al. 2004; Stuber et al. 2005). This dopa-
mine release bypasses the brain’s computational systems, which
direct when and how dopamine should be released (Schultz
1998; 2002). This non-compensable dopamine release (Di
Chiara 1999) has been hypothesized to lead to an overvaluation
within the habit system (Bernheim & Rangel 2004; Redish 2004;
Vulnerability 7). However, cocaine also leads to dopamine
release in the ventral striatum (Ito et al. 2000; Roitman et al.
2004; Stuber et al. 2005), which can lead to development of over-
valuation in the planning system as well (Vulnerability 4).
Cocaine intake also produces transient euphoric highs (Balster
1973; Gold 1997; Volkow et al. 2003), which implies a component
that can mimic reward (Vulnerability 3), followed by a very
strong post-high crash (Gawin 1991; Koob & Le Moal 2006),
which may imply a role of homeostatic mechanisms (Vulner-
ability 1). One potential issue is that psychostimulants can
enhance performance of simple tasks and are sometimes used
in reaction to fatigue and boredom (Koob & Le Moal 2006),
again implying a potential vulnerability in the relief of homeo-
static deviations (Vulnerability 1). With repeated use, users
become tolerant to dosages and the subjective high becomes
harder to reach with a given dose (suggesting a role for allostasis,
Koob & Le Moal 2006; Vulnerability 2).
Cocaine craving is extremely cue-sensitive, in that cues associ-
ated with cocaine use lead to strong cravings (Childress et al.
1988; 1992; O’Brien et al. 1992), involving memory circuits
including the hippocampus, ventral striatum, and orbitofrontal
cortex (Childress et al. 1999; Garavan et al. 2000; Grant et al.
1996; Volkow et al. 2003). These circuits are key components
of the planning system and suggest an involvement of excess
S!(a) O associations, possibly driven by dopamine in the limbic
structures (implying a role for Vulnerabilities 4 and 5).
However, cocaine craving can be separated from drug-seeking
behavior (Dudish-Poulsen & Hatsukami 1997), suggesting that,
for some patients, drug-seeking depends on the non-craving-pro-
ducing vulnerabilities. Anecdotal descriptions suggest the pre-
sence of cue-induced “robotic” relapse in the absence of
identified craving (Altman et al. 1996, implying a role for Vulner-
ability 7).
Some researchers have found that cocaine-seeking is goal-
directed (Olmstead et al. 2001), implying an involvement of the
planning system (Vulnerabilties 1 to 5). However, cocaine and
amphetamine have long been associated with motor stereotypies
associated with habit-system structures such as the dorsal stria-
tum (Johanson & Fischman 1989; Koob & Le Moal 2006), imply-
ing an involvement of Vulnerability 7. Other researchers have
found that prior treatment with amphetamine can lead to a
faster development of automated behaviors, even during naviga-
tion and food-seeking (Nelson & Killcross 2006; O’Tuatheigh
et al. 2003), implying an involvement of Vulnerability 8. That
many vulnerabilities are accessed by cocaine may be one of the
reasons why successful treatment has been so elusive.
B. Opiates
Opiates have been noted as a drug of choice since ancient times
(Koob & Le Moal 2006). Modern opiates include the processed
forms of the opium poppy, including opium, morphine, heroin,
meperidine (Demerol), oxycodone (OxyContin), and codeine.
Abused opiate drugs are all strong agonists of the m-opioid recep-
tor (Jaffe et al. 1997; Negus et al. 1993; van Ree et al. 1999), in
contrast to drugs that have strong k-agonist properties (Jaffe
et al. 1997).
Five components of the reaction to opioid intake have been
identified (Koob & Le Moal 2006): a euphoric rush of intense
pleasure, often characterized by analogy to sexual orgasm, fol-
lowed by a general feeling of well-being, followed then by a
detached, separated state which can include virtual unconscious-
ness, and finally, a fade back to an appearance of normality. This
is then followed by a fifth, highly dysphoric withdrawal state
(Jaffe et al. 1997; Koob & Le Moal 2006).
The presence of the intense euphorigenia suggests a relation-
ship to Vulnerability 3. The development of tolerance and the
presence of a withdrawal state suggest a potential implication
of Vulnerability 2. The fact that the withdrawal can occur after
only a single use (Azolosa et al. 1994; Harris & Gewirtz 2005;
Koob & Le Moal 2006) suggests the presence of homeostatic
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changes (Vulnerability 1) as well as long-term allostatic changes
(Vulnerability 2). However, relapse can also occur well after all
identified withdrawal symptoms have subsided (Shalev et al. 2002).
One potential explanation for relapse long after obvious with-
drawal symptoms have faded is changes in expectations arising
from associations with environmental stimuli (Meyer & Mirin
1979). Homeostatic expectation can also be cue-driven
(Ehrman et al. 1992; Meyer & Mirin 1979; Siegel 1988). Experi-
enced users can show preparation tolerance with cues associated
with heroin (Meyer & Mirin 1979; O’Brien et al. 1977; Siegel
1988). However, opiate addicts are not generally described as
“robotic” (Altman et al. 1996), and opiate addiction generally
involves a strong craving component (Meyer & Mirin 1979).
These data suggest that the environmental stimuli are more
related to S!a O associations, rather than S!a associations,
implying a stronger involvement of the planning system (Vulner-
abilities 4 and 5) than of the habit system (Vulnerability 7).
Many studies have reported that heroin delivery leads to dopa-
mine activity in vitro (Johnson & North 1992) and dopamine
release in the accumbens shell in vivo (Caille´ & Parsons 2003;
Hemby et al. 1995; Kiyatkin 1994; Kiyatkin & Rebec 1997;
Tanda et al. 1997; Wise et al. 1995; Xi et al. 1998). Although
cocaine and psychostimulants always increase dopamine levels
in the nucleus accumbens and striatum, no matter how well pre-
dicted (Stuber et al. 2005), Hemby et al. (1995) have reported
that heroin only increases dopamine in unpredicted conditions.
This finding, however, has not been replicated by other labs
(Caille´ & Parsons 2003; Wise et al. 1995; Xi et al. 1998) which
have found that heroin self-administration does increase dopa-
mine levels in the nucleus accumbens. Kiyatkin and Rebec
(1997; 2001) report an increase in dopamine in the nucleus
accumbens on initiation of self-administration, in preparation
for self-administration, and in response to presentation of a
heroin-associated cue, but a sudden drop in response to the
actual delivery of heroin during self-administration maintenance.
This sequence is very similar to that seen in the lever-press for
food (Kiyatkin & Gratton 1994; Schultz 1998; 2002), but very
different from cocaine (Roitman et al. 2004; Stuber et al.
2005). Kiyatkin (1994) also reports that passive delivery of
heroin led to long-term increases in dopamine similar to that
reported by Hemby et al. (1995). Recently Georges et al.
(2006) found no effect of morphine on dopamine cells in vivo
in morphine-dependent rats. We suggest that re-examining
these data in light of the hypothesized roles of the dopamine
and opiate systems (Berridge & Robinson, 1998; 2003; Montague
et al. 1996; Redish, 2004; Redish & Johnson 2007; Schultz 1998;
2002; and see target article earlier) may be fruitful, and we
believe that these data suggest that opiate addiction is not
likely to involve Vulnerability 7.
C. Nicotine
Nicotine is the primary addictive substance in tobacco products,
including cigarettes, as well as smokeless tobacco products
(Schmitz et al. 1997). Nicotine is extremely addictive, with a
very large proportion of teenagers who sample cigarettes even-
tually succumbing to long-term regular use (Russell 1990). The
neurobiological effects of nicotine are well reviewed elsewhere
(Benowitz 1996; Koob & Le Moal 2006) and therefore not
reviewed here. Nicotine treatment has primarily been through
prevention education (Fiore 2000; Schmitz et al. 1997) and nic-
otine replacement therapy (Balfour & Fagerstro¨m 1996; Beno-
witz 1996; Hanson et al. 2003; O’Brien 2005; Rose et al. 1985).
However, replacement therapy is susceptible to relapse
(Balfour & Fagerstro¨m 1996; Fiore 2000; Hanson et al. 2003),
and current treatments are becoming less successful over time,
possibly due to differences in the population still smoking
(Irvin & Brandon 2000; Irvin et al. 2003).
Nicotine is, however, dysphoric on initial use (Heishman &
Henningfield 2000; Perkins 2001; Perkins et al. 1996). Thus, it
is unlikely to access Vulnerability 1 or Vulnerability 3.
However, attitudes towards nicotine products can drive positive
views of use, which may lead to social pressures that can
support initial usage (Cummings 2002).
Nicotine also leads to very large changes in allostatic levels of
acetylcholine, dopamine, and other neuromodulators (Flores
et al. 1997; Koob & Le Moal 2006; Marks et al. 1992), which
would access Vulnerability 2. These allostatic effects may be
due to changes in levels of cholinergic receptors in the brain
(Flores et al. 1997; Koob & Le Moal 2006; Marks et al. 1992).
Deviations from allostatic levels lead to very powerful withdrawal
effects (Schmitz et al. 1997), which presumably reflect changes in
the perceived needs of an agent, which would lead to strong crav-
ings aimed at restoring those deviations. These deviations can be
seen in a daily cycle in the reaction to the initial cigarette of the
day (Perkins et al. 1996). It is likely that nicotine replacement
therapy can affect these allostatic levels, which may suggest
that replacement therapy is treating Vulnerability 2.
However, nicotine increases the activity of dopamine neurons
through the activity of nicotinic acetylcholine receptors on dopa-
mine neurons (Mansvelder & McGehee 2002; Pidoplichko et al.
1997). In addition, nicotine increases the effectiveness of associated
dopaminergic signals (Rice&Cragg 2004). These effects could lead
to non-compensable value-prediction-error signals (Redish 2004),
which would suggest that nicotine use is likely to access Vulner-
ability 7. This vulnerability would lead to excess cue-related trig-
gers. Nicotine shows a particularly high cue-related susceptibility
to relapse (Chiamulera 2005; Kenny & Markou 2005; LeSage
et al. 2004). Extinction and behavioral treatments potentially
aimed at Vulnerability 7 have had limited success so far (Monti
&MacKillop 2007; Schmitz et al. 1997). Providing valuable alterna-
tives has had some success (Higgins et al. 2002).
D. Alcohol
Alcohol has long been identified as a drug of abuse, and it may be
one of the first drugs to have been regularly abused by humans
(Goodwin & Gabrielli 1997). The neurobiological effects of
alcohol are well reviewed elsewhere (Hunt 1998; Koob & Le
Moal 2006; Valenzuela & Harris 1997) and hence not reviewed
here. Alcohol has extensive neurobiological effects, both in
terms of acute effects on membrane lipids and on ion channels
as well as long-term changes in expression of GABAA and
NMDA receptors (Hunt 1998; Littleton 1998; Valenzuela &
Harris 1997). This may be indicative of allostatic changes (Vul-
nerability 2). Supporting these hypotheses, alcohol intake leads
to very strong withdrawal symptoms (Goodwin & Gabrielli
1997; Hunt 1998), both in terms of acute intake (e.g., a hangover,
Swift & Davidson 1998, suggesting an involvement of Vulner-
ability 1) and after chronic, long-term intake (Saitz 1998,
suggesting involvement of Vulnerability 2).
Much of the theoretical drive behind an understanding of
alcohol addiction has arisen from the relationship between cogni-
tive expectancies and alcohol consumption (“alcohol expectancy
theory”; Goldman et al. 1987; 1999; Jones et al. 2001). These
expectancies can be related to the “if-then” cognitive component
of the planning system. Thus, early consumption can be due to
positive expectations in the planning system (Vulnerability 3).
There is a strong interaction between alcohol and the endogen-
ous opioid systems (Herz 1997). Some success has been found
from pharmacological treatment with opioid antagonists such
as naltrexone in alcoholic subjects, particularly in reducing
craving (O’Brien et al. 1996; Sinha & O’Malley 1999). Alcohol
addiction shows a strong cue-driven craving and desire (Child-
ress et al. 1993; Hunt 1998; MacKillop & Monti 2007; Sinha &
O’Malley 1999), suggesting involvement of the planning
system. Alcohol users show fewer coordination deficits under
the influence of alcohol in alcohol-associated environments
(such as bars) than in non-alcohol-associated environments
(such as offices), suggesting a cue-driven preparation due to
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expectation of alcohol intake (Hunt 1998). However, Dickinson
et al. (2002) found that alcohol intake did not show devaluation
even when a comparably trained food-reward did, suggesting a
developing involvement of the habit system. Some theories of
alcohol consumption have been explicitly tied to the transition
from cognitive to automatic learning (Oei & Baldwin 2002). Neu-
robiologically, the effects of heavy drinking are concentrated on
hippocampal and prefrontal cortical function (Devenport et al.
1981a; Hunt 1998; Oscar-Berman & Marinkovic 2003; White
2003), which may lead to an imbalance between the planning
and habit systems (Vulnerability 8).
Genetic effects on alcoholism have been well studied (Dick
et al. 2006; Herz 1997; Stewart & Li 1997), in particular, in the
relationship between genes involved in negative consequences
of drinking alcohol (Nurnberger & Bierut 2007). Not surpris-
ingly, people who experience more negative consequences
during early drinking experiences are less likely to become
addicted to alcohol (Goldman et al. 1999).
Alcohol addiction is clearly a spectrum disorder, with a wide
variety of paths to dependence (Nurnberger & Bierut 2007).
Alcohol intake stimulates dopaminergic neurons in the ventral
tegmental area (VTA) and substantia nigra; however, these
effects are dependent on the intermediate release of opioid pep-
tides (Di Chiara 1997). It is an interesting (and open) question
whether the dopamine release due to alcohol intake is more
akin to the non-compensable effect of cocaine (Stuber et al.
2005, suggesting influence of Vulnerability 7; Redish 2004) or
to the compensable effect of food (Schultz 1998, suggesting influ-
ence of Vulnerability 3; Redish & Johnson 2007).
E. Caffeine
Although caffeine is often not treated as a typical drug of abuse
(Koob & Le Moal 2006), and is not regulated legally at this
time, it does have strong psychopharmacological effects and
has been identified as leading to a measurable drug-dependence
(Daly & Fredholm 1998; Evans 1998; Greden & Walters 1997).
The most noticeable affect of caffeine related to abuse is the
well-identified caffeine withdrawal syndrome (Evans 1998;
Nehlig 1999), which can last for several days once caffeine
intake has been stopped. However, after that, there is a very
low level of subsequent relapse, and neither craving for caffeine
nor robotic automatic caffeine-ingestion behaviors appear. Sub-
jects showing strong withdrawal symptoms are significantly
more likely to self-administer caffeine than subjects not
showing strong withdrawal symptoms, suggesting that the re-
establishment of homeostasis underlies much of the caffeine
addiction. This suggests that the primary effect of caffeine is
due to easily reversible homeostatic (Vulnerability 1) or allostatic
(Vulnerability 2) effects. Evidence suggests that large doses of
caffeine can lead to dopamine release in both accumbens and
caudate nucleus, but only in doses much higher than typically
seen in human consumption (Nehlig 1999; Nehlig & Boyet
2000). This suggests that caffeine is unlikely to access the other
vulnerabilities, which may explain the ease with which caffeine
intake can often be stopped.
F. Gambling
Although gambling does not entail direct pharmacological
manipulation of the decision-making system, it has been
suggested to share many properties with the pharmacological
addictions (Dickerson & O’Connor 2006; Potenza et al. 2001),
in large part because it entails obvious (and often explicitly
acknowledged) problematic decision-making (Dickerson &
O’Connor 2006; Potenza 2006; Raylu & Oei 2002; Toneatto
et al. 1997; Walker 1992a). Because the primary argument of
our unified framework is that addiction entails vulnerabilities in
decision-making, we argue that pathological gambling can also
be explained within this framework.
The key to pathological gambling has been suggested to lie in
distortions in estimates of the value of certain decisions. Agents
in general show deficits and distortions in probability estimates,
particularly in the difference between probabilities of wins and
losses in the face of noisy variables (Dickerson & O’Connor
2006; Griffiths 1994). These deficits may lead to the process
known as the “illusion of control” in which agents believe they
can control probabilistic situations due to a miscalculation of pre-
dictability relationships between cues and outcomes (Langer &
Roth 1975; Sylvain et al. 1997). This can lead to “hindsight bias,”
in which gamblers explain away losses through the back identifi-
cation of differential cues (Custer 1984; Wagenaar 1988). A
number of researchers have argued that these may be the key to
the process of “chasing” in which gamblers try to recapture
losses by risking larger and larger gambles (Dickerson &
O’Connor 2006; Lesieur 1977; Wagenaar 1988). These descrip-
tions suggest that a large part of the gambling addictive process
is due to Vulnerability 6 (Redish et al. 2007).
As noted by Parke and Griffiths (2004), an effective way to
create a near miss in a gambling context is to manipulate the
“trail” by which the gambler completes the process (Dickerson
& O’Connor 2006). This can provide the user with additional
cues to identify the situations categorized, providing the user
with (incorrect) support for the hypothesis that there is a control-
lable sequence of situations, which, if the gambler could only
control correctly, would lead to the win. Over the last several
decades, manufacturers have changed lottery cards, video
poker, and slot machines to add additional complexity, providing
additional variables and additional cues (Dickerson & O’Connor
2006; Parke & Griffiths 2004), which would increase the likeli-
hood of misclassification of situations (Redish et al. 2007).
This classification component plays a role in both the planning
and the habit components, and therefore, we can expect gam-
blers to potentially show key aspects of the planning or the
habit systems or both. Gamblers with problems associated with
inputs to the planning system may show the signs of planning
system deficits, including explicit expectations, craving, and
complex, planned behaviors. Gamblers with problems associated
with inputs to the habit system may show a more robotic, less
self-recognized gambling behavior. Whether these differences
translate to differences in preferred games is unknown but may
be a testable avenue for future research.
The opiate antagonists naltrexone (Potenza et al. 2001) and
nalmefene (Grant et al. 2006) are effective in the short-term
treatment of gambling addiction, but only in subjects with
strong gambling urges (i.e., craving, thus suggesting an involve-
ment of the planning system over the habit system). No effective
treatment has yet been found for pathological gamblers who do
not show strong urges (i.e., suggesting a primary involvement
of the habit system over the planning system).
Whether other vulnerabilities (such as an over-release of dopa-
mine with monetary wins) can also lead to pathological gambling
is still unknown, but a number of researchers have suggested that
there are multiple pathways to pathological gambling (Dickerson
& O’Connor 2006).
NOTES
1. Some literatures have suggested that the value used is sub-
jective value or subjective expected utility, in which the expected
value is modified by (usually concave) functions (Glimcher &
Rustichini 2004; Kahneman & Tversky 2000; Kahneman et al.
1982). Although this can explain changes in risk-seeking and
risk-aversion, it does not have a major effect on the failure-
points proposed in this article. Other literatures have suggested
an importance of additional parameters such as risk and uncer-
tainty (Hastie 2001; Preuschoff et al. 2006; Rapoport & Wallsten
1972).
2. The farther an event is in the future, the more likely it is
that unexpected events can disrupt the predicted event (Sozou
1998; Stephens & Krebs 1987). Thus, the farther an event is in
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the future, the more potential there is for error and the less value
one should assign to the event. The reward value of future events
should therefore be discounted as a function of the time before
reward is expected to be received. Additionally, the more
quickly one receives a reward, the more one can invest it, pre-
sumably providing a positive return (whether in terms of
money, energy, or offspring) – again, providing for the necessity
of a discounting function (Frederick et al. 2002; Stephens &
Krebs 1987). See Madden et al. (in press) for review.
3. The route system has also been termed the taxon system
(O’Keefe & Nadel 1978; Scho¨ne 1984) or the response system
(Packard & McGaugh 1992; Poldrack & Packard 2003).
4. The S-A system has been termed the S-R (stimulus-
response) system (Dickinson 1985; Domjan 1998; Hull 1943;
1952), but we prefer to use the term S!a , which prevents con-
fusion with R as indicating reward. In addition, much of the psy-
chology literature is phrased in terms of “stimulus” rather than
“situation,” but we prefer the term situation because that indi-
cates the recognition of context, cue, and interactions between
cues, all of which are critical for appropriate behavior. In the
machine learning literature, “situation” is referred to as “state”
(Daw et al. 2006; Sutton & Barto 1998), but we prefer the
term situation because in other literatures, “state” refers to
internal parameters of the agent (e.g., “motivation states”;
Domjan 1998). The categorization of situation includes both
internal and external parameters.
5. Because actions selected via !a O associations only occur
within a context, they too contain situation S components and
should probably also be identified as S!a O. Contexts can be dif-
ferentiated from cueing stimuli in that contextual information
changes slowly relative to the time-course of action-selection,
whereas conditioning stimuli change quickly. Thus, contextual
stimuli cannot be seen as driving actions, but actions are still
only taken from within identified situations. We do not explore
this issue further here, but note that our concept of situations
includes categorizations derived from both contextual and
driving stimuli.
6. The role of d-opiate receptors is more controversial (Broom
et al. 2002; Herz 1997; Matthes et al. 1996).
7. German and Fields (2007a; 2007b) have shown that con-
ditioned place preference (Tzschentke 1998) is in fact due to
repeated transitions into the drug-associated location, implying
that conditioned place preference is evidence of drug-seeking.
8. This inability to recategorize situations’ vulnerability will
also relate to the interaction-between-systems vulnerability (Vul-
nerability 8), below.
9. It is possible for internal states (e.g., hunger) to be incor-
porated into the situation S term, but this would require separate
learning under the different internal-state conditions (e.g., under
hungry and thirsty conditions) without generalization.
10. This inability is seen in rats with fimbria-fornix lesions
(Hirsh 1974).
11. This version in which value is a function of both situation
and the subsequent action is called Q-learning (Sutton & Barto
1998). Other instantiations have been proposed as well.
However, the differences are subtle and not critical to our
needs in this paper. We therefore only describe the very basics
of Q-learning.
12. Although the habit system does not directly take the
immediate needs of the agent into account, it is possible that con-
tinued positive evaluation of drug-taking (or negative evaluation
of abstinence) due to the changed-needs vulnerability could
slowly train up the habit system, leading to a shift in drug use
from the compulsive, needs-based vulnerability to a more
robotic, habit-based vulnerability, independent of changes in
homeostatic or allostatic set-points.
13. Other neuromodulators may be involved as well.
14. There are certainly going to be other problems that have
not yet been identified, but these 10 can provide a starting point
for this discussion.
15. Note that cocaine similarly blocks reuptake of norepi-
nephrine and serotonin through blockage of their respective
transporters (Ritz et al. 1987); however, the behavioral/addictive
consequences of these effects are not known.
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Abstract: The unified framework for addiction (UFA) formulated by
Redish et al. is a tour de force. It uniquely predicts that there should
be multiple addiction syndromes and pathways – a diversity that would
reflect the complexity of the mammalian brain decision system. Here
I explore some of the evolutionary and developmental ramifications of
UFA and derive several new avenues for research.
The postulation of a complex decision system (i.e., with multiple
subparts and subprocesses) for explaining addictive and other
apparently irrational behaviors has some precedents. In most
previous models, however, decision systems were almost invari-
ably modeled by two subsystems in conflict with each other.
For instance, Thaler and Shefrin (1981) modeled “the individual
as an organization” with two coexisting selves, a “myopic doer”
and a “farsighted planner.” (For a recent neural instantiation of
this two-self model, see McClure et al. 2004.) In these dual deci-
sional models, addiction arose when the myopic doer won the
competition against the planner for behavioral control, thereby
defining only one single pathway to addiction (i.e., from future-
oriented, goal-directed actions to blind habits). What is original
in Redish et al.’s unified framework for addiction (UFA) is that
there is no winner, no loser. Each decision subsystem has its
own specific potential failure points or vulnerabilities, each
leading to a specific addiction symptom when accessed by a
drug or behavior. Multiple simultaneous or sequential inter-
actions among these vulnerabilities would then generate a wide
diversity of possible addiction syndromes and/or transitions.
Thus, according to UFA, addiction should be a spectrum dis-
order whose phenotypic diversity reflects the complexity of the
mammalian brain decision system. This new link between brain
decision system complexity and addiction diversity has several
interesting evolutionary and developmental ramifications. Most
of them, however, are almost completely ignored in the target
article. In this commentary, I highlight those with special rel-
evance for future research in the field.
First, the divergent evolution of the complexity of mammalian
brain decision systems implies that the diversity of possible addic-
tions should vary between different species, in general, and
between nonhumanmammals and humans, in particular. Interest-
ingly, the component of the brain decision system with the
highest number of potential failure points – the planning
subsystem – is also the component that has diverged the most in
mammalian evolution. Planning for the far future – which
depends on an intact and fully developed prefrontal cortex – has
long been, and still is, thought to set humans apart from other
animals, including mammals (e.g., Baumeister & Heatherton
1996; Searle 2001; Suddendorf & Corballis 2007). Although
more research is needed to better define the planning abilities
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of nonhuman mammals, current evidence nevertheless clearly
indicates that they are “stuck in time” (Roberts 2002). For
instance, rats or mice – the most frequently used animal models
for human addictions – do plan for the immediate future in a
goal-directed manner (Dickinson & Balleine 1994), but they are
incapable of generating and maintaining long-term goals. The pro-
found divergence in planning between nonhuman mammals and
humans should somehow constrain the “addiction space” that
the former could explore compared to the latter. To take
an extreme example, imagine an agent endowed with a situation-
recognition subsystem and a habit subsystem but no planning sub-
system (and thus no higher-order subsystem that coordinates the
activity of the whole). According to UFA, this myopic agent
should be exposed to only three decisional vulnerabilities (i.e.,
Vulnerabilities 6, 7, and 10) and, therefore, should be affected
by a restricted subset of addictions (i.e., habit-like addiction).
Therefore, a critical goal for future research using UFA will be
to identify among the actual spectrum of addiction syndromes
affecting modern humans the syndromes that are unique to
humans and those that are common, ceteris paribus, with other
animals with less complex decision systems. This research has
obvious implications for the current status and future development
of animal models of human addictions and, in fine, for the neuro-
biology of addictions, which is still largely based on animal research.
Second, as the brain decision system evolves between species,
it also develops within a single individual. In view of its complex-
ity, however, it is highly unlikely that all of the different subparts
of the brain decision system will depend on the same develop-
mental programs and thus will develop at the same pace. For
instance, the planning subsystem of humans develops more
slowly than the habit subsystem (e.g., Blakemore 2008; Ernst
et al. 2006). Humans until late in adolescence are shortsighted
planners who depend heavily on parental and/or societal fore-
sight. The differential development of each subpart of the
brain decision system implies that not all potential decisional
failure points will be accessible during the same developmental
stage. As a result, the age of onset of drug use is expected to
affect the diversity of addiction syndromes and/or transitions
that can affect a developing individual. An important challenge
for future research will be to determine how the addiction spec-
trum varies with the age of onset of drug use and how this vari-
ation is correlated with the differential development of each
subpart of the brain decision system. Alternatively, drug use
may also interfere with the proper development of the brain
decision system. Thus, drugs of abuse could not only distort or
subvert the normal function of a fully developed decision sub-
structure, as conceptualized by UFA, but also retard or even
accelerate its development per se. This would change the
number of decisional vulnerabilities accessible at each develop-
mental stage and, therefore, the spectrum of addiction pathways.
Future research is clearly needed to add developmental
dynamics into UFA.
Finally, I would like to stress that although UFA is no doubt an
important step toward a unified neurobiological theory of addiction
with interesting evolutionary and developmental ramifications, it
still falls short of explaining choices between different kinds of
rewards that are inherent to drug use and addiction. A recent
series of controlled choice experiments from our laboratory pro-
vides a particularly vivid illustration of this important limitation
(Lenoir et al. 2007). Rats with a long history of intravenous
cocaine self-administration were allowed to choose between two
different actions: one action was rewarded by intravenous
cocaine, the other by a brief access to water sweetened with sac-
charine or sucrose. Previous research has established that pro-
longed cocaine self-administration accesses most of the decisional
vulnerabilities identified in UFA, including vulnerabilities 2
(Ahmed et al. 2002; 2005), 4 (Paterson & Markou 2003), 5
(Ahmed & Cador 2006; Mantsch et al. 2004), and 7 (Ahmed
et al. 2003). Thus, according to UFA, with repeated choice, most
chronically cocaine-exposed rats should rapidly develop a strong
preference for the cocaine-associated action. Contrary to this pre-
diction, however, we consistently found that virtually all rats pre-
ferred the sweet sensation over the artificial sensation of cocaine,
a preference that was not surmountable by increasing cocaine
doses (Lenoir et al. 2007). The discovery that taste sweetness sur-
passes cocaine reward, even in cocaine-sensitized rats with a long
history of cocaine self-administration, represents a serious
anomaly, not only for UFA but also for each of the separate neuro-
biological theories of addiction that it has unified. This anomaly
does not necessarily invalidate UFA, however; it may indicate
that the decision-making models on which UFA is based are
largely incomplete. Specifically, these models were essentially
built from data obtained in choice studies involving different
dimensions of the same kind of reward (e.g., delay, amount, and
probability). They are therefore not well adapted for predicting
the outcome of choice between rewards as different in kind as a
drug reward and a taste reward. Alternatively, this anomaly could
also indicate that, as suggested earlier in the context of evolution,
rats cannot constitutively develop all the addiction syndromes
that may affect humans. More research on choices between drug
and non-drug rewards is required here to resolve this anomaly.
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Abstract: The ten vulnerabilities discussed in the target article vary in
their likelihood of producing temporary preference for addictive
activities – which is the phenomenon that puzzles conventional
motivational theory. Direct dopaminergic stimulation, but probably not
the other vulnerabilities, may contribute to the necessary concavity of
addicts’ delay discounting curves, as may factors that the senior author
analyzes elsewhere. Whatever their origins, these curves can
themselves account for temporary preference, sudden craving, and the
“automatic” habits discussed here.
Any or all of the ten vulnerabilities in Redish et al.’s innovative
analysis may have a role in addicts’ decisions. It is an admirable
structure, but this rich menu of potential mechanisms needs to
be seen in perspective. Whatever else is true of them, addictive
behaviors are goal-directed and usually effective. The final
common path of all these vulnerabilities has to be motivation,
even modest changes of which can significantly affect addictive
choices (Becker et al. 1992; Olmstead et al. 2007). And the
best-established property of this motivation is that it is relatively
short-term. Each vulnerability needs to be examined as a possible
explanation, entire or partial, specifically for the temporary
amplification of short-term relative to long-term motivation
that induces temporary preference for the addictive activity.
The search for explanations is complicated by the fact that
short-term rewards’ intermittent dominance of greater long-
term rewards extends beyond the identified addictions. Addic-
tions are not a circumscribed set of activities, just the most con-
spicuous or harmful examples of a broad human tendency to
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develop habits that lure us into continuing them even while we
are trying to break them. Some addictions may indeed be due
to the physiological properties of a substance, but these must
ride on top of whatever general principle makes any rapidly
rewarding activity a mixed blessing. Some serious examples do
not involve substances – not only gambling (Appendix F) but
credit abuse and various kinds of thrill seeking – and some
others involve normal substances that we evolved to ingest:
Food is a prevalent example. Both kinds of temptation shade
over into trivial but unwelcome habits such as drinking too much
coffee (Appendix E) or watching a particular kind of TV show.
All such choices must have brain mechanisms, of course – there
are no disembodied motives – and associated brain processes are
being observed in increasing detail; but the brain processes that
are observed during addictions are not necessarily different from
the processes that govern every choice we make. Even opiates
may not “mimick” rewards (Vulnerability 5, sect. 3.2.1) but be
rewards, useless as far as adaptivity goes, but for hedonic purposes
only different from other rewards in their power, speed, and (con-
sequent?) long-term failure. Which vulnerabilities can explain pre-
ference reversal?
Of the eight that the authors discuss, the most likely candidates
for explaining short-term amplifications of motivation are Vulner-
abilities 4 and 7, those that involve the distortion of error-predic-
tion, in planning and habit systems, respectively, by the direct
action of dopaminergic drugs on striatal structures (e.g., Robinson
& Berridge 2001). Such action has been observed by several
methods, as he reviews. The resulting property of being “wanted
but not liked” is clearly an example of temporary preference – “a
motivational magnet” (Berridge 2007), but this effect has so far
been reported for only short periods of time. It is not known
whether this effect changes motivation long enough to affect the
value of a weekend coke binge, for instance. And this mechanism
would govern only agents that directly elevate dopamine.
Vulnerabilities 1 and 2 describe changes in the value of addic-
tive activities and their alternatives as a result of past or current
addictive activity. Evidence for a long-lasting attenuation after
taking some agents is strong (Volkow et al. 2002), and addicts
often mistake this “grayness” of life for a bleak normality
without their drug (my own clinical observation), but this
remains a factor both when they are deciding to relapse and
when they are deciding not to. By the authors’ own account, Vul-
nerability 3 seems to involve the genuine (opioid-mediated) plea-
surability of some activities, which does not set them apart from
motivated activities in general.
Vulnerabilities 5 and 6 involve selective attention to, or
interpretation of, contingencies of reward. This selection is
motivated. There is no reason to suppose that this kind of
“fooling yourself” occurs differently in addictions than, say, in
the overly positive belief in others’ approval of you or in feelings
of efficacy over random events, which all non-depressed subjects
seem to develop (e.g., Alloy & Abramson 1979). As a practice that
increases current good feeling at the expense of realism, this
selective interpretation is itself a relative of the addictions, and
itself needs explanation.
As for Vulnerabilities 8 and, again, 7, the existence of a habit
system distinct from a planning system is certainly well estab-
lished, but “mindless” would have always been a better term
than “automatic” (or “robotic,” sect. 3.3.1) for the behaviors it
governs. The latter terms imply an ability to override contrary
motivation, whereas this selective principle is actually observed
to give way to the planning system whenever a choice is
subject to conflicting motives. This mechanism seems likely to
be limited to those addictions that cause brain damage. Behaviors
that persist despite punishment have elicited similar explanations
over the years – for example, Freud’s “repetition compulsion”
(1920/1956) and Watson’s “conditioned responses” (1924) –
but a motivational explanation is needed.
Vulnerability 10 is basically a space to be developed. Thus, a
substantial amount of explanatory work will still have to be
done by Vulnerability 9. Redish et al. mention only a high rate
of discounting (sect. 3.6), but it is the hyperbolic or at least hyper-
boloid shape of a person’s discount curve that predicts she will
overvalue rewards only temporarily (Ainslie 1992; 2005). The
review the authors cite analyzes possible mechanisms for the
hyperboloid shape of people’s discount functions (Redish &
Kurth-Nelson, in press, in Madden et al., in press), but makes
it clear that the hyperboloid shape itself is robust. Whatever its
roots, hyperboloid discounting can account for not only overva-
luation of imminent rewards but also for two additional phenom-
ena relevant to addictions. First, the sudden cravings that are
evoked by mere reminders of past consumptions, which are
inadequately explained by linear applications of either hyperbolic
discounting theory or conditioning theories, may come from a
recursive self-prediction process in which a random increase in
a person’s subjective probability of relapse increases craving,
increased craving increases the probability of relapse, and so
on (Ainslie, in press, same volume).
Second, any complex goal-seeking process involves setting up
intermediate goals, which become game-like occasions for an
emotional reward such as joy, relief, or self-congratulation
(Ainslie 1992, pp. 339–43). Then the prospect of a great
“score” of a drug will have the same rewarding power as a
great score in sports, despite a desire to limit consumption, as
will the chance for a restrained eater to neatly finish off a con-
tainer of food. The rewards for any lifestyle consist of much
more than the external rewards that the lifestyle has arisen to
obtain. The additional emotional or “game-like” rewards can
maintain the activities set up by the lifestyle for long after the
ostensible rewards have changed in value – hence the big
lottery winners who continue to travel by bus and save grocery
coupons. Such a process is more likely than mindless automati-
city to underlie consciously unwanted drug-copping habits.
The same potential for game-like reward might be the basic
motivating principle of the non-substance addictions, which
otherwise have scant rationale in the vulnerabilities discussed
here. To the extent that people can anticipate occasions for
emotion, they are apt to have the emotion prematurely – the
way that familiar scenarios become mere daydreams – and
learn to avoid this mainly by making somewhat unpredictable
events the occasions for emotional reward, that is, broadly speak-
ing, by gambling (Ainslie 2001, pp. 168–74). This tactic is often
adaptive when applied to human relationships and attempts at
personal accomplishment, but it can be diverted into short
term rewardingness (addictiveness) by finding bets that are
won or lost quickly – bets that include but are by no means
limited to gambling in the sense of the word that the authors
use (Appendix F).
Dopaminergic agents possibly aside, temporary preference
comes from the general properties of discounted reward.
NOTE
1. The author of this commentary is employed by a government
agency, and as such this commentary is considered a work of the U.S. gov-
ernment and not subject to copyright within the United States.








Abstract: Redish et al. suggest that their failures-in-decision-making
framework for understanding addiction can also contribute to improving
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our understanding of a variety of psychiatric disorders. In the spirit of
reflecting on the significance and scope of their research, I briefly
develop the idea that their framework can also contribute to improving
our understanding of the pervasive problem of procrastination.
Starting from the idea that addiction involves “the continued
making of maladaptive choices, even in the face of the explicitly
stated desire to make a different choice” (target article, sect. 1),
Redish et al. seek to develop a unified framework for addiction
by (1) focusing on research concerning action selection and
decision making, and (2) identifying failure points in our
decision-making system. As they suggest, this approach may be
fruitful for understanding not just addiction, but a variety of psy-
chiatric disorders. I suspect that they are correct, and I want to
develop a somewhat different but related suggestion, namely,
that their approach can contribute to an improved understanding
of the pervasive problem of procrastination.
Although procrastination is more common than addiction, it
can figure as a crucial obstacle to realizing intentions to quit
engaging in harmful addictive behavior. This fits neatly with
the plausible conception of procrastination according to which
it involves putting off an action that one should, given one’s
ends and information, perform promptly.
Even more so than addiction, which is still popularly cast as, at
least in part, the product of powerful cravings that disable agents
from acting voluntarily and in accordance with their decisions,
procrastination is generally assumed to be the product of volun-
tary choices, and so the failures-in-decision-making approach
that Redish et al. employ in their work seems particularly appro-
priate with respect to understanding procrastination. What better
place to look for an understanding of self-defeating but voluntary
delays than in research on failure points in our decision-making
system?
The most established model of procrastination connects pro-
crastination to problematic discounting processes (O’Donoghue
& Rabin 1999a; 1999b; 2001), which is one of the vulnerabilities
that Redish et al. discuss in their work. Like other animals,
humans seem to discount future utility in a way that sometimes
prompts preference reversals (Ainslie 2001; Kirby & Herrnstein
1995; Millar &Navarick 1984; Solnick et al. 1980). This can result
in an agent’s voluntary acting in a way that he or she planned
against and will come to regret. The agent may, for example,
keep making exceptions to his or her ongoing plan to cut down
on indulgent purchases in order to save money for retirement.
Discounting-induced preference reversals can thus foster
procrastination.
A recent, complementary model of procrastination focuses on
another vulnerability, one that is not directly discussed by
Redish et al. but fits very well with their approach, namely,
our vulnerability to intransitive preferences (Andreou 2007).
Intransitive preferences (where, in particular, one cannot rank
a set of options from most preferred to least preferred
because there is a circularity in one’s preferences) are often
prompted by choice situations in which indulgences with indi-
vidually negligible effects (such as smoking a cigarette) have
momentous cumulative effects. Consider an agent who enjoys
smoking but also values decent health. Someone in this situ-
ation may prefer, for all n, quitting after nþ 1 cigarettes to
quitting after n cigarettes, but also prefer quitting after a rela-
tively low number of cigarettes to quitting after a very high
number of cigarettes. This agent has intransitive preferences,
and is vulnerable to intransitivity-induced procrastination
(Andreou 2005).
Other interesting ideas concerning procrastination might fit
comfortably within and be illuminated by Redish et al.’s frame-
work. Consider, for example, the familiar idea that procrastina-
tion may be prompted by fear of failure, which may, in different
cases, be the product of different vulnerabilities. For example,
in some cases, fear of failure may result from the overvaluation
of the expected value of stability; while in other cases, it may
result from excessively (and perhaps obsessively) focusing on
one possible outcome rather than appropriately distributing
one’s attention over the range of outcomes associated with a
situation.
Consider next the idea that procrastination is strongly associ-
ated with the pursuit of “ephemeral pleasures” and “ephemeral
chores” (Silver & Sabini 1981). Ephemeral pleasures and
ephemeral chores are often more immediately gratifying or at
least less aversive than the goal-directed actions that are
called for by long-term projects. Moreover, ephemeral plea-
sures and ephemeral chores are often individually compatible
with one’s long-term projects, though they can accumulate in
a way that interferes with these projects. These points suggest
a connection between procrastination mediated by the pursuit
of ephemeral pleasures and ephemeral chores, on the one
hand, and problematic discounting processes or intransitive
preferences, on the other.
The vulnerabilities I have been focusing on are vulnerabil-
ities in the planning system, which is only one part of our
decision-making system. As Redish et al. stress, problematic
decisions can also result from vulnerabilities in the habit
system or from vulnerabilities in the interaction of the planning
system and the habit system. In the case of procrastination, it
seems clear that planning-based vulnerabilities can foster
habit-based vulnerabilities as well. If, for example, one’s intran-
sitive preferences prompt one to repeat individually negligible
but cumulatively destructive actions, a habit-based vulnerability
may flourish atop one’s planning-based vulnerability. Soon
enough, automatic indulgence will replace rationalized
indulgence.
Relatedly, coping with procrastination often involves dealing
with both planning-based vulnerabilities and habit-based
vulnerabilities. Again, consider the agent whose intransitive
preferences prompt intransitivity-induced procrastination.
Once the agent’s problematic indulgences are supported by
habit as well, overcoming procrastination will involve (1)
dealing with the planning system failure by, for example, adopt-
ing a plan that draws some bright lines in order to stop oneself
from sliding down the slippery slope along a self-destructive
path; and (2) overhauling one’s habits so that acting accordingly
becomes second nature.
In short, in addition to contributing to our understanding of
addiction, Redish et al.’s failures-in-decision-making approach
is suggestive with respect to the related, but more pervasive
problem of procrastination. Indeed, it is probably less contro-
versial to propose that the approach is well suited to provid-
ing a unified framework for procrastination than to propose
that it is well suited to providing a unified framework for
addiction.
Computing motivation: Incentive salience
boosts of drug or appetite states
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Abstract: Current computational models predict reward based solely on
learning. Real motivation involves that but also more. Brain reward
systems can dynamically generate incentive salience, by integrating
prior learned values with even novel physiological states (e.g., natural
appetites; drug-induced mesolimbic sensitization) to cause intense
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desires that were themselves never learned. We hope future
computational models may capture this too.
Redish et al. provide a valuable and comprehensive analysis of
addiction models. They deserve gratitude from the field. Their
sophisticated assessment of alternative models and explanatory
mechanisms is admirably wide-ranging and thoughtful. In their
fine scholarly effort, we would like to highlight what they note
remains a significant gap unfilled by any available computational
model. As the authors put it, “[C]omputational models of the
planning system are insufficiently detailed to lead to specific pre-
dictions or explanations of the mechanisms by which outcomes
are overvalued” (sect. 3.2.1, para. 4). We think this touches a
central problem of dynamic motivation: the generation of
dynamic incentive salience motivation from static learned values.
Current computational models that Redish et al. elegantly
describe are powerful, but they are based purely on associations
and memories. They act solely on what they know. In most
reinforcement-based models, motivation is encoded as a part of
an environmental state associated with the learned value of
rewards, based on previous experiences. Motivational states
may serve as occasion-setting contexts to modulate the value of
rewards that have been previously experienced, and they may
also modulate the unconditioned impact of a reward via alliesthe-
sia. But the learned incentive value of the reward is never directly
and dynamically modulated by the motivational state of the
animal, without an additional learning process to intermediate.
However, evidence indicates the brain does something more
when controlling desire. It dynamically generates motivation
too, sometimes in surprising ways, by integrating static learned
values with changing neurobiological states, some of which may
never have before been experienced. Modulation of incentive
value by new physiological/pharmacological states can be very
potent – even the first time a relevant state occurs (Fudim
1978; Tindell et al. 2005a; 2005b; Zhang et al. 2005).
From the computational point of view, novel integrations of
learned cues with new physiological states requires a kind of
coupling that has not yet been satisfactorily modeled. Such coup-
ling must connect associative values that have been previously
learned and stabilized with current physiological/pharmacologi-
cal states that can change from moment to moment. This falls
into their Vulnerability 4, the one that we feel is particularly
relevant to drug addiction. In particular, we concur with their
assertion that new models are needed to address this point.
Addiction is recognized to usurp natural reward mechanisms,
and even natural appetites offer dramatic demonstrations of
dynamic generation of motivation (Berridge 2004; Toates 1986).
Salt appetite is especially exemplary, because it can be produced
as a novel state, as most humans today and most laboratory
animals have never experienced a sodium deficiency. Salt appetite
transforms the value of an intensely salty taste that normally tastes
nasty (such as a NaCl solution that is triple the concentration
of seawater). The intense saltiness becomes nice in a
sodium-depleted body state, and the same triple-seawater
becomes as hedonically positive as a sucrose solution (Tindell
et al. 2006).
But what if a rat were not given the newly liked salt taste on its
first day in a salt appetite state?What if it were instead given only a
Pavlovian conditioned stimulus (CS) that had previously been
paired with a salt unconditioned stimulus (UCS) when it was
nasty? Cues for the previously nasty salt should have no incentive
value according to most models. All the learning models described
by Redish et al. make the same prediction here: the CS should
elicit only negative reactions on the first trials of sodium deficiency.
Any cached value of the stimulus-response (S-R) habit system
obtained via a temporal difference mechanism must remain
strongly negative, established by the previous pairings with punish-
ing saltiness. Contextual knowledge does not yet exist about the
potential goodness of salt in a sodium-deficient state. Even a
cognitive-tree search mechanism has no way to infer the new
value: its cognitive tree contains only memories of unpleasant
saltiness. It lacks a branch for “liked” saltiness, at least until the
rat is allowed to taste NaCl in its new physiological state.
Yet data from our lab and others show clearly that the incentive
value of relevant cues can be modified on-the-fly based on homeo-
static state. Indeed, we find the motivational value of the CS for
salt is transformed to positive on the first day in the new state,
even before saltiness is experienced: the cue becomes avidly
approached and consumed, and it becomes able to fire limbic
neurons like a cue for sweetness (Berridge & Schulkin 1989;
Fudim 1978; Tindell et al. 2005b; 2006).
Bizarre as this reversal of cue valuation by a natural appetite
may seem, nearly the same mechanism is exploited by drugs of
abuse to cause addiction (Robinson & Berridge 1993; 2003).
For example, other data from our laboratory show that drug-
induced sensitization of mesolimbic systems, or acute amphet-
amine elevation of dopamine levels, causes certain relevant
reward cues to dramatically become more “wanted,” eliciting
more incentive salience (Tindell et al. 2005b; Wyvell & Berridge
2001). The elevation in CS incentive value occurs before the
UCS reward has ever been experienced while amphetamine
was in the brain, or while the brain was in a sensitized state. In
addicts, such sensitized “wanting” is posited to cause intense
cue-triggered motivation for drugs that far outstrips their pre-
viously learned values (Robinson & Berridge 2003).
The implication of these examples is that desire is not reduci-
ble to memory alone. Brain mesocorticolimbic systems are
designed to dynamically modulate previously learned incentive
values, and they do not necessarily require new learning to do
so. As Redish et al. have so admirably shown, current models
give a fine account of how previously learned values of reward
are recalled and coordinated to predict rewards based solely on
previous experiences. We hope future models may also generate
new motivation values of the sort we have described in order to
more fully capture addiction.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The research mentioned in this commentary was supported by NIH
grants DA-015188, DA-017752, and MH-63649.
Addiction science as a hedgehog and as a fox
doi:10.1017/S0140525X08004779
Warren K. Bickel and Richard Yi
Department of Psychiatry, Center for Addiction Research, University of
Arkansas for Medical Sciences, Little Rock, AR 72205.
WBickel@uams.edu
RYi@uams.edu
Abstract: Redish et al. provide a significant advance in our
understanding of addiction by showing that the various addictive
processes are in fact all decision-making processes and each may
undergird addiction. We propose means for identifying more central
addiction processes. This recognition of the complexity of addiction
followed by identification of more central processes would help guide
the development of prevention and treatment.
In a classic essay, Sir Isaiah Berlin (1953) characterizes how
individuals organize their subject matter by referring to the state-
ment attributed to the ancient Greek poet Archilochus: “The fox
know many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.” At
one extreme, some scientists may behave as foxes, treating
their subject as a pluralistic conjunction of many diverse
phenomena. At the other, some may approximate the hedgehog
by viewing their subject as a monolith where one or a small
number of phenomena play a central role in the subject of inter-
est. The target article by Redish et al. proposes an interesting
duality. On the one hand, they suggest that they are unifying
the processes of addiction by proposing that the varied and
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numerous phenomena that have been proposed and investigated
as potential drivers of addiction are all decision processes. On the
other hand, they retain each of the identified processes and do
not argue that these heterogeneous processes interact, can be
grouped into a smaller number of processes, or differ in their
centrality to the phenomenon of addiction. In a very real way,
these processes are presented as operating in parallel, and there-
fore, in our opinion, the preponderance of their theory moves in
the direction of the fox. We think there is considerable opportu-
nity, however, within the structure of their theory to move toward
the hedgehog and to “know one big thing.” Here we offer three
ways to a move to greater unity.
Interaction of processes. If these processes all actuate the clini-
cal manifestation of addiction, it would seem that at least some of
these processes must interact and mutually drive the process to
stability in the addictive state.We consider just two of the processes
and illustrate a plausible means by which this interaction may
occur. One of the clinically relevant aspects of addiction is the rela-
tive insensitivity to price for the addictive commodity. This might
result from an interaction between euphoriogenic rewards or
reinforcement (Vulnerability 3) and temporal discounting (Vulner-
ability 9). Consider that sensitivity to price is affected by the avail-
ability of substitutes. For example, a consumer would not buy a
commodity for a high price if a nearly identical commodity (a sub-
stitute) were available for a substantially lower price. One source of
substitution is inter-temporal. For example, a consumer would not
buy a commodity for a high price now if a nearly identical commod-
ity (a substitute) were available later at a substantially lower price.
However, if the future value of a commodity (say a drug of depen-
dence) is radically discounted, as is often the case (e.g., Bickel &
Marsch 2001; Yi et al., in press), then the opportunity for inter-tem-
poral substitution is limited, which, in turn, would result in less sen-
sitivity to price. We think that there is opportunity for some of the
other processes illuminated by Redish and colleagues to interact in
ways that may plausibly result in known clinical features of
addiction.
Co-identity of processes. Some of the processes identified by
Redish et al. have had a very limited history of investigation. As
such there may be processes that are treated separately for
reason of historical contingency of its exploration and naming
but are very closely related, if not referring to the same phenom-
ena. Let us again consider two: discounting (Vulnerability 9) and
balance between the planning and habit system (Vulnerability 8).
Redish et al. note that drugs may inhibit structures involved with
planning over habit systems. These two systems have been var-
iously named (e.g., Bechara 2005), and we have referred to
them as “impulsive” and “executive” (Bickel et al. 2007). Impor-
tantly, evidence suggests that temporal discounting serves as a
summary measure of these two systems. Specifically, McClure
et al. (2004) used functional magnetic resonance imaging to
scan the brains of normal adults engaged in discounting pro-
cedures. Choices favoring the immediately available option
were associated with greater relative activation in structures
associated with the habit, or “impulsive,” system (e.g., limbic
region). In contrast, choices favoring the temporally remote
option were associated with greater relative activation in struc-
tures associated with the planning, or “executive,” system (e.g.,
prefrontal cortex). As such, temporal discounting provides a
specific measure of the balance between these competing
systems, suggesting that these processes are in fact the same.
Centrality of some processes.To the extent we know how these
processes affect and interact with each other, we may come to
understand the organization or topology of these processes in
addiction. The centrality of these processes may not all be equival-
ent, and knowing their organization may suggest the most effective
means of “treating” the system; that is, some processes may have a
greater effect on the system than others. As an example, consider
protein synthesis in the yeast. The yeast cell produces approxi-
mately 1,870 different proteins (Jeong et al. 2001). However,
these proteins are not all equally essential to the yeast cell.
Understanding the link among these proteins has shown that
highly connected proteins are three times more essential (i.e.,
deletion results in cell death) than proteins with a small number
of links. Suggestions of how to adapt these typological organizations
for the study of addiction have been offered (Chambers et al.
2007). Application of such approaches may indicate which
component processes are best targeted to ameliorate addiction.
In conclusion, we applaud the work done by Redish et al. It is
an important first step, and it puts us on the right footing in our
task to understand, prevent, and treat addiction. We may need to
know many things to reach our goal, and we hope we will come to
know a small number of things that have very big effects.
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Abstract: Redish et al. outline 10 vulnerabilities in the decision-making
system that increase the risks of addiction. In this commentary I
examine the potential role of social influence in exploiting at least one
of these vulnerabilities, and argue that the needs satisfied by social
interaction may play a role in decision-making with regard to substance
use, increasing the risks of addiction.
The target article by Redish et al. presents a theoretical frame-
work for addiction as arising from an array of vulnerabilities in
the way in which individuals make decisions regarding behaviour.
In the present commentary, I examine how several aspects of
social interaction may exploit the vulnerabilities outlined by the
authors.
Redish and colleagues argue that addiction can be viewed as a
series of maladaptive choices, and that models of human
decision-making can be employed to show how addictions may
develop and be maintained. According to Redish et al., these vul-
nerabilities can lead to incorrect or inappropriate decisions
regarding substance use, thereby leading to addiction. To
support these positions, Redish and colleagues review a range
of studies generally drawn from research on human decision-
making, learning theory, and neuropsychology. The authors
point out, however, that their theory may have implications for
other theories of addiction, including social theories.
There have been numerous social theories of addiction in the
literature. For example, social learning theory suggests that
addiction may be the result of observation and mimicking of sub-
stance use and abuse in role models such as parents (Eiser 1985;
Fischer & Smith 2008; Neiss 1993; Raskin & Daley 1991). In
addition, a number of theories of addiction suggest that addictive
behaviors are developed via affiliation with substance-using peers
and others (Bloor 2006; Duncan et al. 1998; Jenkins 1996; Wills
et al. 1998). It seems reasonable to assume that social influence,
and in particular social influence linked to substance use, may
also exploit vulnerabilities in the decision-making system in the
ways specified by Redish and colleagues. In particular, it may
be argued that social influence may exploit three of the vulner-
abilities proposed by Redish et al. – overvaluation of the
expected value of a predicted outcome in the planning system
(Vulnerability 4); incorrect search of situation–outcome relation-
ships (Vulnerability 5); and misclassification of situations (Vul-
nerability 6) – in turn increasing the risk of addiction.
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In describing Vulnerability 4, Redish and colleagues provide a
neurochemical account of how the planning system can lead to an
overvaluation of the value of a predicted outcome, via the pairing
of a valued outcome (drug use) with some other valued stimulus.
It is clear that social interaction might serve as a valued stimulus
that, paired with drug use, could lead to an increase in the value
of drug use, thereby increasing the risk of addiction. For
example, several studies have shown that the initiation of sub-
stance use occurs most frequently in social situations (Clark
et al. 1999; Galea et al. 2004; Kaplow et al. & Conduct Problems
Prevention Research Group 2002). Also, further studies have
shown that adolescent substance use patterns are largely influ-
enced by social context (Petraitis et al. 1998; Schuckit et al.
2007; Wilcox 2003). In addition, neuropsychological research
has shown that social interaction and relationships may stimulate
reward centers in the brain (Caldu & Dreher 2007; Depue &
Morrone-Strupinsky 2005; Guroglu et al. 2008; Walter et al.
2005), suggesting that the pairing of social interaction and sub-
stance use may lead directly to an overvaluation of substance
use, thereby exploiting this particular vulnerability.
Vulnerability 5 involves a memory process by which certain
situations may be more likely to lead to certain outcomes (i.e.,
drug use), because the memory of a valued situation-outcome
pairing becomes more salient, blinding the individual to alterna-
tives. Here again, social interaction may play a crucial role in
exploiting this particular vulnerability. As mentioned previously,
substance use and abuse often occurs in social situations, and
individuals who are early (i.e., childhood and early adolescent)
initiators of substance use, and thus at increased risk of substance
dependence (e.g., Fergusson & Horwood 1997), are more likely
to engage in substance use in a social context. Yet another way in
which this vulnerability might be exploited is through the
salience of social interaction as a cue for memory retrieval. A
range of studies have shown that social information is more
easily recalled, and that it has more complex and detailed
relationships with other information in an individual’s associative
memory network (Clark & Stephenson 1995; Leone 2006; Rey-
nolds & West 1989; Walker-Andrews & Bahrick 2001). These
considerations suggest that the social context in which substance
use and abuse occurs may play a key role in exploiting vulnerabil-
ities in the decision-making process related to memory.
Vulnerability 6, situation misclassification, occurs when indi-
viduals overgeneralize situations to other situations, despite
changes in the nature of the situation. Thus, for example, drug
users may be unable to change their drug-taking behavior
despite negative consequences arising from their drug use. It
could be argued that this vulnerability is exploited when individ-
uals move from the use of one drug to another, more addictive
drug, such as the progression of drug use via the gateway
mechanism (Fergusson et al. 2006; Kandel et al. 1992;
MacCoun 1998). Under this explanation, individuals are more
likely to move from drugs that have a lower risk of dependence
(i.e., cannabis) to drugs with higher risks of dependence (e.g.,
cocaine, opiates, methamphetamine; Fergusson et al. 2006;
Kandel et al. 1992). Fergusson and colleagues have argued that
one of the main drivers of the cannabis gateway is social inter-
action, and that differential association with individuals who
have access to a range of illicit drugs (such as drug dealers)
increases the availability of other illicit drugs, thereby increasing
the risk that an individual will use these drugs (Fergusson et al.
2006). In this way, generalization from one situation (cannabis
use) to another situation (other illicit drug use), arising from
social interaction, may lead to an inability to stop using drugs
when symptoms of dependence arise from the use of other
illicit drugs.
In summary, Redish and colleagues have developed a model
that shows how individuals may make maladaptive choices with
regard to substance use, leading to increased risk of addiction.
It seems clear that social interaction plays an important role
in exploiting these vulnerabilities, providing information that
may inadvertently increase the risk that individuals will become
substance-dependent.
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Abstract: Defining brain mechanisms that control and adapt motivated
behavior will not only advance addiction treatment. It will help society
see that addiction is a disease that erodes free will, rather than
representing a free will that asks for or deserves consequences of drug-
use choices. This science has important implications for understanding
addiction’s comorbidity in mental illness and reducing associated public
health and criminal justice burdens.
As nicely exhibited by Redish et al., we are converging on an under-
standing that addiction is a disease impacting specific brain systems
that control and adapt motivated behavior. Evidence reported
here, and continually mounting (Belin & Everitt 2008), paints an
increasingly clear picture that addiction is not merely a vague
notion of so-called psychological dependence or some unchecked
need to feel good all the time. Rather, it is a disease of neurological
character, involving brain systems and phenomenological themes
reminiscent of Parkinson’s or Huntington’s disease. Like these dis-
eases, addiction involves progressive changes to the basal ganglia,
the primary neural system involved in the ordering and procedural
memory of behavioral programming (Everitt & Robbins 2005;
Haber 2003; Volkow et al. 2006). Perhaps it has taken us this
long to appreciate addiction as a type of progressive cortical-striatal
disease because it uniquely seems to involve functions of “free will”
that many view as unapproachable as a biomedical topic of explora-
tion. After all, Parkinson’s and Huntington’s are so obviously
motoric in nature, and involuntary, whereas any action choice
(i.e., to use a drug) appears voluntary, whether in the addict or
in the drug-naive.
But now a new picture is emerging: While dorsal cortical-stria-
tal systems govern the relatively inflexible execution of pro-
cedural motor programs (i.e., behavior), ventral cortical-striatal
systems flexibly and hierarchically govern the ordering, prioriti-
zation, and selection of these dorsally represented programs
(i.e., motivation) (Gerdeman et al. 2003; Haber et al. 2000;
Kelley 2004b; Yin & Knowlton 2006). As facilitated by ever-chan-
ging environmental contingencies that provoke rapid changes in
striatal dopamine transmission (Bardo et al. 1996; Finlay &
Zigmond 1997; Spanagel & Weiss 1999), neuroplastic alterations
spanning these striatal regions change the way ventral and dorsal
compartments represent information and communicate with one
another (Chambers et al. 2007; Graybiel 1998; Hyman &
Malenka 2001). Thus, behavioral repertoires are dynamically
evolving, highly complex structures, or maps, in which specific
motor programs are like destinations interconnected by motiva-
tional routes (Chambers et al. 2007). Depending on developmen-
tal age, environmental conditions, or inherent individual
attributes, cortical-striatal circuits that generate these motiva-
tional-behavioral repertoires are themselves physically changing
in an unending attempt to provide the most adaptive mapping
of behavioral organization of the individual to the external
world (Chambers et al. 2007).
Equipped with this understanding, there is no need to equate a
biomedical understanding of addiction with a hubristic claim that
we can absolutely define all the physical mechanisms of “free
will.” Who knows if we shall ever fully grasp the extreme com-
plexity of human behavioral repertoires? But we can say that if
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this complexity is synonymous with “free will,” then addiction is a
disease of neural systems that govern free will, in which the adap-
tive complexity of free will is reduced and compromised. Under-
standing this process mechanistically may actually be within our
grasp.
Redish et al. rightly centralize a general concept of impaired
decision-making in the pathophysiology of addiction. Of all con-
texts in which addiction vulnerability has been identified, two
stand out most prominently: adolescent neurodevelopment and
mental illness (Chambers et al. 2003; Kessler 2004). Notably,
these contexts entail features that are associated with a general
theme of impulsivity, whether it be couched in terms of “novelty-
seeking,” “high risk-taking,” “poor judgment” or “decision-
making,” or “behavioral inhibition deficits.” To suggest a succinct,
yet inclusive formulation of impulsivity: it is an operational con-
dition in which ventral cortical-striatal circuits consistently fail to
produce adaptive mapping of behavioral organization onto the
external world, despite normative intelligence. Of course, in
normal adolescence, such impulsivity is actually quite adaptive,
because developing healthy brains have the need and capacity
for learning from their mistakes (Chambers & Potenza 2003).
But in mental illness, such capacities are episodically or chroni-
cally compromised into adulthood, and the mapping of beha-
vioral organization is maladaptively reduced in complexity and/
or relatively inflexible to change based on environmental
demands.
Across the broad span of mental illnesses in which addiction
comorbidity is robustly present (including schizophrenia,
bipolar disorder, antisocial and borderline personality, post-trau-
matic stress disorder [PTSD], various impulse control disorders,
and many others) (Kessler 2004), one or more of the following
three brain regions are pathologically altered: the prefrontal
cortex, the amygdala, and the hippocampus (Charney et al.
1999). All of these areas normally and robustly send direct gluta-
matergic projections into the ventral striatum (Groenewegen
et al. 1999; Haber 2003; Swanson 2000). There, these projections
not only cooperatively help generate and modulate a rich diver-
sity of firing pattern representations spanning ventral striatal
networks (representing motivational information), but they act
in concert with, or are acted upon by dopamine, resulting in
altered neural connectivity (Goto & Grace 2005a; Hyman &
Malenka 2001; O’Donnell et al. 1999; Vanderschuren & Kalivas
2000). Such plasticity likely instantiates the acquisition of new
motivational representations contributing to a more complex,
highly nuanced, and adaptive motivational repertoire that opti-
mally directs behavioral programming. But, if one or more
among the prefrontal cortex, the amygdala, or the hippocampus
is compromised due to a pre-existing neurodevelopmental con-
dition (i.e., mental illness), then the complexity and/or adaptive
flexibility of the motivational-behavioral repertoire, as generated
by striatal networks, is reduced (Chambers 2007). In other
words, since limbic inputs to the ventral striatum are relatively
impoverished, then the catalogue of motivational representations
that may be generated by it are also impoverished in number,
complexity, or changeability.
Although some dopamine-mediated neuroplasticity (and adap-
tive behavioral flexibility) persists that can produce real change in
the motivational repertoire, such change may be abnormally
limited to conditions or stimuli that produce particularly strong
and/or prolonged dopamine (DA) signals (e.g., pharmacological
actions of addictive drugs). Without, or before, addictive drug
exposure, this situation is clinically perceived as impulsivity,
poor decision-making, or other motivational disturbances of
mental illness. Upon addictive drug exposure we have a massive
epidemic of dual diagnosis (substance disorder comorbidity in
mental illness) on our hands to the tune of greater than 50% of
all mentally ill or drug-addicted patients seeking treatment
(Dixon 1999; RachBeisel et al. 1999). In the de-institutionaliza-
tion era, no wonder we face such tremendous medical morbidity
and mortality from addictions, and homelessness and criminal
incarceration of the mentally ill (Lasser et al. 2000; Rosen et al.
2002; Schmetzer 2006).
Consistent with these translational perspectives, animal model-
ing of dual diagnosis has demonstrated that if certain neurodeve-
lopmental lesion models of mental illness are combined with
addictive drug exposure, addiction vulnerability phenotypes are
accentuated. For instance, neonatal ventral hippocampal lesions
(a comprehensive animal model of schizophrenia) produce a host
of biological changes involving prefrontal cortical and ventral stria-
tal circuits (Goto &O’Donnell 2002; Lipska et al. 2003; Tseng et al.
2007). These aspects correspond to increases in acquisition of
cocaine self-administration, resistance to extinction, and drug-
induced relapse of drug-seeking (Chambers & Self 2002). The
lesion also produces elevations of an impulsive approach to
natural reward before drug exposure, and synergistic worsening
of this trait after cocaine exposure in a manner not seen in
control animals (Chambers et al. 2005).
As suggested by Redish et al., identifying differential styles or
mechanisms of impulsivity as predictive markers of addiction vul-
nerability, illness trajectory, or treatment options, is surely a next
step for the field. Studying differential forms and patterns of dual
diagnosis in both animal models and human populations should
represent a major avenue of the exploration. This work will
help us elucidate the extent to which the 10 decision-making
vulnerabilities suggested by Redish et al. represent truly
independent facets of addiction vulnerability or redundant mani-
festations of the same underlying principle. By determining
which of these vulnerabilities carry the most weight of addiction
liability in most people, we may arrive at a more parsimonious
and “winning” theory of addiction.
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Abstract: The consideration of gambling as a decision-making disorder
may fail to explain why the majority of people gamble, yet only a small
percentage of people lose control of their behaviour to the point where
their gambling becomes problematic. The application of dual process
theories to gambling addiction offers a means of explaining the
differences between “normal” and “problem” gambling, augmenting the
multiple vulnerabilities proposed by Redish et al.
The explanation of loss of control of gambling behaviour (so-
called pathological gambling) presents a considerable challenge
for general theories of addiction for two main reasons. First,
unlike many other addictions, gambling does not involve the
ingestion of substances that alter psychopharmacological states.
Second, like many other addictive activities, the majority of the
population participates to some degree (Walker 1992b), yet
only a small percentage of gamblers develop problems with
their gambling behaviour.
The role of decision-making in theories of gambling addiction
has not featured as prominently as it should, given the central
importance of decision making to gambling (e.g., not only decid-
ing when to initiate a gambling episode and when to cease an
episode, but deciding what to bet on and how much to wager).
The identification within a single theoretical framework of
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different types of decision-making vulnerabilities, and their
association (to varying degrees) with underlying neurophysiologi-
cal mechanisms, affords the gambling research community an
overarching framework in which to map out decision-making def-
icits. However, the argument that the explanation of problem
gambling is attributed to Vulnerability 6 (the illusion of
control) is, at best, premature. Moreover, the relationship
between conscious (explicit) and unconscious (implicit) cognitive
processes during gambling needs to be considered in relation to
the types of vulnerabilities that Redish et al. outline.
The application of dual processes theories to addiction (see
Wiers & Stacy 2006a; 2006b for a recent overview) and the
role of two distinct types of decision-making processes in gam-
bling (e.g., Bechara et al. 1997; Evans & Coventry 2006) cuts
across a number of the vulnerabilities outlined. It has been
argued (Evans & Coventry 2006) that the explanation of
gambling behaviour should be seen in the context of two different
types of decision making – implicit and explicit systems –
mirroring processes with associated neurocorrelates that have
been identified in human reasoning research. This opens up
three possibilities regarding how decision-making mechanisms
might affect gambling behaviour in light of these two systems.
First, explicit cognitive processes, in the form of “cognitive dis-
tortions,” may account for increased gambling behaviour.
Second, implicit (“evolutionary older”) cognitive processes
may account for increased gambling behaviour. Third, the inter-
action between these two different systems of decision-making
may account for the behaviour. Fourth, decision-making invol-
ving both or either of these in tandem with additional
(non-decision-based) mechanisms may explain gambling
behaviour.
The notion that cognitive distortions underlie loss of control
of gambling behaviour (Wagenaar 1988) is problematic. First, cog-
nitive distortions when it comes to decision making under con-
ditions of uncertainty are present in the general population as a
whole (hence in the gambling population at large), and not just in
the relatively small percentage of problem gamblers. So cognitive
distortions do not explain the change from so-called normal gam-
bling behavior to the point where someone loses control of their
behaviour (see Coventry 2002; Sharpe 2002 for discussion). In
tandemwith another variable, such as the requirement for a specific
high arousal state associated with positive hedonic tone (Vulner-
ability 2), the role of cognitive distortions in gambling is perhaps
more appealing. Coulombe et al. (1992) reported an increased inci-
dence of cognitive distortions during gambling for regular as com-
pared to occasional video poker players, together with a significant
correlation between arousal increases observed during play and the
frequency of (verbalised) erroneous beliefs about gambling.
However, Coventry and Norman (1998) found no association
between level of gambling behaviour and number of cognitive dis-
tortions under more controlled circumstances using a more robust
coding scheme for cognitive distortions. So the claim that cognitive
distortions underlie loss of control of gambling is controversial at
this time.
The importance of implicit (unconscious) processes in relation
to human decision-making and reasoning has been demonstrated
across a wide range of decision-making and reasoning tasks
(Evans 2003). In relation to gambling as a learnt behaviour,
people can learn to predict complex patterns through this
implicit system, without the necessary acquisition of explicit
knowledge. For example, the implicit system is particularly
good at pattern recognition and identifying sequential dependen-
cies (so critical for tasks such as language learning). On its own,
though, it seems unlikely that loss of control of gambling beha-
viour can be causally explained by implicit learning. However,
the unconscious nature of this system provides a possible key
to the role of this system in the explanation of the development
of problem gambling behaviour. Evans and Coventry argue
that the possible desire for dissociative states and experiences
(escaping from the vulnerabilities associated with everyday life;
see Kuley & Jacobs 1987) provides a plausible motive to maintain
a decision-making system that infers patterns where they do not
aid future prediction (e.g., in roulette). Usually the explicit
system kicks in when the implicit system does not serve us
well, but for gamblers who desire being in an unconscious
state, the explicit system may rather act as means of providing
post hoc rationalisations (Coventry & Norman 1998) or confabu-
lations that serve to maintain the use of implicit processes. If this
view is correct, verbalised cognitive distortions are not causes of
continued gambling behaviour, but rather, are a means
of maintaining behaviour dominated by a different system of
(unconscious) processing.
Consistent with the view that unconscious implicit processes
are important for continued gambling, Diskin and Hodgins
(1999; 2001) have shown that there is indeed attentional narrow-
ing, an inability to keep track of time, and the experience of dis-
sociative states, in regular gamblers when they gamble.
Decision-making within a dual process framework, in tandem
with a cluster of variables associated with positive hedonic tone
and escape, illustrate that the explanation of gambling behaviour
needs to involve multiple constructs, and multiple vulnerabilities.
Detailed process studies of on-line gamblers are desperately
needed to identify how the explicit and implicit systems interact
over time in the transition from regular to problem gambler.
Different vulnerabilities for addiction may
contribute to the same phenomena and some
additional interactions
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Abstract: The framework for addiction offered by the target article can
perhaps be simplified into fewer, more basic, vulnerabilities. “Impulsivity”
covers a number of vulnerabilities, not just enhanced delay discounting.
Real-world drug-use decisions involve both delay and probability
discounting. The motivational salience of, and attentional bias for, drug
cues may be related to a number of vulnerabilities. Interactions among
vulnerabilities are of significance and complicate the application of this
framework.
The framework outlined by Redish et al. raises some important
questions:
1. The ten vulnerabilities described can possibly be collapsed
into fewer, more fundamental, vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities 1
and 2 both infer that the perceived value of drugs increases in
withdrawal (i.e., drug efficacy is enhanced by negative reinforce-
ment). Vulnerabilities 3 and 4 are, in essence, positive reinforce-
ment models. Vulnerabilities 4, 5, and 10 reflect a hyper-efficient
learning process, such that drug-cue associations are learned
quickly, are unusually strong, and the conditioned responses to
such cues are resistant to extinction. Thus, the framework
could be simplified by collapsing these vulnerabilities into
fewer underlying processes. We make these observations based
on the behavioural consequences of each vulnerability, which is
not to say that each vulnerability does not have its own distinct
neural substrate.
2. Vulnerability 9 relates to enhanced delay discounting. The
authors refer to this as “impulsivity.” However, “impulsivity”
has been defined by different authors in many different ways,
some of which vary radically from delay discounting, for
example, deficits in response inhibition (Vulnerability 8), lack
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of perseveration, lack of perseverance, boredom susceptibility,
sensation seeking, functional impulsivity, reflection impulsivity,
and so on. For example, a recent analysis of behavioural tests
of impulsivity (Reynolds et al. 2006) indicated that impulsivity
related to disinhibition (Vulnerability 8) can be dissociated
from impulsive decision making related to delay discounting
(Vulnerability 9). There is arguably a case for dispensing totally
with the potentially misleading umbrella term “impulsivity.”
The current framework suggests that delay discounting is a
stable characteristic (a trait). However, delay discounting rates
are not stable in individuals, as they tend to increase during
acute abstinence, as discussed further on (Field et al. 2006;
Giordano et al. 2002).
3. The mechanism(s) involved in delay discounting (Vulner-
ability 9) are described as “a source of much controversy.”
Delay discounting may critically involve the basic cognitive
process of time perception (Wittmann & Paulus 2007). Altera-
tions in time perception might affect many vulnerabilities invol-
ving the planning system. For example, a slowing down of time
perception in “impulsive” individuals might, perhaps counterin-
tuitively, protect individuals from overvaluation of expected
rewards (Vulnerability 3). This raises the important issue (dis-
cussed briefly by Redish et al) of interactions that occur among
vulnerabilities. Our own work shows that nicotine withdrawal
increases delay discounting (Field et al. 2006), showing that
Vulnerabilities 1 and 2 interact with Vulnerability 9 (delay dis-
counting). Similarly, Verdejo-Garcia et al. (2007) have reported
that, in individuals with substance dependence, the type of
“impulsivity” best predictive of lifestyle (legal, employment,
family, and social) problems is “urgency,” a tendency to
respond impulsively when in negative emotional states (White-
side & Lynam 2001). Such states would clearly be induced by
drug withdrawal of various types. This again indicates that Vul-
nerabilities 1 and 2 interact with Vulnerability 9. Moreover,
these findings suggest that such interactions may well be of con-
siderable clinical relevance.
4. Real-world decisions about using drugs involve both delay
and probability. The user makes a complex decision about the
costs and benefits of using drugs in both the short- and long-
term. The immediate gratification of using drugs is a certainty,
whereas the benefits of abstinence are not. Focusing on
delayed reward alone does not capture the essence of real-
world decision-making.
5. The authors interpret attentional bias for drug-related cues
in terms of Vulnerability 5. However, we suggest that, theoreti-
cally, attentional bias might also belong under Vulnerability 4
(overvaluation in the planning system/sensitization of motiv-
ation). For example, Franken (2003) suggested that attentional
bias and craving both develop as a consequence of dopaminergic
sensitization, and that the two have reciprocal causal effects on
each other (craving increases attentional bias, and vice versa).
Indeed, our research demonstrates that attentional bias is both
associated with (e.g., Field et al. 2005), and caused by (e.g.,
Field et al. 2004) increases in subjective craving, and that
direct manipulations of attentional bias can influence subjective
craving (Field & Eastwood 2005). Attentional bias can also be
understood in the context of Vulnerability 10 (a hyper-efficient
learning process) because it develops rapidly as a consequence
of pairings between the drug and drug-related cues (for review,
see Hogarth & Duka 2006).
6. Recent theoretical views (Goldstein & Volkow 2002; Wiers
et al. 2007) suggest potential interactions between the “salience”
of conditioned drug-related cues (i.e., attentional bias for those
cues; Vulnerabilities 4, 5, and 10), and deficient inhibitory
control (Vulnerability 8). According to these models, inhibitory
control mediates the impact of conditioned cues, either by
directly suppressing responses to those cues, or by acting as a
“brake” to prevent powerful responses to cues from influencing
drug-seeking behaviour. These models are not inconsistent
with the current framework, but they do suggest how
Vulnerability 8 (selective inhibition of the planning system) can
influence specific vulnerabilities within the planning system.
7. A radical implication of the theorising outlined in the target
article is that individuals develop (relatively) unique paths to
addiction, and that treatments based on an individual’s specific
vulnerabilities are required. Although this is an important idea,
we wonder how this would work in practice (even if clinical
tools could be designed to assess vulnerabilities), given that vul-
nerabilities are likely to interact, as outlined earlier. Interactions
among vulnerabilities render accurate predictions from the fra-
mework difficult to make, particularly as they will change in
any individual over time and with drug experience or drug with-
drawal. We also wonder how receptive clinicians would be to a
framework based on fundamental neuroscience.
In summary, we believe the framework outlined could possibly
be both simplified and refined, particularly in terms of emphasis-
ing mechanistic interactions among vulnerabilities.
The biopsychosocial and “complex” systems
approach as a unified framework for addiction
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Abstract: The “unified framework” for addiction proposed by Redish and
colleagues is only unified at a reductionist level of analysis, the biological
one relating to decision-making. Theories of addiction may be
complementary rather than mutually exclusive, suggesting that limitations
of individual theories might be unified through the combination of ideas
from different biopsychosocial “complex” systems perspectives.
Conceptualizing addiction has been a matter of great debate for
decades. Redish et al. put forth a “unified framework” for addic-
tion, but it is only unified at one reductionist level of analysis (i.e.,
biological) relating to just one aspect (i.e., decision-making). It is
clear that conceptualization of addiction has implications for
several groups of people (e.g., addicts, their families, researchers,
practitioners, policy-makers, etc.). Obviously, the needs of these
groups may not be equally well served by certain models, and in
some cases there will be absolute incompatibility. Whether
Redish et al.’s “unified framework” will help specific stakeholders
(such as policy-makers, practitioners, and the addicts themselves)
is highly debatable. Implicit within the claims made by any
particular group or individual will be assumptions about what
levels and types of risk are acceptable in the pursuit of pleasure,
and, more simply, which kinds of pleasure are acceptable and
which are not. Any unified framework for the conceptualization
of addiction must allow for the bottom-up development and inte-
gration of theory by each of these groups – that is, it must be flex-
ible, accountable, integrative, and reflexive.
It is also important to acknowledge that the meanings of addic-
tion, as the word is understood in both daily and in academic
usage, are contextual and socially constructed (Howitt 1991;
Irvine 1995; Truan 1993). Researchers must ask whether the
term “addiction” actually identifies a distinct phenomenon –
something beyond problematic behaviour – whether socially
constructed or physiologically based. There is clearly a case for
a complex systems model of addiction. “Complex” for obvious
reasons, and “systems” after Davies (1992), who argues that
alternative explanations for excessive behaviour require “the
development of a ‘system’ within which drug use is conceived
of as an activity carried out for positive reasons, by people who
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make individual decisions about their substance use, and who
may take drugs competently as well as incompetently” (p. 163).
Gambino and Shaffer (1979) have emphasized the difficulties
of re-integrating research and practice in the area of addiction.
On the basis of Polkinghorne’s (1993) observations on the
nature of such divisions, a more flexible theoretical approach,
such as the complex systems model, ought to go some way
toward bridging the epistemological gap.
The complex systemsmodel corresponds well to the biopsycho-
social approach to addiction (e.g., Griffiths 2005; Marlatt et al.
1988; McMurran 1994). It may also be considered to be a descen-
dant of previous multi-factorial approaches to the addiction
process (e.g., Wanberg & Horn 1983; Zinberg 1984). Obviously,
from the perspective of the complex systems model, it is possible
to consider the interaction of both the common and the unique
elements of any specific individual’s situation. This includes
psychological, physiological, social, and cultural factors that may
be particular to any individual. It also allows for consideration
of the pharmacological properties of specific substances, or the
reinforcing properties of certain kinds of behaviour such as gam-
bling. It is important, therefore, to point out that this is not a
return to citing the property of “addictiveness” as located within
particular substances (or within particular activities). However,
it is necessary to be aware of effects that may be common to
certain kinds of substances or activities, but not to others.
Neurological and pharmacological work on addiction (despite
some discrepancies and disagreements) allows us to remove the
emphasis on substance use (and thus lose some of the awkward
discourse associated with it) and include behavioural activities,
as well as to acknowledge the powerful behavioural dimension
of substance addictions (see Sunderwirth & Milkman 1991).
For this, Redish and colleagues should be commended because
their unified approach allows activities like problem gambling
to be considered bona fide addictions. Any activity that is reward-
ing may thus be seen as potentially addictive, but only those
activities with a social disapproval of their attached “risk” are
viewed as addictions, rather than habits, in the current climate.
This is a strong argument for a greater understanding of the
addiction concept.
In a biopsychosocial complex systems model of addiction, the
process of addiction is dynamic, in which the addict, while
responding to needs for arousal or satiation, and learned patterns
of behaviour, as well as reacting to the environment, still has
recourse to a decision-making process with regard to the modifi-
cation of their physiological state. A number of biological,
psychological, and socio-cultural factors will determine the
nature of this process.
The biological effects of any particular behaviour or drug (i.e.,
the subjectively experienced intensity, and the stimulating and/
or sedating effect of that behaviour or drug) may have a strong
relationship with other biological factors (e.g., opponent-
process adaptation to that effect), as well as with the psychologi-
cal factors (e.g., the subjectively experienced craving for that
behaviour or drug) and the social factors (e.g., prompting of
the craving through peer behaviour), which interact together
during the addictive process. The nature of those reinforcing
effects will, of course, be essentially similar to, and yet crucially
distinct from, those of other activities and substances.
Most of my own research has concentrated on behavioural
addiction (i.e., non-chemical addictions), particularly gambling
addiction but also addictions to videogame playing, Internet
use, exercise, and sex (for summaries of these, see Allegre et al.
2006; Griffiths 2004; 2006; 2008; Widyanto & Griffiths 2006).
Redish et al. have a very narrow approach when talking about
gambling as an addiction, and their “unified framework” also
needs to include these other types of behavioural addictions.
Gambling addiction is a multifaceted rather than unitary
phenomenon, and the decision-making approach (while useful
on some levels) is very limited. Consequently, as with addiction
more generally, many factors may come into play in various
ways and at different levels of analysis (e.g., biological, social,
or psychological). Theories may be complementary rather than
mutually exclusive, which suggests that limitations of individual
theories might be overcome through the combination of ideas
from different perspectives. It is evident that problem gambling
(specifically) and addiction (more generally) is a biopsychosocial
process (Griffiths 2005; Griffiths & Delfabbro 2001) and that a
narrow focus upon one theoretical perspective in the explanation
of gambling and addictive behaviour cannot be justified.
Neither necessary nor sufficient for addiction
doi:10.1017/S0140525X08004834
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Abstract: Although Redish et al. have pulled together a large number of
approaches to understanding decision-making and common errors in
cognition, they have outlined neither the necessary nor the sufficient
attributes of addiction. They are correct in claiming that addiction is
multifaceted and probably more akin to a syndrome than a genuine
disease. But grasping what that multifaceted syndrome is still eludes us.
Over recent years, about as many frameworks for understanding
addiction have been proposed as there are researchers working
on the topic. Redish et al. take the ecumenical path and
suggest that all frameworks are at least partially right and can
be accommodated within a larger theory of decision-making.
There are many paths to addiction, as there are many ways this
cognitive system can break.
The first difficulty with what the authors propose is that it does
not help in predicting, diagnosing, or treating various addictions.
They are very clear that a variety of genetic, environmental,
social, behavioral, and presumably neural factors lead someone
to addiction. Their model does not make any comments on
sorting out which factors are relevant under which circumstances.
But being able to predict who is likely to become addicted when is
probably the biggest lacuna in addiction research today.
In addition, Redish et al.’s proposal offers no clues as to how one
should determine which systemic vulnerability or vulnerabilities
are tied to which addicted individual. Because different addictive
substances and behaviors affect the brain in different ways, we
already know that there is much variation in the biochemical spe-
cifics of addiction. What we do not know is how to identify the vul-
nerabilities a particular individual might have, nor do we know
whether the vulnerabilities are mutually reinforcing.
Finally, although the authors suggest that one should tailor
treatment to the specific breakdowns one finds in the decision-
making system, this is already what health-care providers do.
We already know that addiction has multiple facets, which is
one reason treatments are rarely completely successful. We
already know that one size does not fit all; indeed, one size
does not fit one in most cases. We need multiple interventions
at multiple levels to effect changes in most addictive behaviors.
While the authors have cleaned up some of the laundry list of
attributes contributing to addiction, they have not shortened the
list, nor have they developed a complete list. In other words, their
theory of addiction as vulnerabilities in the decision-making
process is not sufficient for understanding addiction.
The second difficulty is that the vulnerabilities they identify
as contributors to addictive behaviors are not definitive of
addiction. Overvaluation in the planning system happens on a
regular basis in most people’s lives, as does the incorrect
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search of situation-action-outcome relationships, misclassification
of situations, and over-fast discounting processes. For example, if
people are asked whether they would prefer a fifteen-cent Lindt
truffle or a one-cent Hershey’s kiss, 73% choose the truffle. But if
we ask people whether they prefer a fourteen-cent Lindt truffle
or a free Hershey’s kiss, only 31% choose the truffle (Ariely 2008).
In the normal course of our daily lives, we tend to overvalue free
things. These sorts of so-called vulnerabilities in our cognitive pro-
cesses are well known. They suggest that we are not perfectly
rational and that we make errors in our behavioral choices. But
these facts are true of all humans, not just those with addictions.
Even the vulnerabilities that intuitively might seem to be tied
more closely to addiction – moving away from homeostasis, chan-
ging allostatic set points, and euphoric “reward-like” signals – are
part of many non-addicted people’s daily lives. Patients with
depression, schizophrenia, autism, and post-traumatic stress dis-
order, to name a few conditions, could all be described as having
vulnerabilities in their affective reactions. So do people with stress-
ful lives, with new loves, and who are coping with tragedy.
The point is that a malfunctioning or oddly functioning decision-
processing system is a very normal aspect of everyone’s lives.
I would argue that it is part of what makes us human. But more
importantly, these vulnerabilities are not necessary for addiction.
To summarize my main point again: Although the authors have
pulled together a large number of approaches to understanding
decision-making and common errors in cognition, they have
not really developed anything that helps us predict, treat,
control, or understand addiction. They are surely correct in
claiming that addiction is multifaceted and probably more akin
to a syndrome than a genuine disease. But fully grasping that
multifaceted syndrome still eludes us.
Human drug addiction is more than faulty
decision-making
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Abstract:We commend Redish et al. for the progress they have made in
bringing a measure of theoretical order to the processes that underlie
drug addiction. However, incorporating information about situations in
which drug users do not exhibit faulty decision-making into the theory
would greatly enhance its generality and practical value. This
commentary draws attention to the relevant human substance abuse
literature.
We commend Redish et al. for attempting to bring a measure of
theoretical order to the processes that underlie this important
scientific and social problem: drug addiction. However, several
aspects of their article warrant further discussion.
First, there are important disparities between the literature cited
in the target article and other work in the human substance abuse
literature. The article proposes an “explanation for addiction as
‘vulnerabilities’ in an established decision-making system” (sect.
2.1, para. 1). In essence, the claim is that individuals who engage
in maladaptive substance use exhibit deficiencies in decision-
making, and that this inability to make correct non-drug-using
decisions is a main cause of continued substance use. However,
many substance abusers have the capacity to (and do) make
rational choices from available options. For example, Hart et al.
(2000) compared self-administration of cocaine when either a $5
cash or merchandise voucher was available as an alternative rein-
forcer, and they found that near-daily cocaine users’ choice to
self-administer cocaine was significantly lower when cash was the
alternative. These results are consistent with other human labora-
tory data evaluating the influence of alternative reinforcers on
cocaine-taking behavior (e.g., Hatsukami et al. 1994; Higgins
et al. 1994), and suggest that experienced current cocaine users
are capable of making consistent reasonable choices. Similar
results have been obtained in opioid abusers. Comer et al. (1997)
demonstrated that heroin-dependent individuals’ self-adminis-
tration of the drug was decreased as the alternative money
amount increased. Several other investigators have reported
similar findings (e.g., Comer et al. 1998; Rosado et al. 2005;
Stitzer et al. 1983; Vandrey et al. 2007). A discussion of how
these and related findings apply to Vulnerabilities 7 and 9 would
enhance the proposed theory.
Moreover, research participants in substance abuse studies are
required to complete extensive screening procedures prior to
study enrollment (seeHart et al. 2008). Typically they undergo psy-
chiatric and medical examinations and several days of training on
study procedures, requiring multiple screening visits. Once
enrolled in the study – which may consist of alternating in-
patient and out-patient phases lasting a couple of months –
demanding schedules are imposed, requiring participants to do
considerable planning, inhibit behaviors that may be inconsistent
with meeting study schedule requirements (e.g., drug use), and
delay immediate gratification. All of these have been identified in
the target article as potential “failure points.” The conclusion that
substance abusers are handicapped by compromised decision-
making skills that contribute to their addiction is inconsistent
with the findings of human laboratory studies of substance abusers.
Second, most of the data supporting the proposed theory come
from laboratory animal studies, with limited consideration of the
social setting in which the drugs were administered. However,
human drug-taking behavior is extremely sensitive to social
context. Hart et al. (2005), for example, found that experienced
marijuana smokers self-administered significantly more delta-9-
tetrahydrocannabinol (D9-THC) capsules (the primary psycho-
pharmacologically active component of smoked marijuana)
during social/recreational periods compared with non-social/
recreational periods. This and other findings that drug self-
administration is influenced by social factors (e.g., Doty and de
Wit 1995; Foltin et al. 1989) raises questions about the applica-
bility of the proposed theory to human substance abuse.
Third, the target article defines addiction “as the continued
making of maladaptive choices” (sect. 1, para. 1). Appropriately,
the definition is derived from the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) and International
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10). However, both the
DSM-IV-TR and the ICD-10 refer to the phenomenon of inter-
est as substance dependence and not addiction. It is not clear how
the proposed theoretical model deals with individuals who use
“addictive” substances, but do not meet criteria for substance
dependence. While this omission has implications for several
aspects of the model, it is particularly relevant to the discussion
of the mediating role of increased dopamine activity on the
failure point of the habit system. Overwhelmingly, illicit drug
users do not display symptoms associated with dependence (Sub-
stance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 2007),
and many of the substances used by these individuals enhance
dopaminergic activity acutely. In our experience with human
cocaine and methamphetamine users, for example, many non-
dependent individuals report using these drugs several times
per week and, in some cases, for many years. In addition, many
patients are maintained on daily doses of amphetamines, dopa-
mine agonists, for medical reasons (e.g., to treat attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder [ADHD]), yet do not meet criteria
for a substance use disorder. In fact, some investigators have
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reported that stimulantmedication treatment for ADHD is protec-
tive against subsequent development of substance abuse (Wilens
et al. 2003). Given the widespread licit and illicit use of dopa-
mine-enhancing drugs, the model’s failure to address the non-
dependent use of so-called drugs of abuse is a serious omission.
Finally, Redish et al. contend that their theory has implications
for prevention and treatment. We appreciate that an exhaustive
consideration of research on substance abuse would be beyond
the scope of the target article. However, we regret the authors’
failure to discuss what is arguably the most successful substance
abuse treatment strategy: contingency management (for review,
see Higgins et al. 2004). This omission might be related to the
proposed theory’s primary focus on neurobiological explanations
of substance dependence, whereas contingency management
(consistent with the human laboratory data cited earlier) views
such behavior as sensitive to environmental consequences. It is
clear that, under certain conditions, drug users can make rational
choices that limit their drug intake. A theory that delineates the
conditions under which drug users will and will not make mala-
daptive decisions about their drug use would be of enormous
scientific and practical value.
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Abstract: Redish et al. view addictions as errors arising from the weak
access points of the system of decision-making. They do not analytically
distinguish between addictions, on the one hand, and errors
highlighted by behavioural decision theory, such as over-confidence,
representativeness heuristics, conjunction fallacy, and so on, on the other.
Redish et al.’s decision-making framework may not be comprehensive
enough to capture addictions.
Redish et al. offer a unified framework of decision-making. They
use the framework, first, to classify the different kinds of addic-
tions; second, to show how the different theories of addiction
are partial descriptions of these kinds; and, third, to prescribe
different remedies for each kind. Addictions, they argue, arise
from vulnerabilities in the access points of the system of
decision-making – vulnerabilities similar to the errors and
biases uncovered by behavioral decision research (Kahneman
et al. 1982).
Redish et al. propose a decision-making framework based on
the distinction among three systems: “cognitive system,” which
they leave out of the target article, and two action systems,
namely, “planning system” and “habit system.” The planning
system, or, a better term, “deliberation system,” involves asses-
sing the values of outcomes (O) of a ray of actions (a), given
the situation (S) (S!ðaÞ O), and then choose the best (optimum)
action. The habit system involves specific action in response to
a situation, where outcome is absent (S!a ). The outcome is
absent because the decision is very inelastic with regard to
changes in the situation – which would demand different
action if the decision is undertaken by the deliberation system.
It is a step in the right direction to ground addictions in
decision-making theory. This commentary, though, finds that
Redish et al. have failed to analytically distinguish between
addictions, on one hand, and the biases and errors that inflict
decision-making as highlighted by behavioral decision research,
on the other. Further, this commentary questions whether
Redish et al.’s framework is comprehensive enough to explain
addictions. To start with, the habit system is not very different
than the deliberation system: both are regulated by rational choice.
Redish et al.’s deliberation system resembles the standard
notion of rationality. Agents are rational if they obey the transitiv-
ity axiom (consistency), completeness axiom (decisiveness), and
some other minor axioms (see Kreps 1990, pp. 18–37).
Further, agents must also undertake welfare-enhancing acts
(see Becker 1976, Ch. 1). But is the deliberation system, and
its associated habit system, exhaustive description of behavior?
Are organisms motivated only to take the best decision in light
of a situation? Humans, for example, have the urge to act crea-
tively and with imagination – that is, beyond what is suggested
by the situation – which introduces innovations (Khalil 1997;
2007; Nooteboom 2000, Ch. 9). And such urge, or its frustration
in the forms of depression and disorders, might be the basis for
accounting for addictions. Although Redish et al. mention
depression and disorders at the conclusion of the target article,
they fail to incorporate them in their framework.
The main fabric of Redish et al.’s framework is rather the
deliberation system, the habit system, and their interconnection.
But habits do not lie far from deliberation. As the authors repeat-
edly state, habits originate from deliberation: When the organism
faces repeatedly the same situation, there would be no need to
deliberate; the organism would react automatically. This would
speed decision-making, economizing on the use of cognitive
resources. Such speeding is desirable as long as its benefit
exceeds the cost of rigidity.
Despite the fact that habits originate from deliberation, they
have different neural substrates. Redish et al., therefore, consider
them dichotomous systems. “Because the S!a association is a
habitual, automatic association, choices driven by S!a relation-
ships will be unintentional, robotic, perhaps even unconscious”
(sect. 3.3.1, para. 2). But is the habit system unintentional,
robotic, or unconscious? The fact that they involve different
neural substrates does not mean the two systems are dichoto-
mous. They may involve an efficient division of labor. The same
homogeneous structure differentiates itself into substructures,
each specializing in a different function. So, the two systems
might be underpinned by a common structure, rational choice.
In fact, the habit system does not lie far from rational choice. Let
us use Redish et al.’s example of how driving to a new job becomes,
after repetition, a habit (sect. 3.1). They recognize that such a habit
never escapes the intervention of deliberation – as in the case
when road construction closes a route. Nonetheless, aside from
such interventions, they consider the habit system as autonomous.
Let us assume that one’s job moves to a nearby location, where
halfway to work, the agent has to take another route. The agent
would habitually fail to adjust midway, finding himself driving to
the old job. But this repeated mistake does not go uncorrected.
The old habit would eventually dissipate, given that the reward is
suboptimal. Thus, rationality is, in the final analysis, a regulator
of the habit system. We do not have a dichotomy. The habit
system is a subsystem of deliberation.
If so, Redish et al.’s framework amounts to deliberation and its
subsystem. They find that each system and its interaction with the
others are full of vulnerabilities that explain a variety of addictions.
They recognize that drugs enhance the vulnerabilities, leading to an
over-evaluation of outcomes and probabilities. But they also argue
thatmany of the vulnerabilities simply arise fromerrors in reasoning
as uncovered by behavioral decision research (Kahneman et al.
1982; Kahneman & Tversky 2000; Tversky & Kahneman 1981).
Therefore, for Redish et al., addictions are analytically similar to
errors and biases such as overconfidence, preference reversals, illu-
sion of control, availability heuristic, conjunction fallacy, and so on.
However, there is a major difference between errors of judg-
ment and addictions. Most agents commit the same errors of
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judgment in a predictablemanner as they commit optical illusions
(Ariely 2008). No such predictability exists, as Redish et al. admit,
with regard to addictions. For instance, most agents are vulner-
able to the switch from the loss frame to the gain frame in the
Asian disease experiment (Tversky & Kahneman 1981). Also,
most agents fall victim to overconfidence and the conjunction
fallacy (Baron 2008, Ch. 6). But, with addictions, individuals
vary widely in the manner they may or may not become addicted.
The same decision framework seems unable to explain both
biases and addictions. Redish et al.’s framework might not be
the proper tool to explain addictions. Addictions, at first examin-
ation, are maladaptive actions in the sense that they reduce O. In
contrast, the errors that arise from heuristics might be minor nui-
sances that the organism tolerates because the heuristics, on
average, are efficient. In this case, the heuristics are tolerable
“bad habits” given that such habits, in comparison to their
absence, have positive net effect on O. Addictions, in contrast,
totally diminish the ability to produce O. If so, we need
another framework, aside from deliberation and habits, to
tackle addictions. This framework may have to attend to the
urge to be creative, to have a meaningful life, and how it may
lead to addiction when the urge is frustrated.
Role of affective associations in the planning
and habit systems of decision-making related
to addiction
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Abstract: The model proposed by Redish et al. considers vulnerabilities
within decision systems based on expectancy-value assumptions. Further
understanding of processes leading to addiction can be gained by
considering other inputs to decision-making, particularly affective
associations with behaviors. This consideration suggests additional
decision-making vulnerabilities that might explain addictive behaviors.
Redish et al. show that a fuller understanding of the processes
and outcomes of substance use and abuse can be gained by
probing the underlying decision-making and self-regulatory
mechanisms involved in initiation and maintenance of use.
Their analysis of decision-making systems and vulnerabilities in
those systems stems from expectancy-value model tenets in the
decision-making and behavioral economics literatures, and
from conditioning principles and theories in the learning litera-
ture. Although the framework put forward by Redish et al.
draws nicely on these literatures to propose an integrative
model of substance use, there are important processes involved
in decision-making and self-regulation which are not well
included in this framework.
In particular, affective processes are not well represented in
the framework presented in the target article. We know that
affective processes are implicated in a variety of issues around
substance use and abuse. For example, affective states are
reported as antecedents of smoking behavior and of relapses
after quitting (Gilbert et al. 2000; Shiffman et al. 1996). In the
context of alcohol use, negative affect resulting from acts of dis-
crimination is associated with drinking by members of minority
groups (Simons et al. 2006; Terrell et al. 2006). Finally, as
Redish et al. point out, intake of some substances directly leads
to affective states (e.g., euphoria; Koob & Le Moal 2006). More-
over, research from multiple domains has shown that affective
processes are an integral part of “normal” decision-making and
both impact and are influenced by the expectancy-value pro-
cesses discussed in Redish et al.’s analysis. Use of expected-
utility rules changes with decision tasks that arouse negative
emotion (Darke et al. 2006; Greene et al. 2001). Behavioral
choices are influenced by anticipation of experiencing regret,
guilt, or other emotions as a result of engaging in a behavior
(Richard et al. 1996).
An integrative model of the influence on behavioral choice of
cognitively based inputs and affective associations with behaviors
has been proposed recently (Kiviniemi et al. 2007). The beha-
vioral affective associations model focuses on affective associ-
ations with a behavior – feelings and emotions associated with
a particular behavioral practice. The model proposes that affec-
tive associations with a behavior influence actual behavior;
more positive affective associations lead to a greater likelihood
of engaging in a behavior. Moreover, according to the model,
affective associations mediate influences of cognitive beliefs on
behavior. Finally, the model argues that affective associations
influence behavioral practices both via mediating cognitive
beliefs and through a path that is dissociable from and distinct
from the mediation of cognitive beliefs (see Kiviniemi & Bevins
2007 for additional discussion of the model). Affective associ-
ations have been documented for alcohol and marijuana use
(Simons & Carey 1998) and smoking (Trafimow & Sheeran
1998). Recent data from the Kiviniemi lab shows that affective
associations both directly predict use behavior and mediate the
influence of expected utility beliefs on use for alcohol, cigarette
smoking, and marijuana use.
Thus, there are a variety of reasons to argue that affective
associations play a central role in both decision-making about
and ongoing self-regulation of substance use. What implications
might an affective association analysis have for Redish et al.’s fra-
mework for studying addiction? First, consider two components
of Kiviniemi et al.’s (2007) behavioral affective associations
model: (a) affective associationsmediate the influence of expected
utility beliefs on behavior, and (b) affective associations influence
behavior both in conjunction with (through the mediational
pathway) and independent of cognitively based expected utility
beliefs. The mediational path suggests that affective associations
may serve a self-regulatory role by functioning as an indicator of
the expected utility of a behavioral choice or, more broadly, by
indicating the overall positivity or negativity of one’s cognitively
based beliefs (e.g., attitudes, social norms). This would allow
decision making to proceed in a faster and more efficient
manner than directly accessing cognitive beliefs. Such an analysis
is consistent with the work of Damasio and colleagues on the
somatic marker hypothesis (e.g., Damasio 1994). The tenet that
affective associations can exist and can influence behavior inde-
pendent of one’s cognitive beliefs suggests that the content of
one’s affective associations with a behavior could conflict with
one’s cognitive beliefs (e.g., onemight perceive a number of nega-
tive consequences from alcohol use but still have overall positive
affective associations with alcohol and its use).
In the context of substance abuse, this suggests the possibility
for an additional vulnerability in the decision-making system. To
the extent that affective associations are created relatively inde-
pendently of one’s cognitive beliefs about the behavior (as
might be the case for euphoria resulting from use or from associ-
ating the drug and its use with other positively valued things), the
independent affective associations–behavior pathway might
push behavior in different directions than the cognitive beliefs
path. Such a conflict between decision-making inputs then
raises the important question of which input will “win” and influ-
ence behavior. Because cognitively based processes often require
some effort by the individual, whereas affective processes are
more automatic, it may be the case that affective associations
will be more likely to guide behavior. This may be especially
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likely in the context of substance use where impaired cognitive
functioning may be a consequence of use (e.g., Hoffman et al.
2006; Kim et al. 2005).
Supporting this point about vulnerability and affective associ-
ations are the published examples of unconditioned stimulus reva-
luation using Pavlovian conditioning with alcohol (Molina et al.
1996; Revusky et al. 1980; Samson et al. 2004). For instance, in a
retrospective revaluation design Molina et al. (1996) found that
an aversion to a tactile stimulus conditioned with ethanol was abol-
ished if ethanol was later paired with sucrose. More specifically, rat
pups first had an aversion conditioned to the tactile stimulus by
pairing it with intragastrically administered ethanol. If rat pups
then had the ethanol paired with a sucrose solution via intra-oral
cannula, the robust tactile aversion was no longer expressed. The
previously acquired tactile aversion was not lost if ethanol and
sucrose were presented in an unpaired fashion (i.e., no temporal
contiguity). Molina et al. concluded that the representation of
the ethanol unconditioned stimulus (US) was changed by the appe-
titive conditioning history with sucrose. As such, expression of the
earlier conditioned association (memory) was also changed. A
similar possibility has been discussed for nicotine (Bevins, in
press; Bevins & Palmatier 2004). Applied to the early discussion,
here is an example of a choice behavior (avoid aversive stimulus)
that was modified not by direct and contrary learning history in
that situation. Rather, choice was presumably altered by changing
the positive affective qualities of ethanol. Perhaps effortful cogni-
tion was involved in this revaluation. However, such an assumption
is not necessary to explain the change in choice behavior and, in
fact, seems a priori.
In summary, Redish et al. in this target article outline an inte-
grative model of substance use from a decision-making and self-
regulation perspective. This model provides much to think about,
as well as indicates interesting and likely important paths for
future research. However, we suggest that going beyond consid-
ering vulnerabilities within an expectancy-value decision system
to consider how other inputs to decision-making might inform
our understanding of substance use and abuse, can strengthen
the framework proposed by Redish et al. In particular, consider-
ing the role of affective associations with behavior suggests that
an additional decision-making vulnerability influencing sub-
stance use might be conflict between affectively based and cogni-
tively based decision systems. Such conflict can explain why
behaviors, including substance use and abuse, may depart from
expected-utility model predictions.
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Abstract: Decision-making is a complex activity for which emotions and
affects are essential. Maladaptive choices depend on negative affects.
Vulnerabilities to drug or non-drug objects depend on previous
psychopathological comorbidities. Premorbid individual characteristics
allow us to understand why some individuals – and not others – enter
into the addiction cycle. Moreover, plasticity of reward neurocircuitry
is, at least in past, responsible for these vulnerabilities leading to
compulsive drug use.
The field of addiction research is becoming more and more
complex, and many hypotheses have been proposed to account
for the transition from recreational use to impulsive consumption
and to the last stage of this chronic, relapsing disease: compulsive
use and addiction. Redish et al. have reviewed some of these the-
ories and have proposed a classification under eight categories in
such a way that some researchers will be surprised to find them-
selves listed under this or that category. The theories cited each
stress different aspects, functional or neuropsychological, and
different phase of the process, or consider either physiological
mechanisms or structural neurobiology. In the target article,
Redish et al. propose one more theory, which is more specific
and cognitively oriented: the process of decision (decision-
making) is hypothesized to be a “unified framework for addiction”
and to be operational to provide a classification of potential vul-
nerabilities. From a Herculean analysis of the literature, but from
this restricted point of view, they have identified ten potential
different constitutive vulnerabilities.
Scientific analysts alert us about the breaking down and fragmen-
tation of knowledge, a crisis due in part to the reductionism inherent
in modern scientific progress. What is needed is to turn toward a
more difficult task: to try and propose holistic theories and to
conform to the principle of parsimony. Entities should not be mul-
tiplied without necessities, according to the principle of Occam’s
razor. Moreover, most authors now agree about the reality of a
common clinical syndrome for all the drug and non-drug addictions
(Goodman 1990; 2008) and, underlying it, a common set of neur-
onal systems, whose dysregulations is supposed to be responsible
for the set of symptoms (see Koob & Le Moal 1997; 2001; 2006).
The question is to know at which stage the process is examined. It
seems that Redish et al. are considering the stage of addiction
when maladaptive choices are made in spite of their deleterious
consequences, whereas vulnerability is generally studied as an
intrinsic factor operating at thebeginning of the process, accounting
for the huge individual differences in the propensity tomove toward
impulsive drug-taking or gambling (Anthony et al. 1994; Piazza &
Le Moal 1996; Piazza et al. 1989; Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration 2003).
At one moment of the process, there is a passage from impul-
sive control disorder to compulsive disorder – from a stage
where increasing tension and arousal occur before the impul-
sive act, with pleasure, gratification, or relief during the act, fol-
lowed by regret or guilt, to a stage of recurrent and persistent
thoughts (obsessions) that cause marked anxiety and stress fol-
lowed by repetitive behaviors (compulsions) that are aimed at
preventing or reducing distress. The first stage is most closely
associated with positive reinforcement (pleasure, gratification);
the compulsive stage is most closely associated with negative
reinforcement and relief of anxiety and/or stress (Koob & Le
Moal 1997). Addiction involves persistent plasticity in the
activity of neuronal circuits mediating a decreased function of
the brain reward system and a recruitment of anti-reward
systems, now well identified, driving aversive states (Koob &
Le Moal 2005; 2008). For the purpose of this commentary,
the withdrawal/negative affect stage can be defined as the pre-
sence of motivational signs of withdrawal in humans, that is,
chronic instability, emotional pain, malaise, dysphoria, and
loss of motivation for natural rewards. As dependence and
withdrawal develop, brain anti-reward systems are recruited
(Koob & Le Moal 2008). Another critical problem is chronic
relapse in which addicts return to compulsive drug-taking
after acute withdrawal; relapse corresponds to the preoccupa-
tion/anticipation stage of the addiction cycle just outlined. A
unified framework for addiction cannot avoid the fact, well
documented from clinical observations, that affects and
emotions are important, if not central, neuropsychological
dimensions in this human condition. Needless to say, these
dimensions interact with the process of decision-making.
All the neurobiological theories of addiction (we refer to the
last stage of the process) agree (see Koob & Le Moal 2006)
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about an interconnected network of regions and neuronal
systems including subcortical and cortical structures (Everitt &
Wolf 2002; Goldstein & Volkow 2002; Hyman & Malenka
2001; Kalivas & McFarland 2003; Koob & Le Moal 2001; See
et al. 2003). All agree also about the fact that the prefrontal
region (orbitofrontal, medial-prefrontal, prelimbic/cingulate),
associated with the basolateral amygdala, is more and more dys-
regulated as the addictive process progresses. These two regions
are key elements for some of the symptoms and for the dysregu-
lation of the motivational systems described earlier, and finally
for the affective negative state from which addicts suffer so
much. A pure cognitive approach of the syndrome does not
account for what is seen in the real world. Decision-making,
impulse control, and loss of willpower to resist drugs (Bechara
2005) are of course very important, and a correlative deactivation
of the prefrontal cortex will produce enormous consequences.
Drugs, games, and diets are mental objects; they are not addic-
tive by themselves. They will be addictive if they are met by a
person vulnerable to their intrinsic properties. If we consider a
“healthy mind” making a decision, two groups of specialists in
the field have developed the same idea: emotion participates to
reasoning-reflective activity and at least in the first stages of
decision-making. Kahneman and colleagues (see Kahneman
2003) have described a perception-intuition system – stimulus
bound, fast, automatic, effortless, slow-learning and emotional;
and a reasoning system – slow, controlled, effortful, not flexible,
less emotional with different contents such as conceptual rep-
resentations and temporal references. The Iowa group
(Bechara et al. 1998; 2000, Damasio et al. 2000) refers also to a
first emotional stage of the decision, a sort of impulsive system,
followed by a reflective one; a peripheral emotional reaction
occurs before and orients decision-making. It is possible that
these two groups refer to two different parts of the frontal
cortex (dorsolateral versus ventromedial).
The subject who enters the impulsive-compulsive spiral is,
even before his or her first consumption, not immune to psycho-
pathological disorders. He or she does not have a “healthy mind.”
Different parts of the brain present some sort of dysfunction. It is
well documented that the main source of vulnerability (not to be
confounded with polydrug use) is the existence of psychopathol-
ogies and behavioral disorders (depression, anxiety disorders,
impulsivity, stress, self-dysregulations, etc.), and that holds for
more than 80%, if not all, of the subjects who will succumb
(Goodman 2008; Le Moal & Koob 2007; Shaffer et al. 2004).
These psychopathologies are related to neurobiological dysfunc-
tions in both affective and cognitive systems. It has been pro-
posed with robust arguments (Baumeister et al. 1994;
Baumeister & Vohs 2004) that these vulnerable individuals are
unable to self-regulate their emotions, desires, motivations, and
pleasures. Self-regulation failure is a complex construct; it may
lead to impulse control disorders. Here again, the causal mechan-
isms are not clear and may involve cortical dysfunctions due to
subcortical mesolimbic dysfunctions (Piazza & Le Moal 1996),
in a negative feedback manner.
In conclusion, there is, I feel, something missing in Redish
et al.’s scholarly review: the agency of reward-emotional systems
(Koob & Le Moal 2008) and of the stress systems (al’Absi 2007).
Expanding the range of vulnerabilities to
pathological gambling: A consideration of
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Abstract: Redish et al. present a compelling, interdisciplinary, unified
framework of addiction. The effort to integrate pathological gambling is
especially important, but only the vulnerability of misclassifying
situations is described in detail as being linked directly to this disorder.
This commentary focuses on further developing the comprehensiveness
of this framework for pathological gambling using over-fast discounting
as an illustrative example.
Redish et al. put forward a framework of addiction that unites
competing theories by focusing on key vulnerabilities in the
development and maintenance of addictive behaviors and
emphasizing their links to the habit and planning systems under-
lying decision-making. Consideration of pathological gambling
within this framework seems particularly valuable as historically
this disorder has been conceptualized and categorized separately
from substance use disorders (American Psychiatric Association
2000; Hollander &Wong 1995). Based largely on data describing
irrational cognitions in pathological gamblers and therapies
based on altering these cognitions, Redish et al. argue that vul-
nerability to pathological gambling falls largely within the
domain of misclassifying situations (Vulnerability 6). However,
many recreational gamblers experience irrational cognitions
when gambling, which raises questions regarding the centrality
of this feature to pathological gambling (Sharpe 2002). Further-
more, the most thoroughly tested cognitive behavioral therapy
for pathological gambling targets more than irrational cognitions,
addressing coping with cravings and managing finances (Petry
2005; Petry et al. 2006). Clinical experience suggests that chan-
ging erroneous perceptions is not always sufficient in ceasing
pathological gambling, as some patients report knowing that
they will lose but continue gambling problematically nonetheless.
Consistent with the integrative goals of the target article, we
consider Vulnerability 9 (over-fast discounting) as a failure
point with relevance to pathological gambling. While other vul-
nerabilities (e.g., those related to craving, obsessions, or withdra-
wal) could be considered, over-fast discounting applies to
gambling in important ways and thus was selected for
elaboration.
Redish et al. describe the relevance of over-fast discounting of
rewards, particularly temporally (i.e., delay discounting; Ainslie
1975; Rachlin & Green 1972), to substance use disorders, citing
pre-clinical and clinical data (Kirby et al. 1999; Richards et al.
1999). Delay discounting reflects one aspect of impulsivity (Borno-
valova et al. 2005; Moeller et al. 2001). A principal component
analysis of self-reported and behavioral measures of impulsivity
identified two components, termed “impulsive disinhibition” and
“impulsive decision-making,” with delay discounting contained in
the latter category (Reynolds et al. 2006). Self-reported and beha-
vioral measures of impulsivity, including delay discounting, have
not correlated strongly (Krishnan-Sarin et al. 2007). This phenom-
enon might reflect hypothetical versus real-life differences in risk/
reward decision-making, as are often observed, for example, in
trying to maintain New Year’s dieting resolutions in the setting of
chocolate cake being served. Unsurprisingly, preliminary data
associate behavioral measures of impulsivity and substance abuse
treatment outcome, whereas outcomes were not associated with
self-reported measures in the same study (Krishnan-Sarin et al.
2007).
Although several studies of drug abusers have utilized
hypothetical drug reinforcers (a small amount of heroin immedi-
ately versus a larger amount tomorrow), most work has con-
sidered financial choices ($10 immediately versus $12
tomorrow) with the assumption that the drug and money are
functionally related. As such, one might hypothesize that the
Commentary/Redish et al.: A unified framework for addiction
452 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:4
typical delay discounting procedure utilizing financial rewards
might be even more relevant to gambling than to substance use
behaviors. Relatively few studies have directly examined
problem or pathological gambling and delay discounting, and
existing studies have generated inconsistencies (Reynolds
2006). One study indicated a link between problem gambling
and increased discounting of delayed monetary rewards, even
when controlling for self-reported impulsivity (Alessi & Petry
2003). A separate study found that pathological gamblers dis-
counted delayed rewards more steeply than non-gamblers
(Dixon et al. 2003). However, a third study of young adults
found the converse (Holt et al. 2003).
A role for co-occurring substance use disorders is also indicated.
One study found that among a sample of substance abusers,
probable pathological gamblers discounted rewards more rapidly
than did those without gambling problems (Petry & Casarella
1999), although the difference was limited to hypothetical
rewards of larger magnitudes. A related study similarly indicated
that pathological gamblers discounted delayed rewards at higher
rates than did control participants, and gamblers with substance
use disorders discounted delayed rewards at higher rates than
did non-substance-abusing gamblers (Petry 2001). The only exper-
imental study found that, among pathological gamblers, a classic
discounting profile was evident only when conducted in a real-
life gambling context (Dixon et al. 2006). It has also been suggested
that individuals who engage in different forms of gambling (e.g.,
slot machine vs. sports) might be discounting rewards differently
(Cooper 2007). Thus, although multiple studies indicate that
problem and pathological gamblers, like substance abusers, dis-
count rewards more rapidly than do control subjects, the results
are not entirely consistent and suggest that specific environmental,
developmental, or individual factors influence these processes.
This interpretation fits well with the assertion of Redish et al. for
addictions in general, that specific vulnerability factors (including
over-fast discounting) may be more salient for specific sub-
groups, even within diagnostic categories.
The scope of Vulnerability 9 also warrants further consider-
ation. Both positive and negative reinforcement processes have
been implicated in addiction (Koob & Le Moal 2001), and con-
sidering both with respect to rapid discounting seems important.
Although delay discounting has typically been applied to positive
reinforcers in comparing smaller immediate and larger delayed
rewards, it also may be considered in relation to aversive
stimuli in the context of negative reinforcement. In this case,
impulsivity involves the selection of a larger, delayed aversive
stimulus over a smaller, yet immediate aversive stimulus. Said
differently, this describes the tendency to delay experiencing a
mildly aversive event, even though this delay likely will result
in a more aversive event in the future. Currently, few conceptu-
alizations of delay discounting consider this reciprocal focus on
negative reinforcement across substance disorders or pathologi-
cal gambling. This conceptualization appears particularly rel-
evant to important aspects of pathological gambling such as
“chasing” losses, wherein one continues to gamble further, typi-
cally leading to greater future gambling losses, instead of accept-
ing the immediate consequences associated with a recent
gambling loss.
Redish et al. have advanced the field with this ambitious inte-
grative effort. Further developing this model for pathological
gambling as it relates to other vulnerabilities could strengthen
the impact of the model and its utility in advancing prevention
and treatment strategies for pathological gambling.
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Abstract: Redish et al. rely too much on a rational and innate view of
decision-making, when their emphasis on variation, their integrative
spirit, and their neuroscientific insights point towards a broader view of
why addiction is such a tenacious problem. The integration of subjective,
sociocultural, and evolutionary factors with cognitive neuroscience
advances our understanding of addiction and decision-making.
First, the praise. Redish et al. show us the inherent variability in
decision-making. That is a fundamental Darwinian insight, at a
remove from the singular focus of the traditional reward para-
digm in psychology or prominent evolutionary approaches such
as optimality or adaptive modules (Lende 2007; Lende &
Smith 2002). Redish et al. accomplish this feat by tying together
neurobiological, psychological, and animal research – meaning
we no longer face the “black box” of the brain or an over-reaching
theory based on one slice of research. Redish et al. build their
analysis of addiction on similar strengths – an emphasis on varia-
bility in vulnerabilities, comprehensive appraisal rather than a
pet theory, and the much-needed linkage of decision-making to
different addictive drugs and activities.
Unfortunately, three fundamental problems undermine their
overall efforts. First, Redish et al. base their approach on the
“rational man” assumption. As they note, the literatures they
use “have converged on the concept that decisions are based
on the prediction of value or expected utility of the decision”
(sect. 3, para. 1; emphasis theirs). Expected utility lies at a con-
siderable distance from addiction, where excessive involvement
in a behavior, social role failure, and the active ignoring of
costs are core diagnostic features.
Second, Redish et al. approach decisionmaking as largely innate.
Their computational framework works through internal mechan-
isms, a series of calculations based on expected utility, with the
twist thrown in of a fast habit system and a slower planning
system. However, both brain research and decision-making
research have shown that interactive, environmentally dependent
processing are fundamental features of adaptive behavior (Chiel
& Bier 1997; Clark 1997; Epstein 2007). This embodied approach
stands in direct contrast with a representational (or computational)
view of brain function, and it undercuts Redish et al.’s claim that
they have presented a unified framework.
Third, Redish et al. do not draw on either ethnographic or
clinical case studies of addiction, which hampers their ability to
find creative connections between decision-making research
and addictive behavior. This point is especially clear late in the
target article, when they write, “the decision-making theories dis-
cussed in this article are primarily about reinforcement (delivery
of unexpected reward) and disappointment (non-delivery of
expected reward)” (sect. 6, para. 3). Unexpected rewards and
non-delivery do not add up to addiction.
For example, with gambling, Redish et al. emphasize Vulner-
ability 6 (the misclassification of situations and the illusion of
control). Using situations (rather than stimuli), neural plasticity,
and the cognitive dynamics of “control,” the authors bring a
novel interpretation for why addicts get in such a rut about recog-
nizing the costs of their behavior. However, this interpretation
builds from their ability to get away from a rational innatist pos-
ition, precisely through situations, plasticity, and illusion.
Thus, implicit assumptions of rationality and innate compu-
tation hamper the development of a unified approach to how
decision-making plays into addiction. Addiction involves subjec-
tive, sociocultural, and evolutionary elements, and these elements
help us get at the “why” of addiction (Lende 2005a; 2007). Rather
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than assuming that rationality explains why, more fruitful
approaches can be achieved by combining anthropology and
other social sciences with the biological and behavioral sciences
(Hruschka et al. 2005).
Why do people use and abuse drugs? Environmental inequal-
ity makes a direct impact on decision-making (Bourgois 2002;
Singer et al. 1992), for example, in social position, dopamine
function, and cocaine use (Morgan et al. 2002), or in the
quality of the environment and the reinforcement of cocaine
and heroin (Alexander 1987; Alexander et al. 1981). Similarly,
moving beyond the individual misclassification of situations,
sociocultural context can directly shape heavy drinking, particu-
larly the effect alcohol has and the amount that people drink
(Heath 2000; MacAndrew & Edgerton 1969; Marlatt 1999).
Moreover, the understanding of relapse is enhanced through
incorporating elements of self-efficacy, cognitive dissonance, and
personal attribution (Brownell et al. 1986). Rather than blaming
the situation, the person blames “personal weakness,” heightening
the chance of further relapse due to continued “loss of control”
(after all, already lost control once . . .). In other words, relapse
is more than a decision-making vulnerability based on the compu-
tation of benefits or costs in any particular situation.
Finally, drug users seek things from substance use – inten-
tions, subjective experience, and meaning all matter in what
users want. For example, heavy methamphetamine users often
engage in “functional use,” seeking to enhance a skill or to be
in an altered state while still engaging in socially acceptable beha-
vior (Lende et al. 2007). Craving, long seen as psychobiological, is
often defined by users in reference to personal control, rather
than being separable into a cue-, drug-, and withdrawal-driven
typology (Bruehl et al. 2006).
Instead of reducing the habitual and compulsive aspects of
addiction to computational decision-making, these behaviors
and experiences can drive addiction. A renewed focus on the psy-
chology of interest (Silvia 2008) and the use of wheel running as a
behavioral model for compulsive involvement (Rhodes et al.
2003; 2005; Sherman 1998) show us an important insight often
lost in experimental models: neurobiology and decision-making
serve behavior, not the other way around.
A core part of any behavioral involvement, including addiction,
is subjective experience. To take one example, Robinson and Ber-
ridge’s (2001) incentive salience (discussed in Redish et al.’s Vul-
nerability 4, overvaluation in the planning system) depends as
much on the meaning of drug use as it does on the action of the
mesolimbic dopamine system (Lende 2005b). Heightened sal-
ience is a measurable trait, using a psychometrically valid scale
(Lende 2005b). At the same time, both cultural symbols and an
individual’s sense of self impact what users desire and seek out.
In my ethnographic research, one girl who smoked marijuana
nearly every day explained what she wanted: “estar en un video”
(“to be in a video”), where attention was shifted away from how
she felt in her traumatic yet culturally valued family environment.
This type of compulsive involvement, both in itself and as a step
away from a traumatic everyday life just waiting to return, is
central to why some people use drugs to such excess.
Bridging the gap between science and drug
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Abstract: For all its problems, the microeconomic “rational addiction”
theory had the appeal of making clear predictions about the effects of
various drug policies. The emerging picture of the “what” and “how” of
addiction is far more complex. Addiction scientists might help bridge
the science–policy gap by devoting more attention to the “whom” and
“when” of addiction.
Redish et al. document tremendous progress in the scientific
understanding of the “what” and “how” of drug addiction. Stran-
gely, as our understanding of addiction advances, its implications
for rational drug policy seem to recede – at least relative to the
now discredited “rational addiction” account of microeconomists
Gary Becker and his colleagues (e.g., Becker et al. 2004).
There are various ways in which the science of addiction might
produce a more reasoned, less ideological approach to drug abuse
policy (see MacCoun 2003). The influence could be technological,
in the form of more powerful treatments, diagnostic tools, or even
safer psychoactive drugs. The influence could be behavioral, in the
form of advice about the design of optimal prevention, deterrence,
and harm reduction tactics. Or the influence could be rhetorical
and conceptual, changing the very way we think about the problem.
Advances have been steady but incremental on the technologi-
cal front, and I leave it to other commentators to address that
topic. On the rhetorical front, one couldn’t ask for a more
potent reframing than the mid-1990s claim that addiction is a
chronic relapsing disorder (O’Brien & McLellan 1996). This
view arguably helped facilitate the growth of the drug court
movement, but it still wasn’t enough to curtail the steep growth
in the federal drug prisoner population in the decade that fol-
lowed. The public’s flexible image of the addict as enslaved and
yet still blameworthy allows ready assimilation of most new
facts about addiction (see MacCoun & Reuter 2001). At least
in the United States, citizens seem less interested in how
someone becomes addicted than they are in the question
“could the actor have done otherwise?” But addiction scientists
have been more reticent at addressing the middle ground
between philosophy and technology – behavioral questions
about how to do prevention, deterrence, and harm reduction.
Redish et al. are admirably circumspect about offering prescrip-
tions for policy makers. Still, it is worth highlighting some ways in
which an improved neuroscience complicates, rather than simplify-
ing, drug policy analysis. As our understanding of addiction has
grown in sophistication, it has also grown in complexity. Where
earlier models implicated a small handful of core mechanisms
(e.g., tolerance, withdrawal, and craving), Redish and colleagues
implicate eight distinct vulnerabilities. If one wanted to design an
addiction machine robust enough to withstand random environ-
mental shocks or hostile tinkering by saboteurs, eight overlapping
mechanisms would seem to offer more than enough redundancy.
If, as some contend (e.g., Becker et al. 2004), drug addicts
behave like rational microeconomic consumers, then we could
deduce fairly clear policy predictions about the perils of prohibi-
tion and the promise of sin taxes and optimal regulatory enforce-
ment. And in one way, the rational choice analysis fares better
than some might expect; estimates of the elasticity of demand
suggest that even heavy drug users are price sensitive (see
Manski et al. 2001). But ultimately the rational addiction model
fails on both empirical and theoretical grounds (Auld & Grooten-
dorst 2004; Gruber & Koszegi 2001; Skog & Melberg 2006).
Behavioral economic models of addiction (see Vuchinich &
Heather 2003) are more realistic and better supported, though
perhaps still too simplistic. At first glance, a mechanism like hyper-
bolic discounting is appealing because it offers a fairly modest modi-
fication to the economic choice equation. But because hyperbolic
discounting produces preference reversals (unlike the standard
exponential account), it makes less determinate predictions. Still,
the behavioral economic approach teaches us that heavy users
may respond to fairly modest carrots (Bickel et al. 1995) and
sticks (Kleiman 2001) if we deploy them promptly and saliently.
Redish et al. offer an even richer framework for thinking about
the “what” and “how” of addiction. But I would urge addiction
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scientists to take up the “whom” and “when” questions as well.
Drug policy has a broad set of tools, including the legal status of
a drug; criminal sanctions against users and dealers; interdiction
and source country controls; drug prevention, education, and
rhetoric from the bully pulpit; drug treatment; taxes, advertising
controls, and other regulatory mechanisms; drug testing; and
bans on employment, welfare, and other benefits. If we want to
deploy those tools more effectively, efficiently, and humanely,
we need to better understand how these eight decision vulnerabil-
ities play out in real-world behavior. For example, which people
are at greatest risk of each vulnerability? Can we identify them
early, and if so, how should we help them?When is the most effec-
tive time to intervene, and should timing trump concerns about
paternalism or stigma? How does each vulnerability influence
the choice among drugs (substitution and complementarity), as
well the likelihood of any “gateway” progression across drugs?
Do differences in vulnerabilities across drugs imply that there
should be differences in our policies across drugs? And are there
better ways to design secondary prevention and deterrence strat-
egies to overcome impairments in the decision process?
Linking addictions to everyday habits
and plans
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Abstract: Redish et al. trace vulnerabilities in habit and planning systems
almost exclusively to pharmacological effects of addictive substances
on underlying brain systems. As we discuss, however, these systems
also can be disrupted by purely psychological factors inherent in
normal decision-making and everyday behavior. A truly unified model
must integrate the contribution of both sets of factors in driving addiction.
Redish et al. treat addictions as maladaptive, repeated responses
that arise through vulnerabilities in the interaction between a
slow-learning, goal-independent habit system and a fast-learning,
goal-oriented planning system. Although we applaud Redish
et al.’s attempt to locate addiction within a “unified theory of
decisionmaking in the mammalian brain” (target article, Abstract),
their approach ultimately traces vulnerabilities in the habit and
planning systems to the direct pharmacological effects of addictive
substances. In doing so, they neglect substantial evidence that the
interplay between these behavioral control systems also is affected
by a range of psychological and environmental factors that are
commonplace elements of daily life and normal decision making
(e.g., Reason 1990; Wood & Neal 2007). We argue that a unified
theory of addiction must integrate these normal (i.e., non-pharma-
cologically induced) psychological processes. In support, we (1)
review data showing that the role of habit- and planning-based
behavioral control varies dynamically in everyday life and not
simply in instances in which pharmacological agents have dis-
rupted normal control, and (2) discuss specific implications for a
subset of the vulnerabilities advanced in the target article.
As we have elaborated elsewhere, the distinction between habit-
based and planning/goal-based behavioral control is studied across
a range of subdisciplines within psychology and neuroscience (Neal
et al. 2006; Wood & Neal 2007). In laboratory settings, the two
systems can be operationalized by relatively direct tests (e.g., pre-
sence versus absence of reinforcer devaluation effects in animals;
Dickinson et al. 1995) or by manipulating the procedures of beha-
vioral training (e.g., observational versus feedback-based learning in
humans; Poldrack et al. 2001). In real-world settings, the strength of
the planning component is quantified by self-reported intentions to
engage in the behavior in the future, whereas strength of the habit
component is quantified by the frequency and context stability of
past performance (see Neal & Wood, in press). The relative
contribution of planning versus habit-based control can then be
determined by regressing future behavior on each of these
measures to determine which predictor is the strongest, and
hence, which system primarily is controlling the behavior.
Real-world behavior prediction studies using this method typi-
cally yield statistical interactions in which strong habits trump
strong intentions (i.e., intentions cease to predict behavior when
habits are strong). This interaction has emerged in models predict-
ing purchasing fast food, watching TV, driving the car, taking the
bus, recycling, donating blood, exercising, and reading the newspa-
per (Danner et al., in press; Ferguson & Bibby 2002; Ji & Wood
2007; Ouellette & Wood 1998, Study 2; Verplanken et al. 1998;
Wood et al. 2005). Supporting the extrapolation from everyday
habits to addictions, similar patterns have emerged in studies of
smoking cessation. For example, in Baldwin et al.’s (2006) study,
participants’ initial success at quitting was predicted by planning-
related constructs, whereas over the long term, only the number
of months that participants had been quit predicted whether
they continued not to smoke.
The behavior prediction data have important implications for
Redish et al.’s model because they suggest the habit-based com-
ponent of behavioral control often dominates actual behavior
even in the absence of any dysfunction associated with a pharma-
cological agent. In such cases, we presumably must look to
normal psychological processes for an explanation. A key ques-
tion then becomes, to what extent do such normal psychological
processes also contribute to addictions, for which pharmacologi-
cally induced dysfunction likely is a factor? In the remainder of
this commentary, we consider this question by exploring
several purely psychological factors that may contribute to Vul-
nerabilities 4, 5, 7, and 8, which Redish and colleagues trace
instead to pharmacologically induced dysfunction.
Vulnerabilities 4 and 5 involve, respectively, overvaluation in
the planning system and incorrect search in stimulus-action-
outcome evaluation. These biases are attributed to the direct
effects of addictive substances on neural systems underlying
the valuation and search of action outcomes. However, there is
an additional, pervasive information processing mechanism that
may also contribute to this vulnerability. That is, people often
rely on their past behavior to infer their preferences (Ouellette
&Wood 1998). Repeated actions lead to especially strong prefer-
ence inferences (e.g., “I smoke a lot so I must really like it”).
People tend to make such inferences when they are uncertain
about the actual causes of their behavior (Bem 1972), as is
often the case with habits. Thus, Vulnerabilities 4 and 5 plausibly
may be induced or enhanced by a pervasive tendency to infer
preferences from past behavior, leading to overvaluation or
incorrect search for previously experienced outcomes.
Vulnerability 7, involving overvaluation in the habit system, also
is traced in Redish et al.’s model to bottom-up effects of drugs on
neurotransmitter systems. However, evidence from everyday
habits indicates that higher-level decision-making processes invol-
ving switching costs also can lock people into repeating past actions
and choices. That is, the familiarity of an action decreases decision
costs and thus increases the relative cognitive switching costs for
alternative actions (e.g., Murray &Ha¨ubl 2007). Of course, switch-
ing costs may well be encoded as overvaluation of habits in the
dopaminergic system that Redish et al. describe in relation to
Vulnerability 7 (see Niv et al. 2007). Our point is simply that over-
valuation in the habit system need not solely be the product of
drug-induced dysfunction but also may be the product of
normal decision-making processes involving switching costs.
Vulnerability 8 addresses factors that disrupt the planning system
and thereby reduce its scope to correct a misguided habit system.
Although Redish et al. trace such disruptions to the pharmacologi-
cal effects of drugs such as amphetamines and alcohol, our own
model of habits predicts that the effortful inhibition of habits in
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favor of planned behavior is impaired by reductions in psychologi-
cal self-control that are commonplace in daily life (Wood & Neal
2007). This prediction builds on substantial evidence that effortful
self-control draws on a single domain-general psychological
resource that is temporarily depleted with use (Muraven &
Baumeister 2000). Using field experiments, we have shown that
reduced self-control impairs people’s capacity to implement
planned behavior and perpetuates habits in the real world (Neal
et al. 2008). Thus, the balance between habit and planning
systems is dynamically responsive not solely to pharmacological
agents but also to the many factors that deplete self-control in
daily life (e.g., emotion regulation, complex decision making).
In summary, studies of everyday behavior repetition largely
align with Redish et al.’s core premise regarding interacting beha-
vioral decision systems corresponding to habit- and planning-
based control. However, such studies also show that the relative
influence of each system depends on a range of everyday psycho-
logical processes, including normal inferences, switching costs of
decisions, and self-control capacity (Wood & Neal 2007). A truly
unified model of addiction must consider the contribution of
these processes alongside pharmacologically induced dysfunction.
The disunity of Pavlovian and instrumental
values
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Abstract: A central theme of the unified framework for addiction
advanced by Redish et al. is that there exists a common value or
incentive process controlling Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning.
Here we briefly review evidence from a variety of sources
demonstrating that these incentive processes are in fact independent.
Clearly the influence of Pavlovian predictors and goal values on choice
offer distinct potential targets for pathologies of decision-making.
Redish et al. advance a unified framework of decision making in
which they explicitly conflate Pavlovian (stimulus-outcome) and
instrumental (action-outcome) learning processes into a single
“planning component.” They justify this by arguing that both pro-
cesses “entail an expectancy of the outcome that must be evaluated
to produce an expectancy of a value” (sect. 3, para. 8). However, it
becomes clear that situational cues are assumed to be ultimately
responsible for initiating action selection in the planning system;
based on these cues, the agent “calculates the consequences of
potential actions” and then “calculates the value of those conse-
quences” (sect. 3.2, para. 2). This simplified view, although parsi-
monious, is at odds with a number of things we know about the
role played by environmental cues in action selection.
First, the “unified framework” assumes that the evaluative pro-
cesses that govern the performance of instrumental actions – for
example, lever pressing for food – also control the performance
of conditioned responses – for example, anticipatory approach to
the location of food during a signal previously paired with food
delivery. The authors are encouraged in this view by the fact
that both instrumental actions and conditioned responses are sen-
sitive to post-training manipulations of outcome (or unconditioned
stimulus [US]) value. However, there is in fact considerable evi-
dence that changes in outcome value affect these two categories
of behavior through fundamentally different incentive processes
(Balleine 2001; 2004). One particularly effective way to reduce
the value of a food is by pairing it with illness, which can be
readily induced with an injection of lithium chloride. Rats given
just one such pairing tend to immediately suppress their
conditioned approach responses, but continue to lever press for
the devalued food, at least when tested in extinction (Balleine &
Dickinson 1991). However, giving rats the opportunity to actually
consume the devalued outcome (either between training and
testing or during the actual test session) is sufficient to reduce
their lever press performance, suggesting that direct contact
with the outcome is needed to learn that it is no longer an instru-
mental goal. The incentive processes controlling conditioned
approach performance apparently do not require such explicit
feedback. This is not just true of taste aversion learning but also
of shifts in food deprivation (Balleine 1992), water deprivation
(Lopez et al. 1992), sexual motivation (Everitt & Stacey 1987),
thermoregulation (Hendersen & Graham 1979), and drug-
related states (Balleine et al. 1994), among other motivationally
based shifts in incentive value. There is also evidence that the eva-
luative processes guiding Pavlovian and instrumental learning are
neurally dissociable. Although orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) lesions
have been shown to disrupt the effect of outcome devaluation
on conditioned approach performance (Gallagher et al. 1999;
Pickens et al. 2003; 2005), we have reported that OFC lesions
do not impair the sensitivity of instrumental lever pressing to
outcome devaluation (Ostlund & Balleine 2007).
Second, the “unified framework” fails to distinguish between the
roles played by instrumental discriminative stimuli and Pavlovian
conditioned stimuli in action selection. Discriminative cues can
act to signal particular action-outcome relationships; for
example, in biconditional discrimination experiments rats learn
that two discriminative stimuli signal different and opposite
action-outcome relationships; that is, S1 signals R1! 01 and
R2! 02, whereas S2 signals R1 ! 02 and R2! 01. In this situ-
ation, discriminative cues play a critical role in guiding devaluation
performance, such that rats will tend to suppress their perform-
ance of an action when the prevailing stimulus signals that the
devalued outcome is going to be earned (Rescorla 1991).
However, Redish et al. assign conditioned stimuli the same
capacity to guide goal-directed action selection. It is true that con-
ditioned stimuli can influence instrumental action selection. For
instance, rats will tend to increase their performance of an
action previously rewarded with a particular outcome when pre-
sented with a cue that has been independently paired with the
same outcome relative to a cue paired with a different outcome
(Kruse et al. 1983). However, it has more recently been shown
that this Pavlovian-instrumental transfer effect is insensitive to
manipulations of outcome value; that is, conditioned stimuli con-
tinue to selectively retrieve actions with which they share a
common outcome even after that outcome has been devalued
(Holland 2004; Rescorla 1994). Such findings suggest that con-
ditioned stimuli do not play a significant role in guiding the evalu-
ation of instrumental goals and instead appear to bias action
selection through a separate associative priming process. This
latter process likely reflects the information provided by these
cues; Delamater (1995) has shown that degrading the Pavlovian
CS-US contingency is sufficient to abolish the selective influence
of Pavlovian cues on instrumental performance.
Furthermore, we have found evidence that instrumental
outcome devaluation and Pavlovian-instrumental transfer effects
are neurally dissociable at the level of the prefrontal cortex. In
rats, OFC lesions have no effect on the sensitivity of instrumental
performance to outcome devaluation, as mentioned earlier, but
they are effective in disrupting Pavlovian-instrumental transfer, at
least when they are made after training (Ostlund & Balleine
2007). In contrast, lesions of the prelimbic region of the medial
prefrontal cortex have been shown to disrupt instrumental
outcome devaluation performance but leave Pavlovian-instrumen-
tal transfer intact (Corbit & Balleine 2003).
This evidence that Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning are
controlled by distinct incentive processes has implications for
Redish et al.’s ultimate aim, which is to identify aspects of
decision-making that are vulnerable to drug abuse. They describe
Vulnerability 4 as the tendency for repeated drug exposure to
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produce “overvaluation in the planning system” (sect. 4, para. 8),
and argue that “sensitization of motivational signals drives excess
motivation for certain events” (Table 5). Although it has been
shown that post-training amphetamine sensitization enhances the
sensitivity of instrumental performance to Pavlovian-instrumental
transfer (Wyvell & Berridge 2000), as we have argued, this effect
is not likely to be due to an overvaluation of the instrumental
reward. In fact, it has more recently been shown that rats sensitized
to amphetamine after instrumental training are unimpaired in their
ability to use outcome value to select between actions even though
rats sensitized to amphetamine before training showed impaired
outcome devaluation performance (Nelson & Killcross 2006), con-
sistent with the view that drug exposure resulted in excessive habit
formation, something Redish et al. identify as Vulnerability 7.
We support the authors’ attempt to apply concepts developed
in associative learning to the study of addiction, but we believe
that, rather than trying to blur the lines between Pavlovian and
instrumental learning, it would accord better with the evidence
to recognize that these two fundamentally different forms of
learning provide unique potential determinants of the pathologi-
cal drug seeking induced by drug addiction and, therefore,
unique targets for its treatment.
Timing models of reward learning and core
addictive processes in the brain
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Abstract: People become addicted in different ways, and they respond
differently to different interventions. There may nevertheless be a core
neural pathology responsible for all distinctively addictive suboptimal
behavioral habits. In particular, timing models of reward learning suggest
a hypothesis according to which all addiction involves neuroadaptation
that attenuates serotonergic inhibition of a mesolimbic dopamine system
that has learned that cues for consumption of the addictive target are
signals of a high-reward-rate environment.
Redish et al. superbly organize current knowledge of addiction into
an elegant system of conceptual folders. Their claims that different
people succumb to addiction under different pressures, and that
we should expect variability in the way clinical populations
respond to various interventions, are persuasive. However, their
remark that “treatments aimed at these specific modes are more
likely to be successful than general treatments aimed at the
general addicted population” (sect. 5.5, para. 4), while presently
true, invites an overly strong reading to the effect that we should
not expect to find any core neural process that is always crucial
to the distinctively addictive properties of some but not most sub-
optimal behavioral habits, and which neuropharmacological inter-
ventions could target. Certainly, we do not now know there is such
a core process. However, the evidence that Redish et al. so ably
review remains compatible with this hypothesis. What might lead
them to underestimate its probability is their treating Vulnerabil-
ities 2, 4, 6, 7 and 9 as separate, bypassing reasons for suspecting
they may be faces of one process.
The dopamine circuit from ventral tegmental area and sub-
stantia nigra pars compacta (SNpc) to ventral striatum (especially
nucleus accumbens [NAcc]) is, as the authors emphasize, a learn-
ing system. Its learning function has sometimes been modeled as
seamlessly integrating reward prediction, reward valuation,
salience maintenance of perceptual targets that cue expectations
of reward, and preparation of motor response (McClure et al.
2003). More abstractly, Panksepp (1998) has conceptualized
this integrated circuit as a “seeking system.” Merely because the-
orists conceptually distinguish all of these functions doesn’t mean
that the circuitry of the brain does so.
Another theoretical distinction of importance here that may also
lack a clear basis in neural functioning is that between classical and
operant conditioning. It is undermined by Gallistel and Gibbon’s
(2000; 2002) timing models of conditioning phenomena, according
to which animals represent the durations of intervals and the rates
of events, and conditioned responding occurs as a function of the
comparison of rates of reward. On these models, animals are
drawn to environments with higher such rates by gradient climb-
ing, rather than by forming explicit associations between stimuli
and conditioned responses, or between behaviors and specific
expected outcomes. Call such processes “G-learning.” In addiction
studies there has been a long-running and unresolved debate over
the relationship between supposedly classically conditioned crav-
ings and apparently instrumentally conditioned preparations for
consumption of addictive targets. Perhaps the debate has been
inconclusive because these are one and the same process so far
as neural implementation is concerned. Addictions might then be
conceptualized as high-reward-rate “environments” that lure
organisms’ attention and approach, unless the dopamine system
is opposed – as it appears to be, successfully in non-addicts, by
serotonergic and GABAnergic signals from the prefrontal cortex
(PFC).
Daw (2003) computationally models G-learning and temporal-
difference (TD) learning, of the kind implicated in Redish et al.’s
Vulnerability 7, as complementary. Suppose an animal has
learned a function that predicts a reward at t, where the function
in question decomposes into models of two stages: one applying
to the interval between the conditioned and the unconditioned
stimulus, and one applying to the interval between the uncondi-
tioned stimulus and the next conditioned stimulus. Then imagine
that a case occurs in which at t nothing happens. Should the
animal infer that its model of the world needs revision, perhaps to
a one-stage model, or should it retain the model and regard the
omission as noise or error? This is the problem that underlies
Redish et al.’s Vulnerability 6. In Daw’s account, the animal uses
G-learning to select a world-model: whichever such model
matches behavior that yields the higher reward rate will be pre-
ferred to alternatives. Given thismodel as a constraint, TD learning
can thenpredict the temporal placement of rewards (“when”-learn-
ing).This hybrid approachallowsDaw todropunbiological features
of the original model of TD learning by the dopamine system:
tapped-line delay timing and exogenously fixed trial boundaries.
If this is on the right track, then the mesolimbic dopamine cir-
cuit’s response to an addictive target does not involve a breakdown:
it is functioning just as evolution intended. The casino, for example,
is a high reward-rate environment. Furthermore, because of its
variable reward schedule, the casino continually challenges the
system’s “when”-learning and prevents the dopamine signaling,
as represented by the TD algorithm, from settling down. Addictive
drugs may all encourage the same response by interfering with the
reliability of neural clocks, a possible vulnerability Redish et al. do
not explicitly consider, but which might be expressed as changes in
allostasis, their Vulnerability 2.
If addicts’ dopamine circuits are working just as promised in
the Darwinian user’s manual, what has gone wrong, at the level
of neural functioning, in their case? The answer may be Redish
et al.’s Vulnerability 9: neuroadaptation in inhibitory (serotoner-
gic and other) circuits resulting from continuous dopamine over-
load in NAcc. This vulnerability, as caused by the mechanism
identified in Vulnerability 7, is expressed as Vulnerability 4. (Vul-
nerability 6 is simply an expression of Vulnerability 7 given con-
sumption of addictive targets.)
The only evidence that, as far as I can see, Redish et al. provide
against a common central role in all addictions for Vulnerability 7
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is their claim that cravings must implicate the planning system,
whereas the mesolimbic dopamine system is part of the habit
system. This claim must be defended against alternative neural
accounts of cravings. Seamans and Yang (2004) suggest that dopa-
mine action gives rise to two possible states in the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), depending on which of two groups
of receptors, D1 or D2, predominates. Where D2 reception pre-
dominates, multiple excitatory inputs promote VMPFC output
to NAcc. Where D1 reception predominates, all signals below a
high threshold are inhibited. In cocaine withdrawal, protein signal-
ing to D2 receptors is reduced, thus inducing the animal to seek
stimuli that can clear the high D1 threshold. Learned cues that
such stimuli (e.g., cocaine) are at hand may then arouse the
system. Here is a potential dopaminergic model of the mechanism
by which habituation gives rise to cravings. A craving might simply
be the uncomfortable phenomenology associated with the dopa-
mine system’s pulling attention away from motivators, alternative
to the addictive target, on which frontal and prefrontal systems
are “trying” to focus. That the person can, when probed, name
what eliminates the discomfort, and that frontal cognition helps
her seek its consumption, does not in itself show that goals set
by a planning system are necessary for cravings.
Cue fascination: A new vulnerability in drug
addiction
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Abstract: Redish et al. propose a constellation of vulnerabilities inherent
in the brain’s decision-making system. They allow over-attention to cues
a minor role in drug addiction. We think this is inadequate. Using the
established links among drug cues, dopamine, and novelty, we propose
a fuller account of this key feature of addiction, which we call the
phenomenon of cue fascination.
In the target article, Redish et al. characterize drug use in terms of
a constellation of vulnerabilities inherent in the brain’s decision-
making system. Unlike previous approaches to addiction, this
characterization is flexible enough to deal with multiple features
of addictive drugs and addicted individuals. We maintain,
however, that the authors’ sharp separation between the appraisal
of situational cues and expected outcomes in motivating drug use
fails to consider how cues can play more than a signaling role in
habit formation or the reward system. The phenomenon of cue fas-
cination suggests that any description of decision-making vulner-
abilities in drug addiction must address how an addict’s interest
in drug cues can influence habit formation or the calculation of
expected benefits.1 We believe that the authors’ attempt to incor-
porate over-attention to drug cues within the tenth vulnerability,
where they note that over-attention to drug cues may be related
to changes in learning processes, substantially mischaracterizes
this phenomenon, especially when paired with their model of
robotic drug use. A fuller and more robust account of this key
feature of addiction, when incorporated with the rest of the
decision-making system, will strengthen the usefulness of this
model.
Over-attention to drug cues has often been characterized largely
in terms of classical conditioning. The drug cue is a conditioned
stimulus that becomes paired with drug use and consequently
acquires physiological and behavioral relevance as a precursor to
drug ingestion (see, for example, Carter & Tiffany 1999). We
suggest that this model is incomplete. In many cases, the addict’s
interest in drug cues reflects an intrinsic fascination with the cir-
cumstances of the drug use itself. A simple example illustrates
this point. Smokers attempting to quit often find themselves
staring at packages of cigarettes. In some cases, smokers express
an urge merely to touch or look at a cigarette. When reminded
of their resolve to quit, these smokers might say, “But I don’t
want to smoke a cigarette, I just want to hold one.” While this
phenomenon remains understudied, and the typical response to
such statements is skepticism, accounts of drug use and addiction
in humans and animals reveal similar episodes of intense interest
in drug cues, often without corresponding expectations of drug
rewards. In these circumstances, drug-addicted individuals experi-
ence a persistent absorption in environments or cues associated
with past drug use. Rosse et al. (1993) describe compulsive crack
cocaine foraging behavior (“chasing” or “geeking”) in addicts who
have no expectation of finding lost fragments or pieces of the
drug. A study of drug-use rituals similarly suggests that drug cues
and paraphernalia take on added significance or meaning for
drug users even in instances where those rituals delay or obscure
the impact of taking the drug itself (see Zinberg 1984). We
suggest a model in which drug-related cues have an attraction
for addicts that is in important respects independent from both a
conscious desire to use drugs and what Redish et al. call a
“robotic,” automatic, habitual response to cues.
This characterization of over-attention to drug cues corre-
sponds to neurophysiological studies that pair drug cues with
increased levels of dopamine in the mesocortical limbic system.
The theory of incentive salience (Robinson & Berridge 1993)
suggests that the relation between drug cues and drug use is
given not merely by their relation to hedonic response, in
which cues become associated with the pleasure derived from
the drug itself, but rather by their influence on core wanting
(Berridge & Robinson 2003). Although folk psychological
accounts of motivation have typically paired “liking” with
“wanting,” Berridge and Robinson (1993) suggest that these pro-
cesses correspond to distinct neural substrates that are, in fact,
dissociable in the laboratory. Increases in dopamine signaling
have been traced not only to the ingestion of drugs, but also to
the presence of drug cues. In both cases, there is a corresponding
increase in incentive salience, or core wanting, even in the
absence of increases in hedonic rewards. Although the theory
of incentive salience has been enormously influential, exactly
what feature of addicts’ experience is referred to by “wanting”
has been unclear. Robinson and Berridge (2004) have attempted
to clarify “wanting” in terms that are useful for our present pur-
poses. “[T]he process of incentive salience attribution . . . trans-
forms the sensory features of ordinary stimuli or, more
accurately, the neural and psychological representations of
stimuli, so that they become especially salient stimuli, stimuli
that ‘grab the attention’” (p. 352, emphasis added).
Drug cues “grab the attention” because they release dopa-
mine. Indeed, Kotler et al. (1997) report that, for cocaine
addicts, “cocaine cues by themselves increase dopamine
release” (p. 251, emphasis added). We believe, however, that
another well-documented feature of dopamine release offers
insight into the psychological processes that underlie addicts’
experience of drug cues. We refer to dopamine’s association
with the experience of novelty (see Freeman et al. 1985; Garris
et al. 1999; Schultz 1998). Studies of paranoid schizophrenic
patients note that “the dopamine system which under normal
conditions is a mediator of context-driven novelty/salience in
the psychotic state becomes a creator of aberrant novelty and sal-
ience” (Kapur et al. 2005, p. 61). This inappropriate marking
results in patients reporting a subjective state characterized by
fascination. This link between dopamine and novelty suggests
that the experience of the drug cue for the addict is a very par-
ticular kind of experience: the fascination of a novel object. If
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this is true, then the addict is someone for whom a certain class of
objects in the world – objects associated with drug cues – never
becomes familiar, never becomes dull, never loses the fascination
that accrues to what is new.
The link between dopamine release and drug cues is well
established, as is the association between dopamine release and
novelty. We suggest that putting these pieces together will
bring out some important implications of Berridge and Robin-
son’s work on drug cues. In the target article, Redish et al.
consign the phenomenon of “over-attention” to cues to the
catch-all “tenth vulnerability,” where they connect it to increased
learning effects (see sect. 3.6). This is inadequate. Over-attention
to drug cues, the phenomena that we call cue fascination, offers a
new way to characterize susceptibility to drug use as well as new
avenues for drug treatment.
NOTE
1. This commentary is an equal collaboration between its authors. The
phenomenon was first discussed in Michael Clune’s manuscript The
Memory Disease. However, the term “cue fascination” originates in this
work.
E pluribus unum? A new take on addiction by
Redish et al.
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Abstract: Neuroscientists and psychologists have proposed a variety of
well-supported theories to explain addiction. Many of these theories
suggest that addiction results from a single process or dysfunction
across all of its forms. The authors of the current review, in contrast,
have used a well-defined theoretical account of decision-making to
outline the variety of dysfunctions that could account for addictive
behavior.
One major theme in studies of the neural basis of addiction has
been a search for a final pathway common to the actions of all
addictive drugs. For example, it has been proposed that addiction
is caused by aberrant associative learning arising from altered
dopamine neurotransmission (Di Chiara 1999; Kelley 2004a;
Robbins & Everitt 1999). Psychostimulants, as well as opiates,
nicotine, ethanol, and cannabinoids, all have effects on dopamin-
ergic neurotransmission through various pathways (Di Chiara &
Imperato 1988; Tanda et al. 1997; Wise & Bozarth 1987). Obser-
vations such as these have bolstered the hypothesis that addiction
is at its root a unitary phenomenon. Indeed, even pathological
gambling, an addiction that is not a substance dependence,
may be related to changes in dopamine function (Zack &
Poulos 2004). Of course the dopamine-learning hypothesis of
addiction is only one account; other unified hypotheses have
also been advanced to explain addiction. These include proposals
that addiction results from disrupted hedonic homeostasis (Koob
& Le Moal 1997), from sensitization of incentive motivation
(Robinson & Berridge 2000), or from disruptions to prefrontal-
mediated executive processes (Schoenbaum et al. 2006a;
Volkow & Fowler 2000), among others. What these disparate the-
ories have in common is that they each seem to suggest that
addictive behavior arises from one basic dysfunction. But while
each of these theories can marshal persuasive evidence in its
support, each also has substantial areas of evidence that it
cannot explain. For example, dopamine transporter knockout
mice will still self-administer cocaine (Rocha 2003), an obser-
vation difficult to explain if altered dopamine
neurotransmission is the only pathway to cocaine addiction.
In the current review article, Redish et al. have reconceptua-
lized addiction as stemming not from a single unitary dysfunction
but rather from a variety of underlying causes, each of which
impact decision-making. In so doing, the authors take a position
similar to that of others, who have viewed addiction as a disorder
characterized by maladaptive decision-making (Bechara 2005;
Kalivas & Volkow 2005; Schoenbaum et al. 2006a). In this
view, addictive behavior is that which has escaped the normal
mechanisms that control decision-making. However the current
review is unique in that it uses this idea to explore the many
different aspects of decision-making that theoretically could be
disrupted in addiction. Because decision-making arises from a
collection of interacting processes, each with a distinct neurobio-
logical basis, addiction could arise from a disruption to any one of
these processes. After laying out the possible “vulnerabilities” in
the decision-making process, the authors go on to show how dys-
function in each of these different vulnerabilities might be best
explained by a different theory of addiction that has been
advanced by other investigators. As this approach recognizes,
the wide variety of theories of addiction that have been advanced
over the past decades may not be mutually exclusive. Rather,
each one could point to different members of a whole family of
addictions.
The great strength of this approach is that it can be used to
explain why addictions to different drugs, and even to a single
drug in different cases, may have different properties. For
example, multiple subtypes of alcoholism, which vary according
to the amount and importance of craving, have been recognized
by some clinicians (Addolorato et al. 2005; Monterosso et al.
2001). According to the authors’ schema, addictions in which
craving plays a large role could be explained by a different kind
of dysfunction than those in which craving plays less of a role.
However, even if certain theoretical distinctions, such as this
one, turn out not to be applicable to addiction, the overall idea
of distinguishing addictions by the specific aspect of decision-
making that they disrupt is surely a good one. Mechanisms that
appear to point to a final common pathway of all addiction,
such as an increase in dopamine transmission in the ventral stria-
tum, could be epiphenomena in some addictions rather than
their root cause.
The ideas of Redish and colleagues also raise some broad ques-
tions. One of these, for instance, is how the idea that addiction
reflects multiple underlying decision-making dysfunctions
could itself be tested. The very strength of the framework
advanced by these authors – that it is so powerful and wide-
ranging, and can subsume so many theories of addiction – is
also a potential weakness. What kind of result could falsify it?
Related to this is the question of whether all of the theoretical
vulnerabilities in the decision-making process identified by
Redish et al. are equal in explanatory power, or whether some
of them are more fundamentally involved in addiction than
others. One possibility might be that some apparently disparate
vulnerabilities in decision-making could reduce to a common
neurobiological substrate. For instance, the authors identify the
overvaluation of a predicted outcome as one vulnerability that
may be associated with dysfunction of the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) in certain addictions. However, a drug-induced dysfunc-
tion of the OFC could also lead to other vulnerabilities separately
identified by the authors, such as an abnormally fast discounting
function (Roesch et al. 2007). The underlying problem in both of
these vulnerabilities might be a disruption in the ability to signal
the value of expected outcomes by the OFC. Such a finding
would in no way invalidate the approach of Redish et al., but it
might modify their framework. Presumably, these are the kinds
of questions and hypotheses that this important new approach
is designed to stimulate and bring to the forefront.
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Abstract: The model of addiction proposed by Redish et al. shows a lack
of fit with recent data and models in psychological studies of addiction. In
these dual process models, relatively automatic appetitive processes are
distinguished from explicit goal-directed expectancies and motives,
whereas these are all grouped together in the planning system in the
Redish et al. model. Implications are discussed.
We appreciate the attempt in the target article by Redish et al. to
provide an integrative framework for addiction from a multiple
systems view, and we find many of the suggestions regarding
addictive behaviors thought provoking. Our main concern is
related to the lack of fit of the theoretical framework with
recent data and models from psychological science.
Redish et al. distinguish between two broad processes that
jointly explain addictions: an explicit and slow planning
system, relying on stimulus/response-outcome (S/R-O) associ-
ations, and an implicit and fast habit system relying on stimu-
lus-action/response (S-A/R) associations (Table 3 of the target
article). In many recent psychological theories of addiction, a
distinction is also made between two broad systems that super-
ficially resemble the proposed systems (e.g., Deutsch & Strack
2006; Evans & Coventry 2006; Stacy & Wiers 2006; Wiers &
Stacy 2006a; 2006b; Wiers et al. 2007). These models follow
general dual process models in psychology in which the most
characteristic difference between the systems concerns the rep-
resentational format, not the contents of the associations (e.g.,
Strack & Deutsch 2004). In this model, the reflective system
uses the representations in the impulsive system and can
perform logical operations on these representations, such as
negation or placing the contents in a different time (e.g., the
future). Deutsch et al. (2006) have demonstrated the conse-
quence of this difference in representational format. When an
association is learned and later participants are told that in
fact the association was not true, participants correct this as
becomes evident from their explicit expectancies, but when
their automatic associations are assessed, they still show the
original association. A study by Krank and Swift (1994) shows
that this can have serious real-life consequences: adolescents
who were told that alcohol does not make you sexy (a prevalent
alcohol expectancy in adolescents; Goldman et al. 1999), showed
stronger automatic associations between alcohol and sex a week
later. This effect is opposite to what would be predicted if this
association was only governed by a propositional planning
system (cf. Gawronski et al. 2008).
Relatedly, Redish et al. do not acknowledge a range of auto-
matic associations that are conceptual (multi-modal) in nature,
which do not necessarily involve S-A/R associations. These
associative processes can be dissociated from explicit memory
and operations of the planning systems. Examples include
associations processed during semantic priming (e.g., Hutchi-
son 2003; Weingardt et al. 1996), implicit conceptual
memory (e.g., Levy et al. 2004), or construct activation tasks
(e.g., Arndt et al. 2002). The automatic activation of a variety
of different classes of associations (beyond S-A/R) can spon-
taneously bias processing and judgments in ways that do not
appear to involve planning, as revealed in social psychological
research (e.g., Bargh & Morsella 2008). Hence, our general
point here is that there are many more associative processes
that predict behavior than the S-A/R associations of the
habit system and that these can be dissociated from explicit
memory processes in the planning system.
When we turn to psychological addiction research, recent
studies have found that relatively automatic processes such as
an attentional bias for a substance, automatic memory associ-
ations, and action tendencies to approach alcohol are relatively
independent from explicit processes such as motives and expec-
tancies (see Wiers et al. 2007 for a review). Expectancies and
substance associations typically show low correlations and
predict unique variance in substance use (e.g., Houben &
Wiers 2006; Stacy 1997; Wiers et al. 2002). In recent studies,
the relative predictive power of automatic substance associ-
ations and explicit expectancies to explain substance use was
assessed in adolescents who differed in working memory
(WM) capacity. For smoking (Grenard et al., in press) and
alcohol use (Thush et al. 2008), substance use was better pre-
dicted by automatic associations in participants with relatively
poor WM capacity. Interestingly, Thush et al. (2008) found
the opposite pattern for explicit expectancies, which predicted
alcohol use better in participants with high WM capacity.
Hence, some individuals’ substance use appears to be more
driven by their automatic associations, whereas others (with
equally strong automatic substance associations but with a stron-
ger WM capacity on top) appear to be more “rational” substance
users. In summary, the distinction between relatively automatic
or implicit associations and explicit expectancies has been fruit-
ful in psychological research on addiction (see Wiers & Stacy
2006a; 2006b; Wiers et al. 2005; 2007). Although Redish et al.
also differentiate between two main systems (planning and
habit), many of the processes distinguished in psychological
research appear to be inaccurately grouped together and sub-
sumed in their planning system.
A third issue concerns the role of conscious motivation in drug
seeking. Redish et al. state that overvaluation of expected drug
outcomes leads to craving and that this overvaluation in the plan-
ning system might be the result of incentive salience attribution,
citing Robinson and Berridge (1993; 2003). These authors,
however, differentiate between “wanting,” the neural process of
incentive salience attribution, and subjective craving, which
can, but does not necessarily, result from the unconscious
“wanting” process. This distinction may explain, for example,
that smokers, after a Pavlovian conditioning procedure, show
strong approach tendencies to smoking stimuli, particularly in
the presence of cues predicting smoking opportunity, without
these cues eliciting increased subjective craving (Thewissen
et al. 2007). In line with this distinction, a recent meta-analysis
found low correlations between subjective craving and an atten-
tional bias for alcohol (Field et al., in preparation). Redish et al.
attribute devaluation and need-dependent evaluations exclu-
sively to the planning system. However, recent studies suggest
that automatic evaluations can be need-dependent (e.g., Seibt
et al. 2007).
In summary, we believe that there is evidence that relatively
automatic appetitive processes in addiction should not be cate-
gorized together with subjective craving and explicit expectan-
cies in the planning system. This does not imply that they are
part of the habit system either. Perhaps these relatively auto-
matic processes are an intermediate step between explicit pro-
cesses in the planning system characteristic of drug use
initiation and the reward independent associations characteristic
of the habit system in late phases of addiction (cf. Everitt &
Robbins 2005).
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Abstract: By summarizing, in a single piece, various current perspectives
on addiction, Redish et al. have performed a useful service to the field.
Their central message is that addiction comprises many vulnerabilities
rather than a single vulnerability. Such a message may not be new, but
it is worth repeating.
The various perspectives on addiction, as listed in Table 1 of the
target article, remind me of the fabled blind men touching
the elephant, and Redish et al. deserve credit for combining
the different accounts to give us a sketch of the elephant’s
shape. But keen sight they have not given us, and in our attempts
to understand addiction we are still groping in the dark.
Much of the article is a straightforward summary of various
decision systems in the brain, each associated with distinct learn-
ing capacities; little of it covers actual work on addiction. But this
is no fault of the authors, since little research so far has focused
on the effects of addiction on neural systems mediating decision-
making. Although recent studies have begun to look at this ques-
tion (Nelson & Killcross 2006; Schoenbaum & Setlow 2005; Stal-
naker et al. 2006), at present we must rest content with the
hypothetical nature of the vulnerabilities enumerated.
In their review of the literature on the brain’s decision
systems, Redish et al. underscore the importance of behavioral
analysis in our attempt to understand addiction, because
every system they discuss is delineated by behavioral assays
developed over many decades. Unfortunately, though such
assays have become standard tools among serious students of
learning and behavior, they are rarely used in addiction
research.
In this age of molecular supremacy, what some researchers
want, above all, is the so-called addiction center of the brain,
so they can safely disregard the rest in their attempt to nail
down the critical molecule(s) for addiction, in the hope that
the molecule of their choice will turn out to be the master
switch. Such wishful thinking is certainly understandable, but
the danger with wishful thinking, in science as in life, is that
sooner or later it will be shattered by reality. For decades, the
nucleus accumbens served as the center of addiction, but as we
learn more and more about the Pavlovian and instrumental learn-
ing systems of the brain, it is becoming clear that the accumbens
(or the mesolimbic pathway) cannot be the sole substrate of
addiction. If Redish et al. tell us anything about the neural mech-
anisms of addiction, it is that the entire brain (literally the cere-
brum) is critical, but that distinct functional systems within it are
involved in distinct “vulnerabilities.”
To some this is bound to be disappointing news, leaving little
room for real science. To those who believe that science gains
rigor as it zooms in on the particular, the integrative activity of
the brain is no doubt too nebulous an object for any rigorous
analysis. For others it may suggest a new approach that
focuses on interactions between neural systems in behaving
organisms.
How can the entire brain be tackled? Paradoxically, this is not
a question to which neuroscientists today devote much thought,
but we can hardly afford to ignore it any further, especially
when attempting to understand a process like addiction. It is
to precise behavioral analysis that we must turn if we wish to
dissociate global functional processes at the level of neural cir-
cuits. And what is striking about the field of addiction is pre-
cisely the lack of any detailed characterization of
behavior – of what animals actually do after they become
addicted. There is no lack of data, but a lack of meaningful
data on the effects of addictive substances on the decision
systems in the brain, because the field remains fixated on a
few uninformative measures like conditioned place preference.
Such procedures are a legacy from the study of learning decades
ago, and they do not reflect the critical developments in this
field since then. Our knowledge of the decision systems
reviewed by Redish et al. are largely the product of modern
behavioral work, and they have yet to be examined in any
detail in the field of addiction.
That is not to say that what we have learned about the various
decision systems will provide an infallible guide for addiction
research. Far from it; as this article makes clear, much concep-
tual confusion still remains regarding how these systems are to
be demarcated. To me the categorization of various types of
learning without a detailed discussion of specific data is not a
fruitful approach. One can always find studies in the literature
that happen to support a particular classificatory scheme. One
lab showed X, another Y – but the key question is whether
they were trying to measure the same thing and whether the
experimental results can be replicated by others. In the
absence of a general consensus about what is actually done
and what the data are, given a defined condition, one can
argue ad infinitum about which system is which, and how
each should be named, without contributing anything to the
debate.
In short, although Redish et al. provide a fine introduction to
the study of addiction, and a convenient starting point for
future discussions, their article also reveals how far we are
from anything approaching genuine understanding. As so
often happens in the primitive stage of scientific inquiry, a
wild abundance of data masks the lack of fundamental exper-
imental findings, and a great variety of perspectives hides the
poverty of theoretical advances. This is due, no doubt, to our
ignorance of the detailed mechanisms underlying reward and
decision-making, and an article like this will have served its
purpose if it can only remind us of the need to go back to the
laboratory.
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Abstract: In our target article, we proposed that addiction could
be envisioned as misperformance of a decision-making
machinery described by two systems (deliberative and habit
systems). Several commentators have argued that Pavlovian
learning also produces actions. We agree and note that Pavlovian
action-selection will provide several additional vulnerabilities.
Several commentators have suggested that addiction arises from
sociological parameters. We note in our response how
sociological effects can change decision-making variables to
provide additional vulnerabilities. Commentators generally have
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agreed that our theory provides a framework within which to site
addiction and treatment, but additional work will be needed to
determine whether our taxonomy will help identify and treat
subpopulations within the addicted community.
Our target article proposed that addiction is a spectrum dis-
order, with the different aspects arising from misperfor-
mance (vulnerabilities, failure-modes) of the machinery of
decision-making. The 25 commentaries are generally sup-
portive and have provided several different viewpoints on
our theory ranging from the molecular to the sociological.
In this response, we address those additional viewpoints
and show how our theory incorporates them.
We start with a review of the major issues raised in the
commentaries (sect. R1) and then proceed with clarifica-
tions of several issues that were unclear in the target
article (sect. R2). We then discuss revisions to the proposed
framework for decision-making (sect. R3), particularly the
incorporation of additional components such as Pavlovian
action-selection mechanisms, and revisions to the proposed
taxonomy of addiction (sect. R4), particularly the role of
additional processes such as negative affect. From there,
we turn to the question of predictions and falsifiability
(sect. R5), to identifying specific additional vulnerabilities
(sect. R6), and finally to implications for treatment, clinical
assessment, and policy (sects. R7 and R8).
R1. Introduction: The parameter space of
addiction
Theories of decision create an interacting parameter space
of behavior, decision, and brain function, within which we
can place terms such as addiction, compulsion, dysfunc-
tion, and illness. Our target article identifies addiction as
arising from failures in the machinery of decision-
making. Ahmed suggests that we have created an “addic-
tion space” within which the different observations and
theories of addiction can be placed.
The most contentious issue raised is whether our frame-
work of decision-making and thus of addiction is complete
and whether we have separated fragments that should
have been merged (Bickel & Yi; Goudie, Field, &
Cole [Goudie et al.]). We note that there is at least one
additional component which needs to be factored into the-
ories of addiction: Pavlovian conditioning and affect (Kivi-
niemi & Bevins, Ostlund & Balleine; see also Balleine
2001; 2004; Dayan et al. 2006). However (with the
addition of this Pavlovian/affective component), our fra-
mework holds up very well to the potential counterexam-
ples raised in the commentaries. (See, for example, our
discussion of the effect of expectancies later in response
toWiers, Havermans, Deutsch, & Stacy [Wiers et al.])
The second contentious issue is the extent to which
addiction is explicable as a single phenomenon or
whether it is in truth a spectrum of disorders with separ-
ably identifiable etiologies. Le Moal suggests that our
theory is just one more theory to add to a large list of
potential theories (which he seems to reject). However,
we would argue that our theory is a synthesis of many the-
ories (including Le Moal’s) and in doing so unifies a larger
space than the other addiction theories. Hardcastle
points out that our list is neither complete nor shorter
than prior lists on addiction, and thus provides neither a
necessary nor sufficient definition of addiction. Three
important questions arise here: (1) Is it possible to
shorten the list? (2) Does our taxonomy more directly
reflect separable components? (3) Can our theory
provide a framework within which to explain the phenom-
ena within addiction? We would argue that our vulnerabil-
ities reflect a priori failure-modes of the decision system
and as such are more likely to reflect separable com-
ponents. The extent to which our vulnerabilities reflect
the actual mechanisms of addiction is going to require
additional work in the clinical realm. As noted by several
commentators (e.g., Ahmed, Bickel & Yi, Yin), our pro-
posal is only the first step to identifying this process-
space within which we can find the dysfunction that is
addiction.
One issue raised by several commentators is the ques-
tion of whether our “unified framework for addiction” is
truly unified. Griffiths suggests that it is unified only at
a biological level. Several commentators (Boden,
Goudie et al., Griffiths, Lende) argue that addiction
arises at a more sociological level. The sociological
effects on addiction are very interesting, particularly
from a policy perspective (MacCoun), but we suggest
further on that any sociological effects must change the
decision-making systems because, in the end, the addictive
behavior (taking the drug, playing the game) is fundamen-
tally an individual action. We argue that the theory we
have proposed can incorporate social and ethnological
levels as well, because it provides a parameter space
within which to understand the social and ethnological
effects on decision-making.
As we will discuss later, there are many unanswered ques-
tions that remain, both within our understanding of the
machinery of decision-making itself as well as within the
potential dysfunctions. Other decision failures can also be
sited within this framework. For example, Andreou places
the problem of procrastination into the framework of
decision failures, identifying this also as a consequence of
succumbing to a vulnerability within the system. Similar
suggestions have been made that mental illness (such as
schizophrenia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and other
problems) can be seen as failure-modes of neural functional
machinery (Paulus 2007), which may explain the comorbid-
ity often seen with addiction (Chambers).
R2. Clarifications
Several of the commentaries seem to have misunderstood
claims made in the target article. Before responding to
issues raised within the commentaries, we wish to clarify
certain points of our theory.
R2.1. Our theory is looking at all stages of addiction
Several commentators have attempted to place our theory
at a specific “stage” of the addiction process. For example,
Le Moal suggests that we were looking at the “end-stage
of addiction.” This was not our intention at all. The
unified model of decision-making should be able to
explain behavior, and thus, it should be able to explain
not only all aspects of addictive use, but also non-addictive
use. The vulnerabilities hypothesis says that addiction
arises when drug use occurs because drug use is
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inappropriately driving decision-making. A similar case
can be made for failure-modes arising from non-pharma-
cological consequences (such as in gambling or other
behavioral addictions).
Because much behavior moves from expectancy-based,
planning-capable systems (S!a O) to stimulus-response,
sequence-based, habit-like systems (S!a ), drug use will
often proceed through the same stages that normal beha-
viors do (Everitt & Robbins 2005). However, as noted in
the target article, not all behaviors proceed through the
same sequence. It is possible for some behaviors to
remain controlled by flexible S!a O systems, and it is poss-
ible in some behaviors for the process to return to being
controlled by the S!a O system after being controlled by
the S!a system. Our contention is that all components
of the decision-making system have failure-modes, that
these failure-modes will be clinically identifiable, and
that successful treatment will require the identification
of these failure-modes.
It is important to note that not all subjects will show all
failure-modes. Our suggestion that addiction is a spectrum
disorder implies that addiction can arise from any of the
vulnerabilities (i.e., that it is an or process), and that any,
some, or all of these failure-modes may be active within
any specific subject. As noted by Ahmed, most of the pre-
vious theories of addiction have assumed that addiction
arises from a loss of a cognitive, flexible, planning-capable
ability to a habitual, compulsive, automatic system. Several
commentators (e.g., Le Moal) have incorrectly assigned
such a model to us. In fact, our model explicitly posits
that both systems have potential failure-modes. Addicts
can lose control due to a vulnerability in the planning
system, to a vulnerability in the habit system, or to a vul-
nerability in their interaction. With the addition of a Pav-
lovian/affective system ([SO] !a ; Berridge, Zhang, &
Aldridge [Berridge et al.]; Kiviniemi & Bevins;
Ostlund & Balleine; see further on in this response),
there will be additional vulnerabilities in that system as
well as in its interaction with the other systems (Balleine
2001; 2004; Breland & Breland 1961; Dayan et al. 2006).
R2.2. Falling victim to a vulnerability does not imply
that all decision making is faulty
Several commentators assume that falling victim to a
failure-mode implies that a component is unavailable to
decision-making. For example, Hart & Krauss suggest
that because addicts can actually plan and make decisions,
they must not have a problem with decision-making. We
explicitly suggest that each decision, and each failure, will
be caused by an interaction between drugs, the individual,
and the experience. These failure-modes will be both partial
and specific. By analogy, a patient with allergies has a failure
of his immune system, but still can mount an appropriate
immune response to a viral attack. Similarly, a drug addict
who overvalues heroin can still plan, both how to get the
heroin, and how to get to a clinic. It is in the contrasts of
those plans that overvaluation becomes an issue.
R2.3. Drugs are economic objects and users
are sensitive to cost
As first predicted by Becker (1976, Becker & Murphy
1988), drugs are economic objects and thus sensitive to
price and cost. Although there is strong evidence that
changes in drug costs lead to changes in drug use, drug
use remains less elastic to cost than a rational theory
would predict (MacCoun). Nevertheless, they do remain
at least somewhat sensitive to cost (Becker et al. 1994;
Grossman & Chaloupka 1998; Liu et al. 1999). Similarly,
many experiments have shown that drug use in both
animals (Carroll 1993; Carroll et al. 1989; Elsmore et al.
1980; Lenoir & Ahmed 2007; Lenoir et al. 2007; Nader &
Woolverton, 1990; 1991) and humans (Hart et al. 2000;
Hatsukami et al. 1994; Higgins et al. 2002; 2004) is
decreased with the provision of alternate options. Several
commentaries incorrectly attribute to our theory the predic-
tion that drug use would be entirely inelastic and that any
evidence that drug users are sensitive to cost would dis-
prove computational theories of drug addiction (e.g.,
Hart & Krauss).
Most current computational models (and most animal
experiments) suggest that drug users should remain sensi-
tive to costs: drug users become willing to pay very high
cost for drugs, but if a drug user is given the option
between high- and low-cost drugs, they will select the
lower cost. For example, Figure 2 of Redish (2004) expli-
citly shows the modeled drug user (Vulnerability 7) being
sensitive to cost. Thus, sin taxes remain an important
policy issue and a potential means of attacking the drug
problem (MacCoun). It is important to differentiate a
drug user’s ability to recognize costs and to select the
lesser-cost drug from rationality.
Similarly, it very interesting how small (inconsequential)
rewards (like $5 trinkets; Hart & Krauss) can serve as
alternate rewards to reduce drug use more than simply
increasing the cost of the drugs by $5. This implies that
these vouchers and alternate rewards are accessing other
mechanisms beyond cost increases. An important open
question is to determine why these voucher systems work,
and for whom. As we discuss later (see Treatments), our
prediction is that these voucher systems are allowing the
decision-making system to somehow get around a vulner-
ability. Which vulnerability is involved and how those trin-
kets allow a user to circumvent and accommodate that
vulnerability remains an open question for future research.
R2.4. Addiction arises from misperformance of the
decision-making machinery
We selected the term vulnerability (or failure-mode) from
an analogy to engineering to reflect the concept of a
machine doing the wrong thing because of an interaction
with conditions that it was not evolved to handle.
However, several commentators (e.g., Le Moal, Hart &
Krauss) have taken the term to imply an intrinsic factor
preceding any interaction with conditions. Some commen-
tators (e.g., Neal & Wood) have taken this term to imply
that all effects were due to pharmacological manipulations
of the system. Other commentators (e.g., Hart & Krauss;
Wiers et al.) have taken it to imply that a system misper-
forming because of a vulnerability entails a complete
failure of the system involved. These are all misunder-
standings of our terminology.
A “vulnerability” in our terminology is simply any mechan-
ism by which the machine misperforms. This misperfor-
mance can be caused by pre-existing conditions, by
pharmacological manipulations, by natural experiential
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sequences (e.g., gambling), or through an interaction of
these conditions.
Note that a subject can still use a system that is misper-
forming because of a vulnerability within that system.
Thus, a subject with a pre-existing strong planning
system (Wiers et al.) may be more likely to use that plan-
ning system, whether correctly or incorrectly. In fact, the
example given by Wiers et al. is exactly what our theory
would predict: In users with strong planning systems,
drug use is more likely to arise from overvaluation in
those planning systems, whereas in users with weak plan-
ning systems, drug use is more likely to arise from overva-
luation in the non-planning, habit system.
R3. A framework for understanding the machinery
of decision-making
Several commentators ask whether this is a reasonable and
correct taxonomy of decision-making (Wiers et al.),
whether we have missed certain components (Berridge
et al., Kiviniemi & Bevins, Le Moal, Ostlund &
Balleine), and whether our theory depends on assumptions
of rationality (Andreou, Hart & Krauss, Khalil, Lende,
Neal & Wood). We address each of these issues in turn.
We wish to start by stating that our fundamental claim
that addiction arises because of failures of decision-
making and can be best understood and treated by identi-
fying what those failure-modes are, does not actually
depend on the specific framework of decision-making
that we have identified. As noted by Yin, this framework
is only the first step. Additional research will be needed
to validate, extend, and correct the decision-making fra-
mework. The framework laid out in the target article is
based on rational neuroeconomics because of its simpli-
city. We would argue that these other, more complex the-
ories (e.g., prospect theory [Kahneman & Tversky 1979],
or multiple memory theories [Schacter 2001, Schacter &
Tulving 1994]) would also have additional vulnerabilities
(failure-modes) through which behavior could be driven
incorrectly. Our theory is that addiction lies within those
failure-modes. For example, recent work has suggested
the existence of fictive learning signals (e.g., regret) (Bell
1982; Lee 2008; Lohrenz et al. 2007). Chiu et al. (2008)
found that smokers’ brains reflected those fictive signals
correctly, but their behavior did not. This mismatch ident-
ifies a potential unidentified vulnerability whose mechan-
ism needs to be understood.
R3.1. A role for affect and Pavlovian conditioning
In addition to the “planning” ðS!a OÞ and “habit” ðS!a Þ
systems, the framework laid out in the target article ident-
ified a further condition (“observation”, S ! O), which
we identified as not entailing an action and thus as not
part of the decision-making system. As noted by
Ostlund & Balleine, this system is better described as a
Pavlovian association ([SO]), which can drive actions
through Pavlovian conditioning processes (½SO!a Þ. This
could be phrased as an “evolutionary pre-wired response”
to expected outcomes (Dayan et al. 2006). As noted by Bal-
leine (2001; 2004), this Pavlovian process proceeds
through an affect-based system in which the outcome
first produces an emotional affect, which then drives a
pre-wired response (approach or avoid, fight or flight).
The connection to affect suggests that this may be
similar to the direct affect-action component posited by
Kiviniemi & Bevins. Current computational models
that examine actions produced through this system are
limited (Balleine 2001; 2004; Dayan et al. 2006); neverthe-
less, several models have identified vulnerabilities in Pav-
lovian and Pavlovian-instrumental interactions that can
lead to incorrect behavior (Balleine & Ostlund 2007;
Breland & Breland 1961; Dayan et al. 2006).
R3.2. Dynamic motivational control
The issue of dynamic motivational control as raised by
Berridge et al. has important implications for how the
S!a O system evaluates the expectation of value from
the expectation of action. As noted by Berridge et al.,
cached-value or cached-action reinforcement learning
systems (our S!a system) cannot accommodate changes
in value. However, decision-making systems based on
expectancies of outcomes derived from searching
through models of the world (our S!a O system) can
theoretically change valuation on fast time-courses.
Current planning system models (e.g., Daw et al. 2005;
Niv 2006; Niv et al. 2006b; Redish & Johnson 2007),
and recent experimental results directly examining
search and expectancies (Johnson & Redish 2007;
Padoa-Schioppa & Assad 2006; Ramus et al. 2007; Schoen-
baum et al. 2006a), provide a first step towards this
because these models calculate value on the fly through
S!a E(O) ! E(V).
The extent to which value can actually be calculated on
the fly is an interesting, open question. As noted in the com-
mentary by Ostlund & Balleine, devaluation of outcome
in instrumental learning (A-O, S!a OÞ paradigms requires
experience with the outcome before the change in respond-
ing (Balleine 2001; 2004). In contrast, Pavlovian paradigms
can change immediately, without a prior interaction (Bal-
leine 2001; 2004). The experiments cited by Berridge
et al. fit well within this distinction. These experiments
imply an interaction between the homeostatic/allostatic
vulnerabilities and the other vulnerabilities. The dynamic
control of motivation will lie in that interaction (Niv et al.
2006b). But exactly how that dynamic control of motivation
happens, computationally, is still unknown. Theoretically,
the dynamic control of motivation is possible in both the
Pavlovian (½SO!a ) and Instrumental (S!a O) systems;
however, current models have not explored how those
expectations of value are calculated from the expectations
of outcome. An important question remains whether
dynamic controls of motivation are only influencing plan-
ning systems (as suggested by these models) or whether
they can also influence habit systems as well. Several com-
putational models of motivation in habit systems through
changes in latency to action (Niv 2006; 2007; Niv et al.
2006a; 2006b; 2007) have been proposed. Although these
models do not dynamically control goals (there is no expec-
tation of outcome in S!a ), changes in latency and reaction
time can change distributions across goals under specific
experiments (Niv 2006; Niv et al. 2006b).
In a similar analysis, Sarnecki, Traynor, & Clune
[Sarnecki et al.] suggest that dopamine can drive
increased attention, and that attention can drive motiva-
tional control. We note that the temporal difference
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algorithms imply a shift in dopamine to cues predicting
reward (Montague et al. 1996; Schultz 1998; Sutton &
Barto 1998) and drugs (Redish 2004). These shifts occur
in Pavlovian (½SO!a ), instrumental ðS!a OÞ, and habit
ðS!a Þ systems.
R3.3. New models of shifting systems
As noted earlier, new computational models based on
reinforcement learning concepts (Sutton & Barto 1998)
have addressed Pavlovian/affect systems (e.g., Dayan
et al. 2006); instrumental learning systems, based on
search through models of the world (e.g., Daw et al.
2005; Johnson & Redish 2007; Niv et al. 2006b; Redish
& Johnson 2007) or on added memory components (e.g.,
Zilli & Hasselmo 2008); and habit learning systems (e.g.,
Daw 2003; Doya 2000b; Montague et al. 1996; Redish
2004; Suri 2002). However, it is important to note that
these models do not directly address the question of
“What is a unified action?” as asked by Chambers (see
also Chambers et al. 2007). These questions can be
related to early computational models of decision-
making at human scales, such as the early models of
chunking (Graybiel 1998; Newell 1990).
R3.4. A new framework
Thus, we can re-describe our framework as consisting of
three components: Pavlovian (in which actions are evolu-
tionarily driven or “pre-wired” for a given outcome, even
when associated with other stimuli: ½SO!a ); instrumen-
tal (in which actions are decided upon through a delibera-
tive search through future possibilities and their
consequences: S!a O); and habit (cached-action or
cached-value systems, in which actions are associated
with specific situations, and continued without consider-
ation of the potential outcomes: S!a ). (See Table R1.)
Our theory posits that all three systems have potential
failure-modes which can drive addictive behaviors and
that interactions between failures in different systems
can drive addictive behavior. For example, Neal &
Wood note that habit failures can arise because of an
interaction between normal learning mechanisms and
faulty decision-making in the planning system.
R3.5. Faulty decision-making in normals
Several commentators (Andreou, Hart & Krauss,
Khalil, Lende,Neal &Wood) noted that the simple neu-
roeconomic hypothesis of maximizing expected utility that
we began our target article from has been known to be
incorrect for many years. We do not deny that even
normals show many non-simple (and non-rational)
decision-making processes. For simplicity, we started our
theorizing from the maximizing-value neuroeconomic
model. We believe that these more complex theories will
also have failure-modes.
We note, however, that our theory is, in fact, descriptive
and not normative. For example, search is, by definition,
incomplete, even in normals (see Vulnerability 5).
Nothing in our model guarantees transitivity. Thus, our
model does not actually fit the “rationality” definitions
identified by Khalil. However, as noted in the target
article, other errors exist as well (e.g., judgment errors
[Kahneman & Tversky 1979], framing errors [Windmann
et al. 2006], and memory errors [Schacter 2001]). Our
argument is that the better our understanding of the
decision-making machine, the better our understanding
of its potential failure-modes will be, which will lead to
better abilities to identify and treat addiction.
R4. A taxonomy of addiction
One of the major claims of our article is that addiction is a
spectrum disorder, consisting of many interacting subparts.
Hardcastle suggests that health-care providers already
view addiction as a multifaceted disorder. Certainly, the
subset methodology within theDSM-IV-TR (American Psy-
chiatric Association 2000) and ICD-10 (World Health
Organization 1992) would suggest this. However, this
view is not shared by all scientists or clinicians as can be
seen in the Ross and Le Moal commentaries.
In particular, Hardcastle takes us to task for neither
shortening the list nor being complete. If addiction is in
truth a spectrum disorder, it may not be possible to
shorten the list. Additionally, as noted by MacCoun,
which behaviors constitute addictions depend on sociological
definitions. Our hope is that by starting from failure-modes
of the decision-making machine, we will approach a more
parsimonious division of behavior which can improve the
ability of clinicians to guide patients to treatment.
R4.1. Is there really one (hidden) unifying principle?
Several commentators suggest that there is really only one
unifying principle. However, as noted in the target article,
this is belied by the limited success of treatments across
the general population (but strong success within sub-
populations), by the multifaceted nature of addiction,
and by the subset methodologies in the DSM-IV-TR
(American Psychiatric Association 2000) and ICD-10
(World Health Organization 1992).
Ross suggests that the underlying principle may arise
from timing errors within the dopamine system. However,
animals without dopamine will still self-administer drugs
(Rocha et al. 1998; Volkow et al. 2002), and timing theories
of reinforcement do not fit all of the animal-learning litera-
ture. The combination of differences between reinforce-
ment (delivery of unexpected reward) and disappointment
(non-delivery of expected reward; see Redish et al. 2007)
and timing errors in dopamine is likely to be an important
component of some addictions, particularly non-pharmaco-
logical addictions, such as gambling, video games, and Inter-
net addictions. However, this combination cannot explain all
addictions. It is unlikely to explain addictions with a high
predictability of reward-delivery (such as heroin or
cocaine). For many pharmacological substances, faster and
more reliable delivery methods lead to higher addictive liab-
ility (e.g., smoking nicotine vs. nicotine gum vs. the nicotine
patch [Henningfield & Keenan 1993], or crack vs. powder
cocaine [Balster 1973; 1988; Gold 1997]). Nevertheless,
Ross’s hypothesized interaction is likely an important vul-
nerability in decision-making systems.
Le Moal suggests that entities should not be multiplied
without necessity and accuses us of proposing “one more
theory.” However, as noted by Stalnaker & Schoenbaum,
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many single-process theories have been suggested, and do
not fit the data. We disagree with Le Moal’s conclusion
that all of the neurobiological theories of addiction agree
on the network involved in addiction. While the anatomy
itself is not in contention, many theorists disagree about
the underlying neurophysiology of addiction (for
example, compare the different description of the under-
lying neurophysiology of addiction in Everitt & Robbins
2005, in Kalivas et al. 2006, and in Koob & Le Moal
2006). Disagreements range through the importance of
the role of withdrawal (Koob & Le Moal 2006; Robinson
& Berridge 2003), the role of opioid signals (Laviolette
et al. 2004), and the role of dorsal striatum (Everitt &
Robbins 2005). Even within his commentary, Le Moal
notes both ventral striatum and prefrontal cortex as separ-
ate dysregulations. Although a strong claim of our theory is
that there are many dysregulations, it is certainly possible
(and likely!) that some processes are more essential than
others. Nevertheless, the fundamental claim of our
theory is that addiction is a spectrum disorder with mul-
tiple underlying etiologies.
R4.2. Can some of the vulnerabilities be merged
or combined?
Just as our framework of the decision-making machine is
only a first step, our taxonomy of addiction is also only a
first step. Several commentators suggested merging
some of the vulnerabilities. A final definition of what con-
stitutes a failure-mode, the extent of those failure-modes,
and the variability and interaction between them will
require more work from both the basic science and the
clinical sides.
Goudie et al. suggest merging Vulnerabilities 1 and 2
(the homeostatic and allostatic vulnerabilities). Although
both vulnerabilities reflect changes in internal definitions
of needs and targets, Koob and Le Moal (2006) make a
strong case for separating the concepts of homeostasis
and allostasis. Whether a single process can explain
(and treat) them or whether they need to be treated sep-
arately will depend on future work directly addressing
homeostasis and allostasis in the context of decision-
making systems. Goudie et al. also suggest that both Vul-
nerabilities 3 and 4 are examples of positive reinforcement
within the planning system. Yet Berridge and Robinson
(2003) have shown differences between hedonic reward
delivery and overvaluation, suggesting that they arise
from different pharmacological processes, which would
imply they will have different vulnerabilities to pharmaco-
logical manipulation. Similarly, Goudie et al. note that Vul-
nerabilities 4, 5, 7, and 10 are all examples of hyperlearning,
but hyperlearning in planning systems will be very different
from hyperlearning in habit systems. As an example of the
complexity within this taxonomy, Bickel & Yi suggest
merging Vulnerabilities 8 (Interactions between planning]
and habit) and 9 (Temporal discounting). These can be
seen as two kinds of impulsivity – an inability to inhibit a
prepotent response in a go/no-go task (8) and over-fast
temporal discounting (9). Yet, Goudie et al. and Lejuez &
Potenza note that there are multiple kinds of impulsivity
and cite data from Reynolds et al. (2006) that there is no
correlation between these two experiments. The real ques-
tion that needs to be addressed is whether the vulnerabil-
ities are clinically separable and clinically treatable as
separate processes.
Several commentators noted that these vulnerabilities
interact.Bickel & Yi note that sensitivity to price is affected
by the availability of substitutes, implying that discounting
can interact with homeostatic levels. Berridge et al.’s
concept of dynamicmotivational control implies a necessary
interaction between homeostasis/allostasis and planning
systems. Goudie et al. note that homeostasis and attention
to cues interact. And Neal & Wood note that the balance
between habit and planning is sensitive to normal processes
such as stress. Finally, Coventry asks what would large
errors in situation recognition (Vulnerability 6) do to
small errors in the other vulnerabilities, such as the learning
Vulnerabilities 3 to 7? These interactions are only just now
beginning to be studied at a computational level (e.g., Daw
et al. 2005; Dayan et al. 2006; Niv et al. 2006b; Redish et al.
2007).
R4.3. What about a role for other memory systems
in addiction?
Several commentators suggested addiction components not
included in the original decision-making taxonomy. In par-
ticular, four additional decision-making components were
suggested, including negative components (Le Moal,
Lende), affective (emotion) components (Kiviniemi &
Bevins, Le Moal), Pavlovian components (Ostlund &
Balleine), and semantic and working memory components
(Wiers et al.).
R4.3.1. Negative components. One of the largest gaps in
the theory laid out in our target article is the lack of an explicit
role for negative components in the decision-making model.
We acknowledge the importance of negative components in
decision-making but note a gap in the current computational
modeling of decision-making literature. Negative effects
(punishments, aversive signals) are treated as negative
rewards, and non-delivery of punishments (relief) is treated
as positive rewards. Similarly, the non-delivery of positive
rewards (disappointment) is treated as negative rewards.
Extinction studies demonstrate that aversion is a very
Table R1. Three components of the decision-making machine
System Description Learning Theory Reinforcement Learning Expectation
Affect ½SO!a Pavlovian S-S Prewired actions E(O) ! A
Planning S!a O Instrumental A-O Model-based RL E(O) ! E(V)
Habit S!a Habit S-R Cache-based RL E(V)
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different process computationally from non-delivery of
expected reward (Redish et al. 2007).
Even if one follows the concept of aversion and
reinforcement as parallel processes (with relief and disap-
pointment as the non-delivery of expected punishments
and rewards) (Daw et al. 2002; Redish et al. 2007),
decision-making in the face of aversion is still not parallel
(computationally) to reinforcement. With reinforcement,
one thing draws an agent to it, other choices can be
ignored (except in that they may provide potentially
better choices). From a satisficing perspective (Simon
1955), after observing a reward, one has information
about a minimally successful choice. The potential for
improvement must be balanced with the cost of explora-
tion (Stephens & Krebs 1987; Sutton & Barto 1998). In
contrast, after a punishment, one only has information
about what not to do. The question of what action
should be taken still remains unanswered. This has led
to a gap in the decision-making literature. We believe
that this is an important missing component of the compu-
tational literature and that a computational model filling
this gap will provide additional vulnerabilities, which will
provide important components to our understanding of
addiction.
R4.3.2. Emotion and affect – Pavlovian components. Both
LeMoal and Kiviniemi & Bevins argue for an important
component of affect in the vulnerabilities of addiction. Le
Moal seems to attribute all addiction to errors of affect.
But this belies the presence of robotic users (Sayette
et al. 2000; Tiffany 1990). It also belies addicts’ own
descriptions, which differentiate “craving” and “withdra-
wal” (Robinson & Berridge 2003). We would suggest
that affect must have a computational effect on the
decision-making process, perhaps through an interaction
between homeostatic and allostatic needs and the other
vulnerabilities (Bickel & Yi, Berridge et al., Goudie
et al.). Perhaps, emotion and affect are means by which
expectancies are evaluated (E(O) ! E(V), which would
influence Vulnerability 4), or perhaps emotion and affect
change the set of actions considered at any time (which
would influence Vulnerability 5). Kiviniemi & Bevins
suggest the presence of a third action system:
affect    !a . We suspect that this may be related to the
difference between Pavlovian and instrumental condition-
ing (Ostlund & Balleine; see also Dayan & Balleine 2002
and Dayan et al. 2006), and to the dynamic control of
motivation (Berridge et al.). As discussed earlier, one
can fold in a model of Pavlovian action selection based
on affective implications of expected outcomes
(½SO!a ). The relation of these issues with homeostatic
and allostatic changes has only just begun to be studied
computationally (Dayan et al. 2006; Niv et al. 2006b).
The implications for addiction are well worth additional
study.
R4.3.3. Semantic memory, working memory, episodic
memory, and so on. Psychological theories of memory
include many components beyond the simple “situation-
recognition” component discussed in the target article.
Recent computational models (e.g., Daw et al. 2005; Zilli
& Hasselmo 2008) have begun to explore how working
and episodic memory can enable the mechanisms under-
lying search and planning systems (S!a O).
Our theory suggests that these memory systems will
interact with the decision-making machinery to provide
additional vulnerabilities. Taking the example cited by
Wiers et al., subjects with poor working memory capacity
are more likely to use automatic associations in drug use.
In our interpretation, this would be due to a stronger auto-
matic ðS!a Þ system. In contrast, Wiers et al. also note that
subjects with high working memory capacity are more sen-
sitive to explicit expectancies. Given the likely relationship
between working memory, expectancies, and the planning
ðS!a OÞ system (Redish & Johnson 2007; Zilli & Hasselmo
2008; see discussion in target article), users with strong
working memory are more likely to fall victim to vulner-
abilities in the planning system, whereas users with poor
working memory are more likely to fall victim to vulnerabil-
ities in the habit system. This is exactly the major point of
our theory: it should be possible to subdivide addictive
populations based on neuropsychological tests (strength of
working memory) and see differences in the mechanisms
underlying their addictions (dependence on expectancies).
We predict that these two groups will require different
treatment regimens in order to break their addictions.
R5. Predictions and falsifiability
Stalnaker & Schoenbaum ask, How can this theory be
tested? What falsifies it? Obviously, if a single, underlying
cause of addiction is found (such as suggested by Ainslie,
Le Moal, or Ross) or if all addicts pass through a single
sequence (as suggested by Le Moal), then our multiple-vul-
nerabilities theory would be wrong. However, such a clear
alternative is unlikely to be found. Instead, we need to ident-
ify specific predictions and consequences of our theory.
The key prediction of our theory is that addiction should
consist of multiple dissociable, but potentially overlapping,
syndromes. This implies that there should be multiple sub-
groups within addiction, and that each subgroup will need
different treatment regimens. We suggest, furthermore,
that these subgroups can be best defined by vulnerabilities
or failure-modes of decision-making systems. While the
specific taxonomy proposed in the target article is certainly
incomplete, it can provide a direction with which to
proceed in our understanding of addiction. In a sense, as
noted by Ahmed, our theory suggests theories of
decision-making provide a “space” within which addiction
can reside. Each individual will have a different parameter
subspace based on that individual’s decision-making
machinery, which will change the individual’s suscepti-
bility to potential addictions. As noted by Ahmed, this
implies that there should be species, age, and develop-
mental differences in addictions. We would note also
that there should be genetic and experiential (sociological)
differences as well.
Different species of animals have different cognitive and
decision-making abilities. Although the ability of nonhuman
animals to encode non-local information, to create expec-
tancies of their future, and to plan based on those expectan-
cies is still controversial (Buckner & Carroll 2007; Johnson
& Redish 2007; Johnson et al. 2007; Roberts et al. 2008;
Suddendorf & Busby 2003), it is clear that different
species have different abilities. In particular, it is clear
that different species will show different abilities within
planning and habit systems and different balances
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between these systems, as well as different interactions
between them. This means that the availability and likeli-
hood of the available vulnerabilities will differ between
species. This also means that a cross-species comparison
of behavioral liability to addiction subtypes may be a fruitful
avenue for future addiction research.
Ahmed notes that a similar distinction can be made
across development. Adolescents and adults have very
different addiction liabilities (Casey et al. 2008; Chambers
et al. 2003; Kelley et al. 2004; Chambers’ commentary).
These changed behavioral and psychological decision-
systems should change the addiction space and provide
different vulnerabilities.
Similar arguments can be made as to genetic and struc-
tural differences. Each individual’s addiction subspace is
going to be strongly influenced by its genetic variability.
For example, Frank et al. (2007) have shown a triple dis-
sociation with learning rates and three different dopa-
mine-related polymorphisms. Our theory predicts that
these effects on learning and decision-making should
imply different susceptibilities to different addiction vulner-
abilities identified in the target article, the commentaries,
and this response.
Chambers suggests that mental illnesses known to
change both brain function and decision-making systems
could provide insights into these differences. These
changed decision-making systems should, again, have
different liabilities. This may explain the comorbidity
seen between addiction and many mental illnesses.
This suggests a fascinating experimental paradigm in
which lesions known to affect decision-making systems
(e.g., hippocampus [HC], prefrontal cortex [PFC], differ-
ent components of striatum) can be predicted to shift
the addiction space and thus the availability and likelihood
of vulnerabilities and the liability of different aspects of the
addiction syndrome.
An additional falsifiable aspect of our theory is that each
of the identified vulnerabilities entails a set of predictions.
For example, the opiate theory of Redish and Johnson
(2007) predicts that dopamine will not be released from
well-predicted opiate delivery (by analogy to food-
reward; Schultz 1998).1 If this prediction was found to
be wrong, then the opiate explanation for Vulnerability 3
(mimicking reward) would be wrong. However, such a
result would not demolish the entire theory. Vulnerability
7, as laid out in Redish (2004), is dependent on the validity
of the temporal difference reinforcement learning theory
(TDRL) explanation of dopamine signaling (Montague
et al. 1995; 1996; Schultz 1998). If the TDRL explanation
for dopamine signaling is wrong (Berridge 2007), then
Vulnerability 7 is wrong. But again, such a result would
not demolish the multiple-vulnerabilities theory itself.
R5.1. A framework within which to search for
other vulnerabilities
Scientific theories have many purposes beyond providing
predictions to disprove. They also provide a framework
within which to place and understand questions and
answers (Ben-Ari 2005; Mayr 1998). Our theory provides
just such a framework for addiction. It says that addiction
arises as failure-modes of decision-making. Our theory
thus suggests a path for future work to (1) elucidate the
decision-making system, and (2) look for failures within it.
A recent very exciting example is that of Chiu et al.
(2008) who found that smokers’ brains reflect fictive learn-
ing signals, but do not respond to them. Chiu et al.’s work
implies the presence of an as-yet-unspecified vulnerability
in this disconnect that can be looked for and identified.
R6. Additional vulnerabilities
In the target article, we argue that there are vulnerabilities
in the decision-making machinery of humans and animals,
and we identified ten potential vulnerabilities. As explicitly
noted in the target article, that list is not complete. Several
of the commentators suggested additional vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability 11: Errors in expectations
Boden notes that in addition to errors in valuation, the
planning system can also include errors in the actual
outcome expectations. In a sense, these are errors in the cal-
culation of the outcome to expect in the S    !a O relation-
ship. In the computational language of model-based
reinforcement learning paradigms (Daw et al. 2005; Niv
et al. 2006b), it entails errors in the calculation of the prob-
ability distribution P(s0js, a). It would have effects similar to
Vulnerabilities 3 (Mimicking reward), 4 (Overvaluation in
planning systems), and 5 (Errors in the search process).
In particular, social expectations (Goudie et al., Griffiths,
Hardcastle, Hart & Krauss, Kiviniemi & Bevins,
Lende) can change expected outcomes and thus lead to
incorrect expectations. Examples include alcohol expect-
ancy theory (Goldman et al. 1987; 1999) in which expec-
tations of consequences of drinking lead to increased or
decreased drinking, particularly under conditions in which
the planning (expectancy) system is more active (Wiers
et al.). A similar issue can be identified in misapplication
of probability of outcome and misunderstandings of stat-
istics (Ainslie, Goudie et al., Ross).
Vulnerability 12: Errors in construction of past memory
As noted by Neal & Wood, errors in construction of
past memory of success can change the expectation and
evaluation of future consequences (Gilovich et al. 2002;
Kahneman & Frederick 2002; Schacter 2001).
Vulnerability 13: Timing errors
Differences between reinforcement and disappointment
(Redish et al. 2007) mean that multiple samples of unpre-
dictable reinforcement scattered among unpredictable
lack of delivery of expected reward will lead to excess
reinforcement. As noted by Ross, either timing errors
(Daw 2003) or unpredictable timing (such as seen in
video games, gambling, and Internet packet delivery)
can lead to an inability for predicted d signals to cancel
out appropriately.
Vulnerability 14: Pavlovian and affective errors
As discussed earlier, our two-system theory (S!a O vs.
S!a ) is incomplete and needs to incorporate a Pavlovian
(½SO!a Þ component based on evolutionary precompiled
actions taken in response to affective responses to
situation-outcome associations (Kiviniemi & Bevins,
Ostlund & Balleine). This system and its interaction with
the other systems will provide additional vulnerabilities
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that will need to be incorporated into the theory
(Balleine 2001; 2004; Breland & Breland 1961; Dayan
et al. 2006).
Sarnecki et al. expand on one aspect of Vulnerability
10 (Learning rate modulators), which they call “cue fasci-
nation.” The concept is that cues become goals or targets
in their own right (Ainslie). It should be noted that this
is a key concept within many learning theories, including
both Pavlovian conditioning (Dickinson 1980; Mackintosh
1974) and temporal difference reinforcement learning
theory (Montague et al. 1996; Redish 2004; Sutton &
Barto 1998). Goudie et al. suggest that attentional
biases interact with craving, so that craving can cause
and be caused by excess attention to cues. The underlying
etiology of craving is an open question that will require
additional experiments in the context of decision-making
(Niv et al. 2006b; Redish & Johnson 2007).
Vulnerability 15: Interactions with standard behavioral
learning mechanisms
Continued use of drugs through one vulnerability can lead
to learning through normal behavioral learning mechan-
isms, even if there is nothing explicitly failing about the
other mechanisms. For example, Neal & Wood note
that habits are generally hard to break – inhibition of a
well-trained response is difficult and requires effort
(Dickinson 1980; Gray & McNaughton 2000; Husain
et al. 2003; Isoda & Hikosaka 2007; Iversen & Mishkin
1970; Sakagami et al. 2006). This means that continued
drug use due to a planning vulnerability (e.g., Vulner-
ability 3: Mimicking reward, or Vulnerability 4: Overva-
luation in the planning system) can lead to development
of a habit through normal mechanisms. Intransitive pre-
ferences (Ainslie 1992; 2001; Rachlin 2004), normal pro-
crastination effects (Andreou 2005; O’Donoghue &
Rabin 1999a), and switching costs of decision making
(Wood & Neal 2007), can lead to continued use once
started (perhaps because of one vulnerability, e.g., Vulner-
ability 1: Homeostatic effects) despite a lack of additional
failures of the decision-making system (Andreou, Neal
& Wood).
Vulnerability 16: Implications of social issues
Some commentators (Boden, Griffiths, Lende) suggested
components occurring at other than neurophysiological
levels, for example, those arising from social issues. These
commentators asked about the implication of levels of analy-
sis, particularly raising social and ethnographic reasons for
drug taking, seeking, and continued use. Our claim that
addiction arises from errors in decision-making would
imply that these social interactions would be reducible
(perhaps through a complex mechanism) to changes in
expectations, valuations, and action-selection.
Taking the example by Lende that some people use
amphetamine to increase skills,2 our argument is that
this increased skill use is an expectation of the future
(P(s0js, a)). Ignoring the potential downside of continued
use can be seen as incorrectly calculating the expectation
of the future (an error in P(s0js, a), see above) or incor-
rectly evaluating that expectation (Vulnerability 4). The
examples given by Hart & Krauss and Griffiths relating
peer behavior and other psychosocial factors imply
changes in expectations and evaluations. Boden explicitly
suggests this, noting that social interaction can drive over-
valuation (peer pressure, Vulnerability 4), that social
context can stimulate memory retrieval and can increase
recall (changing search parameters, Vulnerability 5), and
that over-generalization (Vulnerability 6) can lead to a
lack of appreciation of the dangers of moving from low-
risk (gateway) drugs to high-risk drugs.
R7. Treatment and assessment
We end our response with a discussion of the implications
of our theory for the clinical and policy realms.
From a clinical perspective, the main implication of our
theory is that because each addict’s problem will be due to
a spectrum of vulnerabilities/failure-modes, each addict
will require a treatment regimen guided towards those vul-
nerabilities. These implications can be contrasted with
molecular theories (Yin; e.g., Nestler 2005) and other the-
ories of unified causes for addiction (e.g., LeMoal), which
would imply that there would exist a single magic bullet
treatment for all addicts. Our theory suggests that such a
magic bullet does not exist.
Several commentators have brought up the question of
how the individualized treatment regimen suggested by
our theory would work in practice (Goudie et al., Hard-
castle). Hardcastle notes that many clinicians already indi-
vidualize treatment. This is certainly true in practice, and
we review several examples further on. However, we
suggest that because the effects of these treatments on
decision-making systems are not known, it has been diffi-
cult to steer addicts to appropriate treatments, or to deter-
mine how treatments might interact to provide a potential
individualized treatment regimen. A similar discussion can
be made as to policy, including the effect of taxes, criminal
punishments, education, and interdiction (MacCoun).
There are many treatments currently being used for addic-
tion, including providing alternative rewards and vouchers
(Higgins et al. 2002, 2004), behavioral (Carroll et al. 2004),
and social treatments (e.g., 12-step programs), as well as
various pharmacological treatments (Grant et al. 2006;
Hyman 2005; Meyer & Mirin 1979; O’Brien et al. 1996).
In general, treatments work very well for subpopulations.
Subpopulations within addicted groups have been found
in alcoholism (Addolorato et al. 2005; Crabbe 2002; Nurn-
berger & Bierut 2007; Stalnaker & Schoenbaum,Wiers
et al.), in nicotine addiction (Irvin & Brandon 2000; Irvin
et al. 2003), and in gambling (Grant et al. 2006; Sharpe
2002; Coventry, Lejuez & Potenza, Griffiths).
Lejuez & Potenza note that there is more to treatment
than correcting errors. This is an important insight and
may lead to alternative methods that could enable
addicts to behaviorally prevent relapse even without
directly eliminating the active vulnerability. For example,
there may be treatments that can change the balance
between planning and habit systems as a means of
decreasing the influence of one or the other (Bickel &
Yi). Treatments will presumably move patients to new por-
tions of the addiction-space. An important question then
is: What are the trajectories of patients within treatment?
Different treatments will move different subpopulations in
different ways. It is even possible that some treatments will
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shift different subpopulations toward other, previously
unrealized vulnerabilities.
We suggest that two important next steps in addiction
research are:
1. To develop clinical tests that could differentiate sub-
populations. For example, the differences in working
memory noted by Wiers et al. could be used to steer
different subpopulations of alcoholics to different treat-
ments. As another example, the identification of subjective
craving in gamblers allowed Grant et al. (2006) to find sig-
nificant success with Nalmefene in treating problem gam-
bling. Our hope is that our theory provides a framework
within which such clinical tests can be situated.
2. To identify the effects of known (or novel) treatments
on the decision-making system, particularly on vulnerabil-
ities within the decision-making system. For example,
Hart & Krauss note the remarkable success of providing
small alternate rewards (such as $5 vouchers) for absti-
nence. Raising drug prices by $5 would not lead to a
similar success. So what is it about actually being forced
to make a decision with an explicit alternate choice that
helps some addicts maintain abstinence? Our hope is
that our theory provides a framework within which to
explain those treatments.
R8. Policy, framing, philosophical space
As noted by some commentators (Griffiths; MacCoun),
the key question for addiction is that of framing and
policy. Approximately a decade ago, addiction was
reframed by Leshner (1997) and others (e.g., O’Brien &
McLellan 1996; O’Brien et al. 2006) as a chronically relap-
sing, remitting disorder or disease. In doing so, these
scientists moved addicts from sinners to be reviled to
patients to be treated. Unfortunately, as also noted by
MacCoun, the neuroscience complicates rather than sim-
plifies the drug policy analysis.
But we believe the first question is actually: What is
addiction? Like many definitions of addiction, we started
from a definition of addiction as maladaptive decisions,
but this is, of course, insufficient. There are many cases
in which we celebrate choices made despite negative con-
sequences. For example, we celebrate Martin Luther King
going to jail for his beliefs. Or perhaps, even more specifi-
cally, we celebrate the middle-class whites who left their
homes and comfort to march with Dr. King. It would be
ludicrous to say that they were addicted to marching for
civil rights for others. As another example, Osip Mandel-
stam continued to write poetry after he was thrown in
the Soviet gulag. Do we really want to say that he was
addicted to poetry?
In order to step away from this controversy, the DSM-
IV-TR and ICD-10 do not use the word “addiction” and
instead refer to “dependence.” This leads to a difficulty
in defining non-pharmacological behaviors as addictive
(e.g., gambling, shopping, sex, or Internet addictions)
(Holden 2001; Potenza 2006; Potenza et al. 2001;
Griffiths). Even in the context of pharmacological addic-
tions, current clinicians have begun arguing for a return
to the term “addiction” (O’Brien et al. 2006, Hart &
Krauss).
As noted by Griffiths, addiction is a contextual and
socially constructed term. It is dependent on the policy
implications of the behavior and on the social disapproval
of said behavior. But again, there are behaviors that are
maladaptive, socially disapproved of, but not addictive.
One thing that is clear from the commentaries is that
few people seem to agree on the core features of addiction.
This is part of what makes addiction such a difficult and
controversial issue. We believe that our vulnerabilities
view may be able to unify some of the debate by asking
how animals (including humans) make decisions and start-
ing to examine the definition of addiction as failures in
those decision-making systems.
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NOTES
1. As noted in the target article, this prediction is still unre-
solved because several labs have found conflicting results
(Caille´ & Parsons 2003; Hemby et al. 1995; Kiyatkin & Rebec
1997; 2001; Xi et al. 1998; Wise et al. 1995).
2. Caffeine use may be a better example of this, because it is also
often used to increase skills but has fewer side effects (Daly &
Fredholm 1998; Greden & Walters 1997; see Appendix E in the
target article).
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